Fleet dynamics in a changing policy environment by Batsleer, J.
FLEET DYNAMICS 
IN A CHANGING 
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
J. BATSLEER
FLEET DYNAM
ICS IN A CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONM
ENT
J. BATSLEER

J. Batsleer
FLEET DYNAMICS IN A CHANGING 
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
THESIS COMMITTEE
PROMOTOR
Prof. Dr A.D. Rijnsdorp 
Professor for Sustainable Fisheries Management 
Wageningen University
CO-PROMOTOR
Dr J.J. Poos 
Senior scientist, Wageningen Marine Research
OTHER MEMBERS
Prof. Dr C. Ulrich, Technical University of Denmark 
Dr Polet, Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research (ILVO), Vlaanderen, Belgium 
Dr R.A. Groeneveld, Wageningen University
Prof Dr A.J. Murk, Wageningen University
This research was conducted under the auspices of the Graduate Wageningen institute of Animal 
Sciences
Fleet dynamics in a changing policy 
environment
J. BATSLEER
Thesis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor
at Wageningen University
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus, 
Prof. Dr A.P.J. Mol,
in the presence of the
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board
to be defended in public
on Wednesday 23 November 2016 
at 11 a.m. in the Aula
Jurgen Batsleer
Fleet dynamics in a changing policy environment,
172 pages.
PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2016)
With references, with summary in English and Dutch
ISBN 978-94-6257-952-1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/391925
Dit proefschrift is opgedragen aan mijn ouders en gezin.
“Waar je ook bent
Ik zou het niet weten
Niet in afstand of tijd te meten
Maar ik heb je bij me
Diep in mij
Daarom ben je zo dichtbij” 
Toon Hermans

CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 9
CHAPTER 2
Mixed fisheries management: Protecting the weakest link _________________________ 27
CHAPTER 3
High-grading and over-quota discarding in mixed fisheries ________________________ 53
CHAPTER 4
Mixed fisheries management: Is the ban on discarding likely to promote more 
selective and fuel efficient fishing in the Dutch flatfish fishery? _____________________ 83
CHAPTER 5
Exploring habitat credits to manage the benthic impact in a mixed fishery  __________ 107
CHAPTER 6
General discussion ________________________________________________________ 131
ADDENDUM
Summary _______________________________________________________________ 156
Samenvatting ____________________________________________________________ 158
Curriculum Vitae __________________________________________________________ 161
List of Abbreviations ______________________________________________________ 162
Dankwoord ______________________________________________________________ 166
Training and Supervision Plan _______________________________________________ 171

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1Chapter 1
10
1BACKGROUND
Human fish consumption has been surging in the past five decades. This increased demand 
for fish is reflected in the global annual catches of marine fish. Global marine catches in-
creased from 20 to 60 million tonnes between the early 1950s and 1970s but stabilized 
around 80 million tonnes per year since the 1990s (FAO, 2014). In Europe however, annual 
catches have been declining in the past decade, while the economic performance of the EU 
fishing fleet shows a positive trend (STECF, 2014). This improved economic situation of the 
EU fishing fleet can be partially attributed to positive effects of the European fisheries poli-
cy (for instance stock recovery and capacity reduction) as well as innovation towards more 
selective and fuel efficient fishing techniques and favourable market conditions (e.g. higher 
average first-sale prices). 
European fisheries policy originates from the Treaty of Rome (1957) where fisheries 
were regarded as an agricultural product, forming part of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). This policy focused primarily on the social and economic interests of the fishing in-
dustry. In the 1970s the European Community expanded with the accession of big fishing 
nations such as Denmark, Ireland and the UK (Symes, 1997). Enlargement of the European 
Community entailed the development of an individual policy for fisheries, establishing a 
common organisation of the market for fish and fish products, and adopting a Community 
structural policy regulating access and conservation to common resources (Holden, 1994). 
In 1983 the European Community formally established the European Common Fisher-
ies Policy (CFP). The policy adopted a more conservation oriented approach, directed on the 
sustainable exploitation of fish stocks while ensuring an economic viable European fishing 
fleet providing employment and opportunities for coastal communities (Holden, 1994). To 
evaluate policy objectives the CFP would be revised every 10 years. Hence, during the first 
two terms of the CFP (i.e. 1983 and 1992) a set of measures, including annual total allowable 
catches (TAC), multi-annual guidance programs (MAGPS) (i.e. to find a balance between the 
fleets fishing capacity and the available fishing opportunities) and technical measures (for 
instance area or mesh size restrictions) were introduced for the conservation and manage-
ment of fish stocks (Daan, 1997). Especially implementation of the TAC-system, providing 
access to the resources, had a big impact on fisheries as shared resources had to be divided 
among EU Member States (national quota). To prevent arguments between Member States 
over how national quota should be allocated, quota were based on a historical proportion 
of the catches and special provisions for communities depending on fishing, i.e. relative sta-
bility (Holden, 1994). 
At the turn of the 21th century it became clear the CFP regulations had not met expec-
tations. Many stocks were being exploited at unsustainable levels and fishing fleets still had 
an overcapacity, producing a negative economic effect in the fishing industry (Daan, 1997, 
Frost and Andersen, 2006). This failure was attributed to the lack of long-term strategies, the 
political decision process, low enforcement and non-compliance with management meas-
ures (Arts and Tatenhove, 2004, Daw and Gray, 2005). This critical situation required a major 
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1reform of the CFP in 2002 which introduced four fundamental changes: (1) multi-annual 
recovery and management plans, (2) the opportunity to restrain fishing pressure by limit-
ing the days-at-sea, (3) creation of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) giving stakehold-
ers (i.e. fishing industry and environmental groups) a greater say in the decisions making 
process and (4) a progressive implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
(Symes, 2005). 
When the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries was introduced in the CFP reform in 
2002, it was unclear how it could be made operational. There was a clear gap between theo-
ry (i.e. knowledge) and practice (i.e. management plans) (Arkema et al., 2006). Parallel to the 
changing CFP a myriad of secondary legislations, including the Habitat Directive (HD, 92/43/
EEC) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD, 2008/56/EC) have been adopted. 
These directives are oriented towards nature conservation and comprise of a framework to 
manage human impact on vulnerable habitats and sensitive species, biodiversity and the in-
tegrity of marine ecosystems. While the HD and MSFD adopted ecosystem-based consider-
ations, the CFP failed to integrate the wider ecosystem effects of fishing into policy making 
such as reducing pressure on non-target species and habitats.
The latest CFP reform was adopted in December 2013 and came into force in January 
2014. This reform adopted an ecosystem-based approach and includes ambitious measures 
to achieve long term environmental, economic and social sustainable fisheries. These meas-
ures include restoring and maintaining all fish stock to sustainable levels by 2020, phasing 
out discarding (i.e. throwing back unwanted catches at sea) by introducing a discard ban, 
and implementing multi-annual fisheries plans which includes establishing marine protect-
ed areas. In addition, the CFP will need to be harmonised with the objectives of environmen-
tal legislation such as the MSFD. 
Recognizing European fisheries policy went through some profound changes in the 
past decades, it is vital to explore how policy decisions may influence the dynamics of the 
fleet (Hilborn, 1985). The dynamics of a fleet is a result of individual skippers making choices 
on when and where to fish, while competing for similar resources. An individual’s choice 
will predominantly depend on the spatio-temporal distribution of the resources, the costs 
exploiting different fishing grounds, market value of the resources, and constraints imposed 
by management (Gillis et al., 1995a, Rijnsdorp et al., 2008, Poos et al., 2010). All too often, pol-
icy makers assume management decisions will deliver the obvious results (Walters, 2007), 
ignoring the potential influence of fleet responses to uncertainty associated with manage-
ment. This thesis will study how location choice and discard decisions made by individual 
fishers in a mixed fishery are influenced by management, (uncertainty in) resource distribu-
tion and technological innovations. This knowledge will provide a basis for predicting the 
response of the fleet to management measures attempted to reduce the ecosystem impact 
of fisheries and improve the sustainable use of marine ecosystems.
Chapter 1
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1DISCARDS IN MIXED FISHERIES
A target species is a species which is intentionally caught by a fishery. Most gears, however, 
are not able to retain one specific target species in the net, but catch multiple target species 
simultaneously (mixed fisheries). The targeted species often have a similar body morphol-
ogy and spatial and seasonal (at least for a certain period during the year) distribution. An 
example is the Dutch flatfish fishery targeting plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and sole (Solea 
solea), where the distribution of sole overlaps the distribution of plaice in winter (de Veen, 
1976, de Veen, 1978). 
The choice of gear with its specific selectivity properties (e.g. mesh size) will determine 
the characteristics of the catch. Inevitably, the catch will be diverse in terms of species, age 
and size categories. Species having no or little commercial value as well as commercial spe-
cies constrained from landing are not of primary interest to the fishery and are referred to 
as by-catch. Subsequently, restrictive management regulations and economic motives urge 
fishers to return the by-catch to sea (Alverson et al., 1994, Jennings et al., 2001, Catchpole et 
al., 2005).
Management measure can directly effect discarding decisions in a mixed fishery. 
Minimum landing size (MLS) regulations have been introduced, prohibiting landing species 
below a fixed reference size. The regulation had the intention of encouraging fishers to fish 
more selective reducing the catch of juvenile fish by for example increasing mesh sizes. In 
mixed fisheries however, discarding occurs because of a mismatch between MLSs of the dif-
ferent target species and the selectivity of the gear for those species (Cook, 2003, Catchpole 
et al., 2005). For example in the Dutch flatfish fishery the MLSs for sole and plaice are 24cm 
and 27cm, respectively. The selectivity of the gear is tailored by using smaller mesh sizes 
to retain the more valuable sole. As a result, substantial numbers of undersized plaice are 
caught and discarded compulsory (Van Beek et al., 1983, Rijnsdorp and Millner, 1996). 
Each year the European Commission requests scientific advise on the total allowable 
catch (TAC), being the amount of fish that can be caught for most commercial fish stocks 
in European waters. The size of the annual TAC for each individual stock is decided by the 
Council of Ministers. Each Member State may decide how the national quotas are shared 
among the fishing industry. In the Netherlands, national quota for plaice and sole are di-
vided in individual transferable quotas (ITQs) owned by individual fishing companies (Salz, 
1996). ITQs enable fishing companies to trade (i.e. selling, leasing of buying) quota, depend-
ing on how fishing activities are developing throughout the year. 
TACs intend to control fishing mortality by limiting the amount of fish that can be 
harvested from a single stock. Basically, TACs assume fishers will align their fishing activi-
ties with the imposed catch limitations, and fishers will stop catching a given species when 
the quota is fully exploited (Holden, 1994, Daan, 1997, Branch and Hilborn, 2008, Ulrich et 
al., 2011). In mixed fisheries, however, fishers have different quota for each target species 
and will continue their fishing activities until all unused quota are exhausted. In this process 
marketable fish for which quota have already been fully exploited will be discarded (Pascoe, 
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11997, Poos et al., 2010). Hence, the effectiveness of single-species TACs to control fishing 
mortality in mixed fisheries has been criticised because TACs limit the landings but not the 
catch of a fishery, resulting in excessive discarding of marketable fish (Daan, 1997, Rijnsdorp 
et al., 2007). 
Commercial fishing is driven by economic considerations, whereby the commercial 
market plays a crucial role in determining the price for fish. Generally, the price for fish is 
quality related and size-dependent, with a lower market value for damaged and small in-
dividuals (Zimmermann et al., 2011). Hence, it is in the interest of the fisher to optimize the 
catch retained on board with market demands. Consequentially, fishers deter from holding 
and landing non market or low-valued fish especially when the costs of the process (i.e. 
sorting, storage and landing) of keeping the fish on board exceeds the financial gains from 
selling the fish. Economic motives can also induce discarding of lower valued marketable 
fish in order to make room for more higher valued (larger) fish while quota are still available 
(high-grading) (Gillis et al., 1995b). Empirical evidence for high-grading is scarce as fishers 
do not report these discards, however studies have shown high-grading is a mainly a result 
of the interplay between economic motivations and management constraints (Pikitch et al., 
1988, Gillis et al., 1995b). Constraining quota for conservation benefits could be counter-
acted by increased high-grading as fishers will try to maximize the value of their catch by 
discarding lower valued marketable fish. High-grading is perceived as a wasteful practice 
and the EU has declared high-grading an illegal practice in 2009 (Council Regulation (EC) 
43/2009 (EC., 2009a)). 
There is a general concern about the extent of discarding in mixed fisheries. For exam-
ple, mixed demersal fisheries on flatfish, round fish and Nephrops contribute substantially to 
an estimated 1 million tonnes of annually discarded organisms in the North Sea (Catchpole 
et al., 2005). In Europe, Member States are required to provide estimates on the amount of 
discarding of their most important commercial fisheries through the Data Collection Frame-
work (DCF, Council Regulation (EC) No 1543/2000 (EC., 2000)), which is used to feed and 
improve stock assessments. The availability and quality of discard data, however, is still low 
as Member States use different data formats, sampling protocols and intensities, and do not 
share information (Uhlmann et al., 2014). Hence, imprecise estimates of actual numbers may 
lead to incorrect assessments of the stock and thus hamper the confidence of management 
advice (Crowder and Murawski, 1998, Dickey-Collas et al., 2007). In addition, discards can be 
subject to high mortality rates (Van Beek et al., 1990). Mortality rates will vary between spe-
cies and depends on many factors including the type of fishery, haul duration, sorting and 
handling process on board, depth of the catch but also location (i.e. type of substrate) and 
season of the fishing activity (Van Beek et al., 1990, Berghahn et al., 1992, Evans et al., 1994, 
Sangster et al., 1996, Smith and Scharf, 2011, Enever et al., 2009, Marçalo et al., 2013). In this 
context, the substantial amounts of discarding of small and juvenile fish is a major concern 
for the sustainability of population and the future yield of fisheries. In addition, high mor-
tality rates instigate the debate concerning the loss of valuable resources due to discarding 
of marketable fish. 
Chapter 1
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1Discard reduction has become a key element in fisheries management. In the latest 
reform of the CFP (2013) the EU accepted the implementation of a discard ban in 2015 for 
European fisheries. The discard ban will be introduced in phases and will prohibit discarding 
of all species subject to catch limits in 2019. The ban primarily aims at reducing discards by 
incentivising fisheries to become more selective, avoiding non-target species, juvenile and 
over-quota catches. Improving selectivity to reduce the by-catch can be achieved by tech-
nological innovations. Technological innovations can range from net-innovations such as 
Figure 1.1 
The flatfish beam trawl (top) (source: Jennings et al.(2001)) 
and flatfish pulse trawl (bottom) (source: ABPmer and Icht-
hys Marine (2015))
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1increased mesh sizes or separation panels (van Marlen, 2003, Nikolic et al., 2015), to a switch 
of fishing gear used. The latter has been observed in for example the Alaskan groundfish 
fishery where a switch to just using a pelagic trawl has been observed (Graham et al., 2007); 
and in the Dutch flatfish fishery with a transition from using a beam trawl to a pulse trawl 
(figure. 1.1) (van Marlen et al., 2014). Alternatively, fishers can decide to adapt their fishing 
strategies resulting in a more selective fishery (Eliasen et al., 2014). Studies have shown fish-
ers can respond to management constraints by changing their discarding decisions, choices 
on where, when and what to fish (effort allocation) and tow duration (Gillis et al., 1995b, Bab-
cock and Pikitch, 2000, Branch and Hilborn, 2008, Poos et al., 2010). Few studies, however, 
have explored the response as well as environmental and socioeconomic consequences of 
behavioural choices in relation to the implementation of a discard ban (Condie et al., 2013, 
Simons et al., 2015). 
ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The initial objective of the European Common Fisheries Policy was to conserve fish stocks 
and ensure economic viability for European fisheries. In recent years many fish stocks in the 
North-East Atlantic have shown a positive trend, as 48% of the assessed stocks are fished at 
or below the maximum sustainable fishing mortality levels (EC, 2015). Despite the improve-
ment in the status of many of the commercially exploited stocks, fisheries management is 
still criticised for not taking into account the ecosystem consequences of fishing (EC, 2009b). 
The impact of fishing goes beyond the removal of individual target species as fishing in-
teracts with other ecosystem components such as the seabed and (vulnerable) non-target 
species (Kaiser et al., 2002, Shephard et al., 2015).
The main ecosystem impacts of fisheries are the modification of seabed habitats due 
to the impact of the gear, the loss of biodiversity and changes in food web dynamics (i.e. 
changes in the species, age and size compositions) due to mortality of target as well as by-
catch species (Jennings and Kaiser, 1998, Murawski, 2000). The impact will largely depend 
on the type of gear and the operational methods (e.g. mesh size, rigging, towing speed and 
depth) being used (Valdemarsen et al., 2007). Bottom trawls, for example, are towed over the 
substrate to target a mix of species living or feeding close to the seabed (i.e. demersal fish). 
This type of fishery is known to have a substantial amount of by-catch and discards of both 
target and non-target species, generating additional unintended mortality (Pascoe, 1997). 
In addition, various gear components make contact to the seabed, disturbing the sediment 
as well as the organisms living close to (epifauna) or within (infauna) the sediment (de Groot, 
1984, Collie et al., 2000). Alternatively, passive gears, such as longlines, gillnets and trammel 
nets can be anchored to the substrate and left to fish passively, hooking, trapping or entan-
gling species (Jennings and Kaiser, 1998, Valdemarsen et al., 2007). These gears will have a 
lower impact on the substrate, but are known to have a relatively high by-catch of mega-fau-
na, such as cetaceans, sea turtles, elasmobranches and seabirds (Jennings et al., 2001). 
Chapter 1
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1Holding fisheries accountable for having an impact on marine ecosystems empha-
sised the need to shift fisheries management from a single-species management approach 
to an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries (EAF). The EAF strives to sustain healthy ecosys-
tems and the fisheries they support. The EAF should thus provide (i) environmental protec-
tion (ii) socioeconomic prosperity and (iii) accumulate knowledge (Pikitch et al., 2004, Rice, 
2011). These three elements are pursued in the 2013 reform of the CFP which obliges stocks 
to be exploited at sustainable levels by 2020, prohibits discarding and urges Member States 
to protect vulnerable habitats. These obligations should contribute to avoid degradation 
and minimizing the risk of serious harm to the ecosystem as well as ensuring long-term 
benefits from harvesting marine resources for fisheries. In addition, the role of science will 
need to be reinforced by generating knowledge and sharing information in order to assess 
the status of the ecosystem and the fisheries. 
The 2002 reform of the CFP was criticised for insufficient integration of marine man-
agement preventing the EAF to get foothold (EC, 2009b). Now that the CFP has adopted 
an EAF, placing fisheries in an ecosystem context, objectives have to be complementary to 
goals defined in other Community legislation. This requires the integration of fisheries pol-
icy with environmental policies such as the Habitat (HD, 92/43/EEC) and the Marine strate-
gy Framework Directive (MSFD, 2008/56/EC). The MSFD demands management measures 
contributing to achieve a Good Environmental Status (GES) of the EU’s marine waters by 
2020. GES relates to the assessment of the quality of the structure and functioning of marine 
ecosystems to restore or resist anthropogenic environmental changes (Borja et al., 2013). 
GES is assessed based on 11 descriptors including biological, hydrological and chemical 
components. The CFP can thus be an important tool for achieving GES under the MSFD. 
Management measures relating to the exploitation of stocks and the protection of sensitive 
habitats from fishing, for example can contribute to improve or maintain, habitat and popu-
lation condition (i.e. size and age distribution) which are important criteria determining GES. 
FLEET DYNAMICS
Fisheries managers traditionally implement measures (e.g. catch or effort limitations) con-
trolling the impact of fisheries on exploited species and the environment.  However, the in-
fluence of measures on the individual fisher and fishing communities are often overlooked. 
Fishers can adapt and change their behaviour in relation to imposed constraints, which can 
lead to unintended and unexpected consequences of fisheries management (Hilborn, 1985, 
Salas and Gaertner, 2004, Branch et al., 2006). However, for a long time the effect of adaptive 
behaviour of fishers on the success of fisheries management has been neglected and only a 
few studies addressed the behaviour of fishing fleets (Gordon, 1953, Hilborn and Ledbetter, 
1979). 
Hilborn (1985) was one of the first scientist to point out that the lack of knowledge on 
fishers behaviour may underlie the failure of fisheries management. The study drew atten-
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1tion to the importance of the role of individuals choices within a fleet and argued that fleet 
dynamics should be an integral part of fisheries management. In addition, four principal 
elements were recognized which should be studied to increase our knowledge on fleet dy-
namics: (1) the process of investment, providing insight in why and when fishers will invest 
in new vessels or gear; (2) effort allocation to provide insight in decisions when, where and 
what to fish for; (3) harvesting efficiencies to increase knowledge on the differences in catch-
ing process between gear and vessel types; and (4) discarding to improve our understand-
ing on the decision why species are kept or thrown back overboard.
The study of Hilborn (1985) created awareness about the influence of fisheries be-
haviour on the effectiveness of fisheries management. In many studies on fishers behaviour 
economics are used as the main driver for the choices of individuals (Gordon, 1953, Gillis et 
al., 1995b, Babcock and Pikitch, 2000, Poos et al., 2010, Dowling et al., 2012). It is assumed 
fishers will adapt their behaviour and trade-off cost and benefits in order to maximize their 
profits. While the assumption of profit-maximization is supported by observations and in-
terviews (Hilborn and Kennedy, 1992, Robinson and Pascoe, 1997), it is questioned whether 
fishers will prioritise profits over other metrics such as maximizing landings, or risk aversion 
or simply follow personal habits (Eggert and Tveteras, 2004, Salas and Gaertner, 2004, Hol-
land, 2008). 
Another aspect is the decision of fishers to comply or non-comply with management 
measures. Non-compliance, by for example high-grading, quota busting and data-fouling, 
can pose a serious challenge to the success of management measures. Compliance behav-
iour in fisheries is not well studied as fishers are often reluctant to disclose the underlying 
reasons for non-complying. Available studies, however, indicate that compliance will de-
pend on the stringency and efficiency of measures, possibility of being detected, height or 
severity of sanctions as well as an individuals norms and values (Sutinen et al., 1990, Hønne-
land, 1999, Hatcher, 2000, Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). To reduce the resistance 
to comply with management measures, fisheries managers should require more knowledge 
and understanding of the implications of imposed management and enforcement meas-
ures on compliance decisions with the fleet. 
This thesis will contribute to the understanding of adaptive behaviour of fishers by ex-
ploring the implications of European fisheries management on decisions of individual ves-
sels active in mixed demersal fisheries. We will address three of Hilborns elements of fleet 
dynamics including decisions on effort allocation, discarding and harvest efficiency. In ad-
dition, the deterrent effect of monetary fines on non-compliance will be addressed. Under-
standing processes that determine the dynamics of fisheries and choices fishers make, are 
necessary to assess and understand the impact of fishing on fish stocks and ecosystems, but 
will also aid in understanding how fishers respond to regulation changes. In the context of 
ecosystem-based management, these insights are highly relevant to develop management 
strategies to mitigate the adverse environmental effects of the fisheries while maintaining a 
sustainable exploitation of the fisheries resources and economic profitability. 
Chapter 1
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1MODELLING APPROACH
Many different models have been developed for modelling decision making processes in 
fisheries and these have proven to be helpful tools to explain and predict fisheries dynam-
ics (van Putten et al., 2012). In this thesis the dynamics of a fishing fleet is studied using a 
dynamic state variable model (DSVM, (Houston and McNamara, 1999, Clark and Mangel, 
2000)). Dynamic state variable models have been applied in a broad range of ecological 
(Clark and Butler, 1999, Marescot et al., 2013) and fisheries related problems (Gillis et al., 
1995b, Babcock and Pikitch, 2000, Poos et al., 2010, Dowling et al., 2012). The DSVM uses 
an individual based modelling approach in which individuals are modelled by formulating 
specified behavioural rules, allowing the estimation of an individual’s optimal choice. This 
modelling technique allows the evaluation of a utility function at the end of a time period 
while sequences of choices are made that have to result in reaching the maximum of that 
utility function within constraints. In the context of fisheries, constraints can be set by man-
agement regulations (Clark and Mangel, 2000). 
The model used in this thesis has been developed by Poos et al. (2010) to explore the 
mechanisms and patterns of effort allocation of the Dutch beam trawl fleet. Here, the model 
is extended in several steps to address the behavioural dynamics for the Dutch North Sea 
flatfish fisheries and the French mixed demersal fisheries in the Channel in response to new 
management regulations and economic opportunities. Initially, the model is expanded by 
expanding the number of species that can be included and allowing fishers to switch gears. 
In order to evaluate high-grading and over-quota discarding I increased model complexity 
by including size-structured populations which vary in their spatio-temporal distribution. 
In addition, seasonal variation in size specific ex-vessel prices (i.e. the price received at the 
point of landing the fish) was included. The final adaptation of the model comprises of add-
ing individual habitat credits to address the wider ecosystem effects (i.e. habitat and benthic 
ecosystem impact) of fishing. Extending the DSVM model contributes to the aim of this the-
sis which is to develop a generic model to explore the implication of management measures 
on short-term decisions such as discarding, gear choice and the spatial and temporal distri-
bution effort and the environmental and socioeconomic consequence thereof for a wider 
range of demersal fisheries.
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis explores how management measures can mitigate the adverse effects of 
fishing to support the development of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries manage-
ment. The study focusses on fishers behaviour, in particular effort allocation, discarding de-
cisions, and harvest efficiency, and explores how behavioural adaptations may influence the 
performance of management measures aimed at reducing the adverse side effects of the 
fisheries characterised by a substantial bycatch of target and non-target species and impact 
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1on the seafloor and benthic ecosystem. Using a generic Dynamic State Variable model, spe-
cific applications are build to address different research questions inspired by the North Sea 
flatfish fishery and the French demersal fishery in the Channel. 
For many years North Sea cod (Gadus morhua) is harvest unsustainably. The stock is 
exploited above sustainable mortality levels (Fmsy), and its spawning stock biomass has 
been well below the conservation limit (Blim). Despite signs of recovery following the recov-
ery plan imposed in 2003, the stock has remained the weakest component of the demersal 
fish assemblage (Ulrich et al., 2011, Kraak et al., 2013). In chapter 2 of this thesis we explore 
how quota management in combination with a discard ban may improve the regulation of 
fishing mortality for a depleted stock that is exploited in a mixed fishery. This is studied us-
ing a dynamic state variable model (DSVM) to evaluate the behavioural response, i.e. effort 
allocation, discard behaviour and compliance, of French mixed fisheries operating in the 
Eastern English Channel. The trade-off between socio-economic benefits of fisheries and 
the protection of the weakest links in the ecosystem is clarified. 
Fishers discard parts of their catch due to policy or market driven incentives. Discard-
ing marketable resources is of particular interest as this is seen as a wasteful practice. Fishers 
will discard marketable fish when quota are exhausted (over-quota discarding) or by trying 
to optimize their economic return by discarding size or age classes with the lowest econom-
ic value (high-grading) (Gillis et al., 1995b, Poos et al., 2010). The occurrence of high-grading 
is often based on anecdotal information from the fishing industry, while empirical evidence 
is scarce (Poos et al., 2010). In chapter 3 I review the literature on observations of over-quota 
discarding and high-grading to gain insight in the conditions under which discard decisions 
may occur. In addition we apply a behavioural model to the Dutch demersal beam trawl fleet 
to explore the implications of discard decisions in a mixed fishery on the stock structure and 
assessment. 
The discard ban aims at reducing discarding of fisheries resources and encourages 
fisheries to fish more selective. Selectivity can be improved by using more selective gears 
and by reallocation of fishing activities to areas with lower catch rates of certain species, 
size or age classes. It is expected technical and behavioural adaptations may reduce the 
catch of undersized or unwanted catches but may also lead to a reduction in the economic 
profitability of the fishing fleet, reducing the incentive to fish more selective. In chapter 4 of 
this thesis we address the question how a new management measures, such as the discard, 
ban may promote the transition towards more selective fishing gears. The Dutch demersal 
fisheries is used as a case study as the fishery is undergoing a transition from using a con-
ventional beam trawl to using the more selective (i.e. for undersized fish) and fuel efficient 
pulse trawl. We explore the annual fishing strategies of both fleets targeting size-structured 
populations to evaluate the economic profitability under quota management in combina-
tion with a discard ban. 
The EAF strives to sustain healthy ecosystems while providing optimal output for fish-
eries (Pikitch et al., 2004). The EAF has a prominent role in European fisheries management, 
requiring fisheries managers to assure the sustainable use of resources while ecosystem 
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1composition, structure and functioning are safeguarded. Because bottom trawl fisheries af-
fect both fish populations as well as the benthic habitat, fisheries managers resort to techni-
cal management measures, such as gear restrictions or spatial measures to limit the impact 
of fishing activities on the benthic habitat and ecosystems. However, these limitation often 
count on resistance from the fishing industry as these limitations constrain fishing activi-
ties and socioeconomic benefits are limited or reduced (Caveen et al., 2015). In chapter 5 
we apply a behavioural model used in the previous chapters, adapted to include individual 
habitat credits, to study decisions on effort allocation of the French multipurpose bottom 
trawl fleet in the Eastern English Channel. As such we explore the potential of an alternative 
approach of implementing a habitat credit system in combination with quota management 
to achieve sustainable exploitation of target species while minimizing the impact on the 
benthic ecosystem. 
Chapter 6 includes the general discussion of this thesis. Here I will summarize the 
findings of the various studies and elaborate on some of the main assumptions made. In 
addition, an overview of the introduction and current state of play of the discard ban is 
provided. 
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CHAPTER 2
MIXED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: 
PROTECTING THE WEAKEST LINK
Batsleer J., Poos J.J., Marchal P., Vermard Y. , Rijnsdorp A.D.
Chapter published in Marine Ecology Progress Series (2013) 479: 177-19
2ABSTRACT
North Sea cod (Gadus morhua) stock is outside safe biological limits and total allowable 
catch (TAC) management has proved ineffective to rebuild the stock. The European Com-
mission is considering to impose a discard ban to preserve vulnerable and economically 
important fish stocks. We explore the potential effects of a discard ban in mixed fisheries 
management using the French mixed fisheries in the Eastern English Channel as a model 
system. We examine in particular the performance of two different management scenarios, 
(i) individual quota management with a tolerance for discarding and, (ii) individual quo-
ta management in combination with a discard ban, using a dynamic state variable model. 
The model evaluates a time series of decisions taken by fishers to maximize profits within 
management constraints. Compliance to management was tested by applying an in height 
varying fine for exceeding the quota. We then evaluate the consequences of individual cod 
quota in both scenarios, with respect to over-quota discarding, spatial and temporal effort 
allocation and switching between métiers. Individual quota management without a discard 
ban hardly influenced fishers’ behaviour, as they could fully utilise cod quota and continue 
fishing other species while discarding cod. In contrast, a discard ban forced fishers to real-
locate effort to areas and weeks where cod catch is low, at the expense of lower revenue. In 
general, a restrictive policy for individual quota for cod needs to be combined with a discard 
ban and a high fine (> 20 times the sale price) to reduce over-quota discarding. 
KEYWORDS: 
discard ban, 
TAC, 
Dynamic State Variable Modelling, 
eastern English Channel, 
cod (Gadus morhua), 
mixed fisheries, 
fleet dynamics.
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2INTRODUCTION 
Fishing is an important socio-economic activity providing food and employment (FAO 2008) 
but is criticized because of its adverse impact on exploited fish stocks and marine ecosys-
tems. In this context, throwing overboard dead fish that have been caught in the net (“dis-
carding”) is often considered a wasteful practice that has adverse effects on fish stocks while 
not contributing to the harvesting of food (Alverson et al. 1994, Kelleher 2005l).
Discarding is mainly driven by economics and management. From an economic per-
spective, low valued fish of quota species are discarded (high-grading) in the expectation to 
catch more valued fish later (Gillis et al. 1995b), while regulation of mesh size and minimum 
landing size determine the discarding of undersized fish (Cappell 2001, Graham & Fryer 
2006). TAC regulations also create an incentive for fishers to discard the over-quota caught 
fish, especially in mixed fisheries (Daan, 1997, Reis et al., 2010), and they have often proved 
unable to control fishing mortality around sustainable levels (Ulrich et al. 2011).
Discard reduction is high on the agenda of EU fisheries managers, and the European 
Commission is implementing a discard ban. Under a discard ban, all catches of both target 
and by-catch species should be landed and will be deducted from the individual quotas. A 
discard ban in combination with individual, and possibly transferable, quota (ITQ) aims to 
prevent the waste of food, reduce fishing impacts on the ecosystem, preserve vulnerable 
and economically important fish stocks and improve scientific advice (Anonymous 2011, 
Buisman et al. 2011). Despite of the implementation of ITQ management with a discard ban 
in some countries, few studies have address the performance of this combination. However, 
results have shown that discarding, albeit at a significantly lower level, still occurs, but that 
the ban can aid to the recovery of exploited stocks (Kristofersson & Rickertsen 2005, 2009, 
Diamond & Beukers-Stewart 2011).
Given prevalent management regulations, fishers are expected to adjust their be-
haviour to maximise their utility (Gordon 1953, Hilborn & Kennedy 1992). Hence, fishers 
may respond to management regulations by trading-off economic gain against the cost of 
non-compliance. Adaptive behaviour of fishers, e.g. reallocation of effort to other species, 
fishing grounds or seasons, is an important management concern (Salas & Gaertner 2004, 
Poos et al. 2010). Further studies on adaptive behaviour of fishers may be useful to explore 
the scope for responses that undermine the effectiveness of a certain management system. 
A fisheries manager needs to trade-off socio-economic benefits of a fishery against protec-
tion of the weakest links in the ecosystem. Unveiling these trade-offs will support fisheries 
management.
The present study describes how a discard ban in combination with individual quota 
may improve the regulation of fishing mortality for a depleted stock that is exploited in a 
mixed fishery. Using a dynamic state variable model (DSVM; Clark & Mangel 2000), we study 
the over-quota discarding of cod (Gadus morhua) in the eastern English Channel and the 
southern North Sea. Despite signs of recovery following the recovery plan imposed in 2003 
the stock has remained the weakest component of the demersal fish assemblage (Ulrich et 
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2al. 2011, Kraak et al. 2012). We compared the performance of (1) quota management that 
allows over-quota discarding and (2) quota management in combination with a discard ban, 
using the French otter trawl and net fisheries as a case study. The consequences of individual 
quota for cod in both management regimes are studied based on a number of indicators of 
the fishery system such as the catch of cod, the spatial and temporal distribution of fishing 
effort, the changes in métiers and the economic performance of the fishery.
METHODS
THE ENGLISH CHANNEL MIXED FISHERIES
The English Channel is a corridor between the Atlantic and the North Sea. The eastern Eng-
lish Channel (ICES division VIId) is the narrowest part of the Channel and it is an important 
fishing area (Vaz et al. 2007). The French fishing fleets are most active in this area with a 
total of 641 vessels in 2005, landing over 90,000 t of fish with a total value of € 218 million. 
Boulogne-Sur-Mer is the main French fishing harbour, both in number of vessels and total 
landings (Carpentier et al. 2009).
DATA
Effort and landings data  from logbooks and sales slips were made available over the period 
2001 – 2005. The data set included information by fishing trip on vessel length, vessel ton-
nage, engine power, gear type, mesh size, fishing ground (ICES rectangle, 1° longitude x 0.5° 
latitude, approximately 30 x 30 nautical miles), fishing effort (hours fished for trawlers, days 
absent from port for netters), and the weight and value of the landings per species. We se-
Figure 2.1 
Map of the eastern English Chan-
nel (ICES division VIId) and southern 
North Sea (ICES division IVc), showing 
the ICES rectangles where both fleets 
may fish. The star indicates the loca-
tion of the port of Boulogne-sur-Mer
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2lected two fleets: the French otter trawl fleet and netting fleet. These fleets fish in the eastern 
English Channel and most southern part of the North Sea between 49°N, 2°W and 52°N 4°E, 
for which most of the above-mentioned data available (Fig. 2.1).
OTTER TRAWLERS
The otter trawl fleet is one of the main demersal fishing fleets operating in the eastern Eng-
lish Channel. Vessels in this fleet are predominantly rigged with 80 mm mesh size nets (Car-
pentier et al. 2009). The dataset consists of 120 vessels with an average engine power of 440 
kW and average vessel length of 21 m.
The otter trawl fleet operates two separate métiers using: (1) demersal otter trawls 
(OTBD, 25591 trips) and, (2) mixed demersal/pelagic trawls (OTBM, 725 trips). Métiers are 
derived from the observed landings and largely based on DCF level 5 metiers (Ulrich et al. 
2012). Both métiers land a mix of species, of which whiting, cod, plaice, sole, mackerel and 
mullet make up 65%. Whiting and mackerel contribute to the bulk of landings of OTBD and 
OTBM, respectively (Table 2.1). Fishers are capable of switching métiers during the year. Both 
métiers are operated inside and outside the 12 nautical mile zone (Carpentier et al. 2009), 
with fishing grounds in ICES rectangles 30F1 and 29F0 being the most frequently visited.
Table 2.1 Proportion (%) of 6 commercial species in the catch composition of both fishing fleets, separated by métiers. 
OTBD: demersal otter trawl; OTBM: mixed demersal/pelagic trawl; TN: trammel net; GN: gillnet.
Otter trawl Static net
OTBD OTBM TN GN
Sole (%) 0.4 0 54.9 14.8
Plaice (%) 4.1 2.1 15.4 15.7
Cod (%) 5.3 2.6 8 45.3
Mackerel (%) 15.6 44.9 0 0
Whiting (%) 29.4 12.1 0.9 2.7
Mullet (%) 6.8 4.0 0.1 0.1
Other (%) 38.3 34.1 20.6 21.4
STATIC NETTERS
The netting fleet in the study area consists of 107 vessels, with an average engine power of 
160kW and average length of 12m. The most common gear is the trammel net (TN, 10449 
trips), being used interchangeably with gillnets (GN, 632 trips) (Carpentier et al. 2009). Both 
nets are anchored to the bottom but differ in their structure and target species. TN have 
three sets of netting, of which the outer nets have a large mesh and the inner net has a small 
mesh size, whereas GN have only one net. This difference makes TN less selective in terms 
of size and variety of fish species caught (Carpentier et al. 2009). The most commonly used 
mesh size for both nets is 90 mm, used mainly to catch sole; however, larger mesh sizes 
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2(100mm – 180mm) may be used when plaice or cod are targeted. Although sole, plaice, and 
cod are the main target species and account for approximately 80% of the landings, sole 
is the main target species for TN, whereas cod is the primary target species for GN. Most 
netting activities occur close to the port of Boulogne-sur-Mer (ICES rectangles 30F1, 31F2). 
A few (2.7 %) observations in the data set consisted of multiple aggregated trips, and these 
were not included in the analysis.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Our aim is to parameterize a simulation model by estimating the spatial and temporal dis-
tribution of landings per unit effort (li) of six species: plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), sole (So-
lea solea), cod (Gadus morhua), whiting (Merlangius merlangus), Atlantic mackerel (Scomber 
scombrus) and mullet (Mullus spp.). Our dataset contains measurements of landings (yi) in 
weight (kg) by species and fishing effort (Ei) per trip i:
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We apply Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) to allow for non-linearity in the relationships 
between the response variable and multiple explanatory variables (Wood 2006, Zuur et al. 
2009). The actual value of the landings per trip is used as the response variable while the 
fishing effort serves as offset. By analysing the six species separately, we ignore potential 
covariance structure among species. We use the negative binomial distribution with a log-
arithmic link function to correct for over-dispersion while allowing zero-observations. The 
logarithmic link ensures the fitted values are always non-negative (Zuur et al. 2009):
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where, µi is the expected landings per trip and θ is the dispersion parameter, which accounts 
for under- or over-dispersion. Log(Ei) is the known offset and ηi is the linear predictor model-
led as follows:
ηi = métiers + year + ƒ(engine power|fleet) + ƒ(mesh size|fleet) + ƒ(DoY) +  
ƒ(lat,lon) + ƒ(lat,lon,DoY) 2.3
Métiers and year were entered as discrete variables (Table 2.2). The term ƒ(engine power|-
fleet) are for estimating the smooth function of engine power by tactic and ƒ(mesh size|-
fleet) for mesh size by tactic. The term fleet indicates the difference between trawlers and 
netters. ƒ(DoY) and ƒ(lat,lon) indicate the main effects of day of the year (DoY) and space 
(latitude and longitude based on geographic midpoint of the ICES rectangle). ƒ(lat,lon,DoY) 
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2is the spline for the interaction term of latitude, longitude and DoY. The main effects and the 
interaction between latitude, longitude and DoY are included to model the seasonal chang-
es in distribution. We limited the number of knots in each smoothing to reduce the possibil-
ity of over-fitting (Table 2.2). Because vessel length and engine power are highly correlated, 
we decided to only include engine power because of its presumed larger influence on the 
catch efficiency (Rijnsdorp et al. 2006). Mesh size was included as it may indicate the target 
species, i.e. the predominant 80mm and 90 mm mesh sizes to target whiting and sole for 
otter trawls and TN respectively, while larger mesh sizes (120mm-180mm) are fitted when 
targeting cod. Finally, the variable year was used to capture differences in landings per unit 
of effort between the years. 
Forward selection based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used to select a 
model for each species. Forward selection starts with an empty model, fitted with the intercept 
only. Then covariates are added sequentially based on the BIC in order to obtain the “best” mod-
el. The results of the best model were used to predict the spatial and temporal patterns in catch 
rates for each of the species and vessel–gear combinations to be used in the simulation model.
SIMULATION MODEL 
Our model is based on Dynamic State Variable Modelling (DSVM) (Houston & McNamara 
1999, Clark & Mangel 2000). The DSVM is an individual based model that has been used to 
predict behaviour of animals (Mangel 1987, Clark & Butler 1999) as well as fishers (Gillis et 
al. 1995b, Poos et al. 2010, Dowling et al. 2011). We expanded the model of Poos et al. (2010) 
in which each individual vessel in the model has a set of choices, allowing it to respond to 
management regulations and economic opportunities. In the expanded model individuals 
choose simultaneously: (1) to go out to fish or to stay in port, (2) a métier, (3) a fishing ground 
and (4) to discard or land the catch.
A vessel evaluates its optimal annual strategy in terms of biweekly (i.e. every 2 weeks) 
behavioural choices, based on a utility function. We use the annual net revenue (φ) as the 
utility that a fisher wants to optimize (Gordon 1953, Poos et al. 2010). 
Table 2.2 Model components used to describe variation in landing rates. Variables métier and year are discrete variables 
and engine power, mesh size, latitude (lat) and longitude (long) (based on geographic midpoint of the ICES rectangle) and 
day of the year (DOY) are continuous variables. The term fleet represents a segregation of the fleet by trawlers or netters. The 
term k denotes the maximum number of knots in each smoothing. 
Nominator Model component  Description k
A Métier  Effect of métier -
B Year  Effect of year -
C ƒ(engine power|fleet)  Effect of engine power by fleet 4
D ƒ(Mesh size|fleet)  Effect of mesh size by fleet 4
E ƒ(DoY)  Variability in time 4
F ƒ(lat,lon)  Variability in space 4
G ƒ(lat,lon,DoY)  Variability in catch rates in space and time 5
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2φ is defined as the total quantity landed of each species (Ls) weighted by each species 
price (ps) minus the variable fishing costs and a fine for overshooting the quota:
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-Variable fishing costs consist of total fuel cost; i.e. total effort (E) (in days) times fuel costs 
per day (€ day-1) (pe). The fine for overshooting the quota (D(Ls)) is zero as long as landings 
are within quota, and increase linearly with over-quota landings. Given the utility function at 
the end of the year, the dynamic programming equation is used to calculate the optimal de-
cision in each time step given the state of the individual. In our case, the state is determined 
by the proportion of the cod quota fished, landings of the five other species, and the fishing 
effort. All vessels within a fleet are equal at the beginning of the year. As a result of the vari-
ability in catch rates in the model, the vessels will differ in their state as time progresses. The 
details for this procedure can be found in Poos et al. 2010. 
Compliance to management was tested by exploring the effect of different fine val-
ues. Fines (€ kg-1) increased from one to twenty times the cod price per kg. These fines are 
equivalent to those imposed for catching abalones illegally, i.e. 10-fold the landing price 
(Bose & Crees-Morris 2009).
For each time step, a vessel chooses a métier and one fishing ground (out of 20) based 
on the optimal choice given the vessel’s state. Each combination of métier and fishing 
ground within a time step is characterized by a mean (µ) and variance (θ) of the catch rates 
for each species estimated by the GAM. Catch rates were calculated from the GAM results by 
setting the offset equal to the average fishing effort for trawlers or netters within two-week 
periods. The catch rates are assumed independent of previous fishing activities in that area. 
We arbitrarily chose 2005 as a basis of our simulations. Further parameterisation of the mod-
el in terms of variable costs was done assuming Boulogne-sur-Mer was the home harbour 
of the vessels. 
The combination of métier and fishing ground determines the amount of effort re-
quired for the fishing operation. Fishing effort consists of the summed actual fishing time 
and travel time required to reach the fishing ground. The average fishing time was estimated 
from the 2001 data at 3.1 days for a trawler and 3 days for a netter. Travel time depends on 
the distance from port and was calculated from the distance in nautical miles in a straight 
line from the harbour of Boulogne-sur-Mer to each fishing ground. Assuming a steaming 
speed of 10 n miles h-1 for an otter trawl and 6 n miles h-1 for a netter (Messina & Notti 2007) 
and taking account of the number of trips observed per time step (2-week period), we cal-
culated the travel time needed to reach a fishing ground. If a fisher decides to stay in the 
harbour, nothing is caught and no effort is used.
The costs associated with using fishing effort depend on the fuel use in the model. 
Fuel costs per day are estimated to be € 1800 for trawlers and € 1300 for netters and are 
equivalent to approximately 35% of the gross revenue (Taal et al. 2009). The final element for 
the parameterization is the market value of the target species. We chose to use fixed market 
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2values for each species, determined by the average price per kg within our dataset. Table 2.3 
provides detailed information on the parameters and their values used in the model.
Table 2.3 Summary of parameter values included in the model.
Trawl Net
Engine power (kW) 440 160
Mesh Size (mm) 80 90
Fuel costs per day (€) 1800 1300
Fishing effort (hours) 75 72
Market value (€ per kg)
Sole 9.42
Cod 2.43
Plaice 1.99
Whiting 1.40
Mackerel 0.99
Mullet 5.40
MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS
This study compares the performance of individual cod quota (IQ) management combined 
with two discard scenarios for both fisheries: (1) over-quota discarding is allowed; (2) over-
quota discarding is not allowed (discard ban) (Table 2.4). IQ gradually increase from 0 to 27 t 
yr-1 for trawlers and 0 to 20 t yr-1 for netters. In addition, different fine values are used to test 
the compliance of trawlers to the imposed discard ban.
Table 2.4 Description of scenarios. IQ: individual cod quota.
Scenario Fleet Individual cod quota (t y-1)  Fine (€ kg-1)
Discard ban Trawlers 0 - 27 2.43 - 200
Netters  0 - 20 
Discards allowed Trawlers 0 - 27 0
Netters 0 - 20 
RESULTS
STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
All 6 GAM models exhibit similarities in selecting covariates, based on BIC results, that best 
explain the variation in landings (Table 2.5). The model for whiting, besides having the lo-
west (28.3%) explained deviance, diverges from the other models because the DoY as a 
main effect did not improve the model.
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2Within the cod model, mesh size was added as first variable, which confirms our ex-
pectations that larger mesh sizes are preferred when fishing for cod. A remarkable result 
for cod is that landings are significantly (p < 0.001) lower in the years 2004 and 2005. Lower 
landings are likely related to the low abundances and weak recruitments of cod during that 
period (ICES 2010). For plaice, whiting and mullet, the variable engine power was selected 
and added as first variable in explaining the landings. The first variable selected for mackerel 
and sole was the métiers. This result confirms our chosen métiers classifications, whereby 
mackerel was mainly targeted by mixed demersal/pelagic trawls while sole was the main 
target species for trammel netters. In addition, for sole the variable engine power was select-
ed as the second variable confirming vessels with low engine power (i.e. netters) target sole. 
The simulation model results based on the GAM predictions are presented below.
COD CATCH
Cod catches depend on the fishing fleet and management scenario (Fig. 2.2). For trawlers, 
IQ lower than 10 t yr-1 result in full utilization of quota by almost all vessels, while over-quota 
catches are being discarded. Hence, holding cod catches at a high level (ca. 10 t yr-1). Incre-
asing IQ above 10 t results in trawlers progressively being unable to use all their quota: all 
cod catches (ca. 12 t yr-1) are landed and none are discarded. The variability in cod catches 
in the model causes some fishers to be more or less successful catching cod than others. 
Successful fishers will fully exploit their quota and discard their over-quota catch, while less 
successful fishers will land all their cod catches and will not use all quota. When a discard 
ban is introduced (in combination with a high fine (200 € kg-1), IQ may reduce catches con-
siderably. At IQ below 4 t yr-1, the cod catch is < 1 t yr-1. Increasing IQ results in an increase in 
landings, but vessels rarely utilize their quota completely. As for the first scenario, catches 
level off towards ca. 12 t yr-1. 
There are two main periods, during which cod is caught by trawlers (Fig. 2 3). The first 
period is around the end and beginning of the year, while the second period occurs halfway 
during the year. Fishers constrained by a discard ban switch to other fishing grounds during 
these periods, resulting in lower annual cod catches.
Table 2.5 Model selection results for the 6 species, based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Numbers indicate 
the difference between the previous obtained BIC associated with the previous variable and the newly acquired BIC of the 
newly selected variable. If negative, the variable is excluded from the best model. For the model descriptions, the offset has 
been omitted. The estimated theta (θ) is also given. The letters are referenced by the letters used for the variables in Table 2.2
Species model structure BIC1 BIC2 BIC3 BIC4 BIC5 BIC6 BIC7 Theta (θ)
Cod intercept + D + G + B + C + A + E + F 7095.8 2845.9 1554.5 1636.7 663.0 121.3 -1.5 0.185
Plaice intercept + C + A + G + B + D + E + F 18002.6 3205.2 3119.3 932.6 324.3 290.4 -1.4 0.393
Sole intercept + A + C + G + B + D + E + F 22990.1 12189.5 886.6 444.4 258 118.7 -4.6 0.193
Whiting intercept + C + G + A + D + B + F + E 5302.3 6073.5 1044.2 299.3 40.5 0.2 -8.7 0.252
Mackerel intercept + A + G + C + B + D + E + F 15575.5 3143.5 2272.3 402 279.9 10.5 -1.7 0.234
Mullet intercept + C + G + E + B + A + D + F 5415.7 4104.7 2293.9 1580.1 360.7 170.1 -1.2 0.231
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Figure 2.2 
Modelled average annual cod catches 
(i.e. landings plus discards) per vessel 
for both trawlers and netters in rela-
tion to the available individual cod 
quota (dashed line). Upper panels (a) 
and (b) are for trawlers; lower panels 
(c) and (d) for netters. In the left pa-
nels (a) and (c) discarding is allowed, 
while in the right panels (b) and (d) 
discarding is banned. Average annual 
landings (black line) with confidence 
area (dark grey shaded area) are se-
parated from average annual cod 
catches (light grey line) with confi-
dence area (light grey shaded area), 
depicting the amount of cod discards. 
Figure 2.3 
Modelled temporal variation in cod catches for both ma-
nagement scenarios at individual quota of 3, 6 and 9 t yr−1, 
including a fine equal to €200 kg−1. The average cod catch 
of an individual (a−c) trawler or (d−f ) netter per time-step 
(2 wk period) is illustrated. The shaded area quantifies 
cod discards, being the difference between cod catches 
(dashed black line) and cod landings (black line), when 
discarding is allowed. The dot-dashed line indicates cod 
catches when a discard ban is imposed.
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Despite much lower cod catches (< 2 t yr-1) for netters (Fig. 2.2 c & d), similar results 
are observed as for trawlers. While the netting fleet shows more spatial overlap under both 
management scenarios, deviations of the choice of fishing grounds occur during periods 
when cod is more frequently caught (Fig. 2.3 d-f ). So, netters also switch fishing grounds to 
avoid catching cod.
When IQ for cod are reasonably high (~ 9 t yr-1), trawlers only become limited in land-
ing cod at the end of the year, and only discard when quota are almost fully exploited. When 
less quota is available, the amount of cod being discarded increases and fishers discard ear-
lier in the year as well. When quota are low (~ 3 t yr-1) cod is discarded throughout the year, 
with the highest amounts of discards occurring during both periods when cod is mainly 
caught. Netters barely discard cod due to their low catches. However, if cod is discarded, it 
occurs at the end of the year during the period when cod catches are higher. These results 
show that fishers are able to regulate their landings by switching fishing ground, switching 
métier and discard their over-quota catch. When discarding is banned, fishers can only regu-
late their landings by switching fishing grounds and targeting other species.
EFFORT
If discarding is allowed, annual allocation of fishing effort of a trawler is independent of the 
cod quota (Fig. 2.4). The total days at sea (DAS) increase marginally from an average of 108 
days to 110 days when more quota becomes available. Effort is mainly allocated near the En-
glish coast (30E9) and in the southern North Sea (30F1 and 32F1) (Fig. 2.5). Imposing a discard 
Figure 2.4 
Modelled average annual effort per 
vessel for both fleets and both ma-
nagement scenarios for (a, b) trawlers 
and (c, d) for netters. (a, c) Discarding 
is allowed, (b, d) discarding is banned. 
The area between the upper (95%) 
and lower (5%) confidence intervals is 
shaded. DAS: days at sea
Chapter 2
38
2Figure 2.5 
Modelled spatial allocation of effort by average number of 
trips per year for (a−d) trawlers and (e−h) netters at low (5 
t yr−1) and high (15 t yr−1) individual cod quotas (IQ). Panels 
(a, b) (trawlers) and (e, f ) (netters) are based on the first ma-
nagement scenario (discarding), while (c, d) and (g, h) are 
based on scenarios with a discard ban. 
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2ban in combination with low IQ has a clear impact on effort and setting IQ to 0 results in a 
complete stop of fishing. At quota below 6 t yr-1, there is a steep increase of effort with increa-
sing quota. As more quota become available the increase in effort slows down and stabilizes 
towards an average effort of 110 DAS. Introducing a discard ban causes a spatial shift in the 
distribution of fishing. At low IQ levels, trawlers make fewer trips (21 trips) and effort is con-
centrated in more southern and distant fishing grounds such as 28F0, 28F1, 30E9 and 29F0. 
At a higher IQ level, the spatial distribution resembles that found when discarding is allowed. 
In the absence of a discard ban, netters spend 108 DAS, regardless of the quota. As for 
trawlers, cod quota management on its own has no influence on the spatial distribution of 
netters that predominantly fish in the eastern English Channel (56% in 28F1). With a discard 
ban, effort is only influenced at low (< 8 t yr-1) quota. Fishing stops when IQ is zero, but rap-
idly increases up to 111 DAS when IQ is less than 3 t yr-1. Yet effort gradually decreases again 
and remains fixed at an average annual effort of 107 DAS. The peak at low quota may reflect 
a reallocation of effort away from the southern North Sea (30F1) to more distant fishing 
grounds into the eastern English Channel (29E9). At higher IQ levels, spatial distribution of 
fishing effort is equal to the distribution when discarding is allowed.
The shift in spatial distribution of fishing effort from the southern North Sea to the eastern 
English Channel is related to the spatial distribution of cod. Cod is more frequently caught in the 
southern North Sea fishing grounds compared to the Channel. When cod quota is high a fisher 
can continue to fish in the northern fishing grounds until the cod quota becomes depleted. Im-
plementing low cod quota and a discard ban, however, makes Channel fishing grounds more at-
tractive, because of a reduced risk of catching cod, while targeting other commercial fish species. 
Figure 2.6
The proportion of effort allotted to each métier operated 
by trawlers, (a) when discarding is banned and (b) when 
discarding is allowed. (light grey: mixed demersal/pelagic 
trawl, dark grey: demersal otter trawl)
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Besides spatial effort allocation to reduce cod catches, trawlers change their prefer-
ence for a métier in response to IQ (Fig. 2.6). When constrained by a discard ban and IQ 
below 4 t yr-1, there is no fishing at all or trips are done only choosing OTBM. As IQ increases, 
fishers increasingly choose for OTBD (0% to 47%). An IQ of 27 t yr-1 results in similar operation 
levels as observed for the scenario when discarding is allowed. Also in this scenario, less quo-
ta, reduces (48% to 28%) the choice to operate the OTBD métier. Netters choose, regardless 
of the management scenario, to fish using a trammel net throughout the year.
CATCH COMPOSITION
For trawlers constrained by a discard ban and low individual cod quota, mackerel is the most 
dominant (> 90%) species in the catch supplemented with mullet (ca. 8%) and plaice (1%) 
(Fig. 2.7). With increasing IQ, whiting catches gradually increase (0%-53%), while the propor-
Figure 2.7
Proportion of each of the 6 species contributing to the total 
catch for trawlers and netters. Modelled catch compositi-
ons for both management scenario’s.
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tion of mackerel in the catch decreases (> 90% to 40%). Other species such as mullet (4%), 
cod (3%) and plaice (< 1%) contribute marginally to the catches. 
Allowing discards eliminates the effect of low IQ on the catch composition. For trawl-
ers, whiting and mackerel are the main contributors whether a low or high cod quota is 
implemented. Yet, less quota ensures a slight decrease in whiting and a small increase in the 
proportion of mackerel.
Figure 2.8 
Trade-offs between (▲) net revenue, (■) effort and cod 
catches (t yr-1) for (a,b) trawlers and (c,d) netters. (a,c) Dis-
carding is allowed, (b,d) discarding is banned. Note the 
changing colours of the points from black to light grey as 
individual cod quotas increase from low to high levels.
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2Netters mainly catch sole (> 80%) and plaice (~18%), while cod is caught in small 
quantities and contributes less than 1% to the entire catch. Hence, introducing a discard 
ban on top of individual cod quota has little impact on the catch composition of netters.
TRADE-OFFS
In the present study, 2 indicators of fishery success,, i.e. effort and net revenue, were weig-
hed against cod catch (Fig. 2.8). Reducing IQ while allowing cod discards upholds effort, net 
revenue and cod catches for both fleets (Fig. 2.8 a and c). The slight decrease in net revenue 
(from ca. 420.000€ to ca. 373.000€) for trawlers can be related to reduced cod landings. 
In contrast, imposing a discard ban clearly affects both indicators and cod catch (Fig. 
2.8 b and d). When IQ is below 1 t yr-1, fishers stay in port and do not generate revenue. Set-
ting a low IQ ensures that fishers avoid cod catches by targeting other commercial species 
with lower market value (e.g. mackerel) in more distant fishing grounds. Consequently, a 
trawler generates less revenue (ca. 73.000€) in proportion to the amount of fishing effort (ca. 
44 DAS at an IQ of 2 t yr-1). At an IQ of 4 t yr-1, trawlers allocate some fishing effort to cod fish-
ing grounds, increasing the catch of cod to 1 t yr-1. Effort doubles (88DAS), while net revenue 
almost triples (211.000€). As more quota is made available, effort increases and levels off at 
~ 110 DAS. This increase in effort leads to an increased cod catch, because gradually more 
cod fishing grounds are fished. In addition, landings of commercially valuable and co-occur-
ring species such as whiting increase likewise and contribute substantially to the revenue. 
Hence, while effort levels off, net revenue continues to increase until the point where IQ are 
no longer constraining i.e. 18 t yr-1. 
Trade-offs as seen with trawlers are less frequently observed for netters. Increasing 
IQ to 1 t yr-1, fishing (58 DAS) resumes, generating revenue (ca. 135.000€) by fishing for sole 
and plaice while cod catches remain substantially low (< 6kg). With higher IQ, effort and net 
revenue level off to 107 DAS and ca. 270.000€, respectively. Revenue is maintained regard-
less of the IQ level, indicating that netters are to an extent economically independent of cod 
catches when avoiding the use of a GN. Netters mainly generated revenue by fishing for sole 
and plaice, while whiting and cod are by-catch species. 
In general, permitting cod discarding, fishers will uphold effort and maintain their net 
revenue at the expense of cod conservation. In contrast, with a discard ban, fishers avoid cod 
but maintain a reduced fishing effort targeting lower valued species, such as mackerel, to 
compensate the loss in revenue. 
OVER-QUOTA FINE 
The results above assumed that the discard ban was fully enforced, corresponding to a very 
high fine. The response of the fishers in terms of over-quota discarding of cod for a range of 
different fines is shown in figure 2.9. With a low fine equal to the market value of cod (2.43€ per 
kg) trawlers start discarding when IQ are below 9 t yr-1. Above this level, fishers have sufficient 
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quota available to uphold their revenue and switch to other target species when their quota is 
fully exploited. Increasing the fine shifts the threshold, IQ below which fishers start discarding 
the over-quota catch, towards a lower level. In our model, the fine needs to be sufficiently 
high, e.g. 20-fold the price of cod, to reduce discarding of over-quota cod below 6 t yr-1. 
DISCUSSION
This study explored the effects of a discard ban in combination with individual quota in 
mixed fisheries. Under a management regime that allows over-quota discarding, quota 
for by-catch species such as cod may have little effect on the effort allocation, and catch 
composition of fishing fleets. Fish that is caught without quota provision are discarded. IQ 
management with a discard ban can reduce over-quota discarding of cod when properly 
enforced. In that case, fishers will reallocate effort to fishing grounds and weeks when the 
cod catch is low at the expense of lower revenue.
Figure 2.9
Average over-quota cod catches in relation to fine levels. 
The thick dashed line represents a free-fishing situation 
(fine = 0). The thin lines represent different levels of fines 
imposed, ranging from 5-fold the market value of cod (€ 
12.5 kg–1) up to 20-fold the market value (€ 48.6 kg–1). The 
solid black line with no over-quota catches represents a si-
tuation with an extremely high fine (€ 200 kg−1) for overs-
hooting the quotas
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2The methods and results of this study will be generally applicable for mixed fisheries 
systems because the main results will not be affected by a number of simplifying assump-
tions necessary in our modelling approach, but the results cannot be directly applied in the 
management of the Channel fisheries. First, we assume that catching fish in an area has no 
effect on the amount of fish available in that area later in the year. Second, only variable 
costs related to fuel use were incorporated. In addition, these fuel costs were set at ~ 35% of 
gross revenue, whereas operating costs of gill-netters and beam trawlers are estimated to 
be 20% and 50%, respectively (Marchal et al. 2011). If costs are higher fishers may spend less 
time at sea or fish closer to port (Poos et al. 2010). Hence, differences in fuel costs may influ-
ence the catch composition and discard rate. Third, revenue was determined by the mod-
elled six species, although other commercially valuable species including squid, sea bass 
and herring also contribute to the revenue. Fourth, the quota system imposed on the French 
eastern Channel fisheries is more complicated than the system of individual quota explored 
with our model. In France, yearly quotas are allotted to public organisations and are either 
distributed to members (individual quota), or are available for all fishers, in which case it is 
competitive (generating a race for fish). Both mechanisms occur, and we lack precise quan-
titative information on how much each one occurs and for which species. In that sense, we 
also assume that only cod quota affect behaviour, while in reality also other species are man-
aged by quota. Fifth, we considered the study area as a single management unit, although 
it belongs to two different management units (subdivisions IVc and VIId). Since 2009 the 
eastern English Channel (subdivision VIId) was allocated a separate cod TAC (i.e. 1600 t in 
2011) from the North Sea (subdivision IV) cod TAC (i.e. 26800 t) (ICES 2011) and the French 
fleet receives a larger proportion of cod TAC (ca. 84%) in VIId, compared to that in IV (ca. 4%). 
Finally, we did not account for physical (e.g. depth, substrate) and natural (e.g. weather, wave 
height) elements of the environment making certain areas inaccessible to certain fleets or 
métiers. Due to these assumptions results may not fully correspond to the observed data. If 
we want to adjust the model to make it operational for practical use then the management 
questions should be specified first, because they will dictate the amount of detail required 
in the model. As indicated above, better understanding of the economic costs and returns 
and a more detailed implementation of the management regulations are likely candidates 
for addressing specific  management questions. 
Our model showed that, when forced by a fine, fishers have to some extent the ability 
to avoid over-quota discarding by reallocating their effort in space and time. Empirical sup-
port for this response comes from Branch & Hilborn (2008) and Branch (2009), who showed 
that when TACs were increased for some species and reduced for others, fishers were able to 
adjust the species mixture in their catches by reallocating their fishing effort. In the eastern 
Channel, landings of non-regulated species such as striped red mullet (Mullus surmuletus), 
sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) and squid (Loligo spp.) have increased following the decline 
of cod landings and may reflect a response of fishers to the change in resource composition 
(Carpentier et al. 2009).
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2An important consideration when exploring management regulations is the com-
pliance of fishers to regulations. Results show that compliance of the fishery to restrictive 
quota is influenced by the fine for overshooting the IQ. The fine as currently imposed in our 
model does not explicitly penalizes discarding, but applies to overshooting the specified 
maximum landing quotas. We hypothesise that the fine for discarding should be equal to 
the fine for over-quota landings minus the fish price to have similar effects in the observed 
patterns. This hypothesis results from the observation that the difference between discard-
ing and over-quota-landing is the price of the over-quota fish. Our results indicate that fines, 
in order to be efficient, should be much higher than fish price. Imposing a high fine would 
be a contributing factor to deter fishers from rule-breaking behaviour (Bose & Crees-Morris 
2009, Jagers et al. 2012). In our model, we assume a 100% detection rate, while realistically, 
rule-breaking behaviour of fishers may not necessarily be detected. This implies even higher 
fines should be considered to obtain full fisheries compliance. Yet, assessing the risk of being 
detected is beyond the scope of the present study.
Catches in this study are estimated on the basis of landings per unit effort of French 
commercial vessels. High resolution estimates of spatial and temporal distribution from in-
dependent sources like scientific research surveys are lacking for this area. The drawback 
of using commercial landing data of stocks which are managed with TAC remains the lack 
of information on high-grading, over-quota discarding and misreported catches (Rijnsdorp 
et al. 2007). Due to this missing information estimated catches may suffer a degree of bias, 
especially for species with a restrictive TAC such as cod (Ulrich et al. 2011).
In the present study, we have focussed only on one component of the discard prob-
lem, the over-quota discarding. Fishers may also be forced to discard catches below the min-
imum landing size (MLS) or discard non-commercial species. These discards are particularly 
high in mixed fisheries that target multiple species with different selectivity characteristics 
relative to the minimum landing size, such as in the roundfish, flatfish and Norway lobster 
fisheries (Rijnsdorp & Millner 1996, Cappell 2001, Catchpole et al. 2005). By ignoring these 
other discards, we will underestimate the overall level of discarding in these fisheries (Gillis 
et al. 1995a, Poos et al. 2010, Depestele et al. 2011).
The DSVM approach could also be applied to the problem of high-grading as well 
as discarding undersized and non-commercial fish. In the present study, each species was 
modelled as a homogeneous group of marketable fish, but key descriptors such as abun-
dance, catch and market price could be classified into different size classes in the future. 
Also, by including price dynamics into a stochastic dynamic programming model the be-
havioural response of fishers towards market value fluctuations may be studied (Dowling 
et al. 2012). Like many other studies of fishers’ behaviour we have presumed that fishers 
are entirely driven by economic interests (Gordon 1953, Hilborn & Walters 1987, Poos et al. 
2010). The relevance, however, of tradition, past experiences and information exchange on 
fishers’ behaviour (Holland & Sutinen 2000, Little et al. 2004, Marchal et al. 2009) could be 
taken into account. 
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2Currently most of the advice in mixed-fisheries is based on single-stock biological 
objectives (e.g. keep species above a certain biomass, obtain desired fishing mortality), al-
though in a mixed fisheries context the single species objectives cannot be achieved for 
multiple species simultaneously (Gröger et al. 2007, Ulrich et al. 2011, Da Rocha et al. 2012, 
Rijnsdorp et al. 2012). The model presented in this study allows trade-offs between multiple 
objectives in a mixed fisheries context. By introducing a length structure or age structure 
for different species, management scenarios can be tested to estimate (1) the bycatch of 
undersize commercially important species such as plaice; (2) over-exploitation of vulnerable 
species and (3) link predictions to existing stock assessment models and contribute to the 
improvement of mixed fisheries management. 
Mechanistic models are increasingly being used to analyse vessel fishing behaviour 
(Little et al. 2004, Poos et al. 2010, Dowling et al. 2011). Commonly, fishers behaviour is based 
on economic interests while alternative utility functions with less emphasis on economic in-
terests, such as tradition or information sharing could be included (Little et al. 2009). Howev-
er, this would require a more extensive understanding of the rationale of fishers’ behaviour. 
Fisheries management is a complex system, whereby a manager must take interests and 
concerns of many stakeholders into account. Our spatially explicit effort allocation model 
proves to be a useful tool to evaluate conservation and economic trade-offs and enables 
managers to visualize consequences of new management scenarios, such as a discard ban. 
Hence, our conclusions are important for fisheries in Europe as well as fisheries globally, con-
tributing to an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management where one tries to mitigate 
overfishing and low economic resilience of the fishing industry.
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CHAPTER 3
HIGH-GRADING AND OVER-QUOTA 
DISCARDING IN MIXED FISHERIES
Batsleer J., Hamon K. G., Overzee H.M.J. van, Rijnsdorp A.D., Poos J.J.
Chapter published in Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries (2015) 25: 715–736
3ABSTRACT
High-grading is the decision by fishers to discard fish of low value that allows them to land 
more valuable fish. A literature review showed high-grading is reported in commercial and 
non-commercial fisheries around the world, although the number of observations is small. 
High-grading occurs in fisheries that are restricted to land their total catch due to manage-
ment, market or physical constraints. Using the mixed flatfish fishery as a model system, a 
dynamic state variable model simulation showed that high-grading of certain grades occurs 
throughout the year when their ex-vessel price is low. High-grading increases with the de-
gree of quota restriction, while the level of over-quota discarding is unrelated to the quota 
level. The size composition of the high-graded catch differs from the landed catch. Due to 
the differences in the seasonal variation in size specific ex-vessel price, the effect of quota 
restrictions on the size composition of the discarded catch is non-linear. High-grading is dif-
ficult to detect for the fishery inspection as it occurs on-board during the short period when 
the catch is processed. We conclude that high-grading is under-reported in fish stocks ma-
naged by restrictive quota, undermining the quality of stock assessments and sustainable 
management of exploited fish stocks. 
KEY WORDS: 
By-catch, 
discards, 
Common Fisheries Policy, 
fisheries management, 
flatfish.
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3INTRODUCTION
Many fisheries around the world capture fish that are subsequently discarded back into the 
sea (Kelleher 2005). Discarding is mainly policy or market driven. Policy measures such as le-
gal landings sizes or catch quota may forbid selling small fish (Harley et al. 2000; Rochet and 
Trenkel 2005; Depestele et al. 2011; Feekings et al. 2012) or over-quota catches (Copes 1986; 
Branch 2009; Poos et al. 2010), while market incentives prevent the sale of certain (by-catch) 
species or size classes (Gray and Kennelly 2003; Hara 2013; Eliasen et al. 2014).
Discarding of marketable fish in fisheries that are under catch quota management are 
of particular interest. Catch quotas or “Total Allowable Catches” (TAC) are used worldwide 
to regulate fisheries. The intention of catch quotas is to control fishing mortality of a given 
stock to a specified level (e.g. to prevent overfishing). The use of such quotas relies on the 
premise that fishers adjust their fishing behaviour according to imposed catch limitations 
(Holden 1994; Daan 1997; Punt et al. 2006; Branch and Hilborn 2008). However, in reality 
TACs may control landings of fish but not the catch, because fishers may continue to fish 
and discard marketable fish exceeding the quota, as is likely in mixed fisheries (Pascoe 1997; 
Poos et al. 2010). As a result, the effectiveness of TAC management of mixed fisheries is ques-
tionable (Daan 1997).
As a refinement of the TAC system, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) (Christy 
1973) have been introduced world-wide to stop the “race for fish” (Copes 1986; Arnason 
1993; Squires et al. 1998). ITQs provide a share of the TAC to participants in a fishery who 
are allowed to sell and lease their share of the quota (Davies 1992). Having rights to prede-
termined shares of the resource output, fishers can plan their fishing effort to secure their 
share of the catch, without having to account for the catches of other fishers. Although the 
ITQs have generally been considered successful (Branch 2009; Hamon et al. 2009; Hannesson 
2013; Soliman 2014), they have not completely taken away the incentive for discarding parts 
of the marketable catch. Given that the quota is a predetermined share, fishers can optimize 
the economic return by “high-grading” their catch: that is to say, discarding those parts of 
the marketable catch that have the lowest value while quota is still available. Also in mixed 
fisheries, fishers can discard marketable fish once their quotas have been reached, termed 
“over-quota discarding”. The survival of the discarded fish can be low (Van Beek et al. 1990; 
Yergey et al. 2012), depending on the type of fishery (Van Beek et al. 1990; Campbell et al. 
2014), depth of catch (Sauls 2014), and other factors (Smith and Scharf 2011; Marçalo et al. 
2013). Because the survival of the discarded fish can be low, high-grading is considered to 
be a waste of resources. In response, in 2009 the EU declared high-grading an illegal practice 
(Regulation (EU) 43/2009). 
Theoretical studies suggest over-quota discarding and high-grading occur under spe-
cific conditions (Anderson 1994; Turner 1997; Parslow 2010; van Putten et al. 2012). However, 
empirical evidence for high-grading is scarce, although there is anecdotal information from 
the fishing industry. High-grading is not only an unknown contribution to the waste of food 
resources, it may also reduce the accuracy of stock assessments that underpin the manage-
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3ment of many fish stocks. Such stock assessments often rely on the age or length structure 
of the catches to estimate mortality in fish stocks. In the absence of observations of catches, 
landings are sometimes used as a proxy for catches. Since high-grading affects the age and 
length structure of the landed fish, the resulting stock assessment may lose accuracy in es-
timating the mortality and stock size, undermining the credibility of fisheries management 
(McCay 1995; Daan 1997; Rijnsdorp et al. 2007). Several studies have highlighted the impor-
tance of incorporating discards in stock assessments and propose methodologies for their 
inclusion (Punt et al. 2006; Aarts and Poos 2009). 
This paper reviews literature on high-grading and over-quota discarding observations 
from different fisheries around the world, collating empirical evidence from a wide range 
of fisheries to study the conditions under which this may occur. In addition, we present a 
case study that applies a behavioural model to study high-grading decisions of fishers in 
a Dutch beam trawl mixed fishery under individual quota management (Gillis et al. 2008). 
This fishery is known for discarding marketable fish (Quirijns et al. 2008, Poos et al. 2010). 
The model assumes that a fisher chooses a strategy that maximizes annual net revenue. Size 
structured catches allow exploring the consequences of quota management on discarding 
of less valuable market size classes in time. The results allow us to forecast over-quota dis-
carding and high-grading and explore the effect on age composition and the implications 
for stock assessment.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A list of original publications on observations of high-grading and over-quota discarding 
was derived from literature searches. First a search in Scopus on high-grading was done 
using the query ‘TITLE-ABS-KEY (((“high-grading” OR  “highgrading” ) OR “individual quotas” 
OR (“individual” AND “quotas” AND “strategy”) OR  (discard* AND (“minimum landings size” 
OR “minimum legal length” OR “commercial species” OR “legislation”))) AND (fish* ))’. This 
query thus included search terms for high-grading, and for terms that were expected to 
be linked to high-grading observations. Papers that contained observations on high-gra-
ding, such as on-board observations, interviews, or skipper logbooks were included in the 
review. Papers hypothesizing high-grading based on conceptual models were not conside-
red. Review papers were not included, but the original references were evaluated. In total, 
336 papers were screened from which 44 contained observations on high-grading. For each 
of these 44 papers, the gear type, main species, geographical area, management system, 
type of observation, and a short description of the observation were recorded. Table 3.1 
summarises the papers that report empirical observations of high-grading. Thirty of these 
reported observations were made by on-board observers. The fourteen other observations 
were mostly obtained by interviews, or self-sampling. In most cases where on-board obser-
vers were present, high-grading was inferred by generating sigmoid curves describing the 
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3length-based retention of individuals, and comparing these to minimum landing size (MLS) 
regulations. If the length at which 50% of the individuals was retained was higher than the 
MLS, this indicates high-grading. In 16 of the papers, the authors mentioned the existence 
of high-grading in the title or abstract of paper. For the remaining 28 papers, the existence 
of high-grading was mentioned in the text of 17 papers, or inferred by us in the other 11. In 
general we inferred the existence of high-grading when (1) length-structured discards ob-
servations showed that fish larger than the MLS was discarded, or (2) there was a clear size 
difference between landings and discards in the absence of an MLS. 
High-grading is reported from a wide range of areas and jurisdictions. In Europe, 
high-grading is observed in fisheries ranging from the Mediterranean Sea to the North-east 
Atlantic. In North-America, high-grading is reported in the Gulf of Mexico and the East coast. 
Additional observations are from Turkey, Greenland, New Zealand, Australia, and South Af-
rica. The existence of some form of individual quotas in the fishery was mentioned in 18 
papers. Other fisheries where individual vessels were able to plan the use of quota, such as 
trip limits and bag limits, also reported high-grading. The relatively large number of papers 
that are associated with ITQs may in part result from our query. Also, the concerns about 
high-grading in ITQ fisheries may have spurred empirical research into high-grading in 
those fisheries. Especially in New Zealand, the benefits and costs of adopting ITQs (and asso-
ciated problems with high-grading) appear to have been well studied. Finally, high-grading 
was present in at least five fisheries with TAC management. The exact number cannot be 
inferred from the literature because not all studies exactly specify the management system, 
while even national annual quota are sometimes subdivided and made available to individ-
ual vessels by e.g. producer organisations. High-grading was not always related to fisheries 
management, even if extensive management was in place: the literature review resulted 
in seven papers that explicitly mentioned high-grading because of market condition. Four 
studies mentioned the constraining hold of the vessel to be a driver for high-grading (Pikitch 
et al. 1988; Neher 1994; Olbers and Fennessy 2007; Kristofersson and Rickertsen 2009). Lower 
price categories are high-graded, most often the smaller individuals. However, high-grading 
of larger individuals is also observed. Most of the observations on high-grading in the litera-
ture represent commercial fisheries using a wide range of gears. One paper explicitly studied 
and mentioned the existence of high-grading in recreational angling.
A second search was done for over-quota discarding, using the query ‘TITLE-ABS-KEY 
((( “over-quota” OR “overquota”) OR “individual quotas” OR ( “individual” AND “quotas” AND 
“strategy”) OR (discard* AND (“minimum landings size” OR “minimum legal length” OR  “com-
mercial species”  OR  “legislation”))) AND (fish*))’. The resulting papers were treated similar to 
the high-grading literature review. However, from the 314 papers resulting from this query, 
we found only five papers where over-quota discarding could be unequivocally inferred. 
Those papers where wording was sufficiently strong to suggest discarding of marketable 
fish after quota were exhausted are collated in Table 3.2. Some of these papers were also 
included in the high-grading observations. Many papers are not included in table 2, be-
cause the discarding that resulted from constraining quotas can either be high-grading or 
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3over-quota discarding (e.g. , Richards 1994; Baelde 2001; Brewer 2011; Cullis-Suzuki et al. 
2012; Catchpole et al. 2014; Mace et al. 2014).
To summarise, the literature review shows that high-grading is reported from all over 
the world in a broad range of fisheries, although the number of reports with empirical evi-
dence is small. High-grading occurs in fisheries that are restricted in landing their total catch 
due to management, market or physical constraints. In the following sections, we will de-
scribe a conceptual model for quantifying high-grading and over-quota discarding.
SIMULATION MODEL 
In order to gain insight as to the mechanisms inducing high-grading and over-quota discard-
ing behaviour, we used a dynamic-state variable model (DSVM) (Houston and McNamara 
1999; Clark and Mangel 2000). Dynamic state variable models have been applied in a variety 
of fisheries to analyse vessel fishing behaviour (Gillis et al. 1995; Poos et al. 2010; Dowling et 
al. 2012; Batsleer et al. 2013). In such models, the optimal annual strategy of fishing vessels 
operating in fisheries under individual quotas and in a stochastic environment is evaluated. 
Our model differs from earlier models in that: 1) it includes size structured fish catches, and 
2) ex-vessel price by size class fluctuates over time. The utility function assumes that fishers 
are profit maximizers. Although other incentives may play a role in decision making, there is 
empirical evidence for profit as a useful metric of utility (Robinson and Pascoe 1997).
We model bottom trawl fishers targeting three size-structured fish species (sole, plaice 
and cod), where catches are divided into market categories based on size (Table 3.3). The 
size classes have seasonally variable auction prices (Fig. 3.1). The size structure and species 
composition of the catch is thus an important determinant of the value of a catch. The ex-
pected catch rates of each species/size class combination is defined by probability distri-
butions that are functions of fishing location and season, reflecting spatial and seasonal 
variations in abundance. Parameters describing the probability distributions are estimated 
from historic data. 
Table 3.3 Marketable size classes of the three target species. 
Size class Plaice Sole Cod
1  > 41 cm > 38 cm > 88 cm 
2 35 - 41 cm 33 - 38 cm 72 - 88 cm
3 31 - 35 cm 30 - 33 cm 55 - 72 cm
4 27 - 31 cm 27 - 30 cm 46 - 55 cm
5  24 - 27 cm 35 - 46 cm
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In the model fishers maximise their annual net revenue1 by making weekly decisions 
on (i) to go fishing or not; (ii) fishing location; and (iii) how much to discard given their an-
nual landing quota and restrictions on discarding. A weekly time scale is chosen because 
most fishing trips last from Monday to Friday in the bottom trawl fishery that serves as a 
case-study (Rijnsdorp et al. 2011). 
For simplicity we assume that there is one individual quota restricting a single species. 
In this case we chose plaice given observations of discarding of marketable plaice in the Dutch 
beam trawl fishery (Poos et al. 2010). Historically, the plaice quota constrained the fishery in 
the 1990s, leading to changes in the targeting behaviour of the fleet (Quirijns et al. 2008). The 
cumulative landings in weight of species s of the set of species S and size class n of N size class-
es is denoted by Ls,n. The cumulative landings in weight of the quota constrained species, that 
we define by s=1, represents the state of the individual, denoted by L and equal to 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
.
The landings are determined by the discarding decision and the catches which in turn 
depend on the spatial and temporal distribution of all size classes within the 3 species. Each 
week t individuals choose to visit fishing area a and to keep or discard any combination of 
the size classes caught of the different species. This behaviour is defined by a matrix d, of di-
mension S and N. Catches above ds,n are discarded. To limit the number of discarding options, 
the values of ds,n are restricted to 0 (all catches are discarded) or 231 (all catches are landed) for 
each combination of species and size class. The catches are modelled as a random variable 
having a negative binomial distribution with a mean ms,n,a,t per area, week, species and size 
1  i.e. the revenue minus variable costs, given that fixed costs do not impact short term decisions
Figure 3.1 
Seasonal variation in the ex-vessel price of the five size clas-
ses of plaice, sole and cod. Size classes are ordered from 
1—large to 5—small (adapted from Rijnsdorp et al. 2012)
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3class, and a dispersion parameter per species rs. The means and dispersion parameters are 
estimated from logbook data from the case study fleet. The probability 
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                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
of making a landings ls,n of amount χ is a function of the area choice in a given week, and the 
discarding decisions such that it has following cumulative distribution function:
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
 3.1
where 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
is the gamma function (Press et al. 2002). The optimal strategy in each week 
of the year, denoted by t depends on the cumulative landings of the quota species. These 
landings affect the possibility to continue fishing and land fish without exceeding the an-
nual quota. The expected net revenue at the end of the year is linked to the choices in the 
preceding weeks through a value function between time t and the end of year T. The value 
function represents the maximum expected net revenue to be made between week t and 
the end of the year T and depends on the state of the individual L, the amount of quota U 
for the quota species, the fine per unit weight for exceeding the quota F, and is expressed 
as 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
. Individuals exceeding their quota get a fine that depends on the quota 
overshoot. At the end of the year T, after all fishing has been completed, the value function 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , f r 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
is defined by the fine of overshooting the quota:
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
 3.2
For each week before T, the expected net revenue is determined by the value function, the 
weekly gross revenue and the costs of fishing. 
For all times t preceding T we use stochastic dynamic programming to find the opti-
mal solution by backward iteration of the net expected revenue H from t to the end of the 
year considering the choices a and d and the state L at t and optimal choices in subsequent 
weeks:
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
 3.3
where R(a,d,t) is the expected direct contribution of the gross revenue that follows from the 
sales of fish in a week resulting from choices a and d, and the prices of fish in that week  ps,n(t): 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
. The term κ represents a factor accoun-
ting for the additional revenue obtained from landing marketable species that are not explicit-
ly modelled. The term C(a) represents the variable costs in a week resulting from the choice of 
fishing area a. The term L’ reflects the change of the state L resulting from the weekly landings 
for the quota species, 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
. The term 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
denotes the expected future va-
lue taken over all possible states resulting from choices a and d. The optimal choice is given by :
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.  
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 
 
𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� =
                                           �∑ � 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  Γ �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!Γ�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=0 , for 0 ≤ 𝜒𝜒𝜒𝜒 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1                                         , for  χ ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ,
 
Γ (∙)  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
 
Chapter 3
66
3𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)  
 3.4
Hence, starting with 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)], 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡):  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′ 
 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁   
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡;𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)   we can iterate backwards in time and find 
the optimal choice in terms of location and discarding behaviour for all possible states, com-
bining the net revenue obtained from the sale of fish and costs of a fishing trip and the effect 
of the annual fines when exceeding annual quota. 
We explore high-grading and over-quota discarding decisions of conventional beam 
trawlers under a range of individual plaice quota (100 to 800 tonnes per year).
CASE STUDY DATA
Marketable catch and effort data by fishing trip are obtained from logbooks and individual 
sale slips for large Dutch beam trawl  mixed fishery (>1500hp). Restrictive TACs in recent years 
may bias port-based catch rate observations of marketable fish because of over-quota discard-
ing and high-grading (Rijnsdorp et al. 2008; Poos et al. 2010). Therefore, log book data from 
1970-1974 are used, a period where there were minimum mesh and landing sizes, but no TACs 
(Daan 1997). TACs were introduced only in 1975 for this fishery (Salz 1996). The data are collect-
ed on a trip by trip basis and include the landed weight of marketable fish by species and size 
category, fishing ground (ICES rectangle, ca. 30×30 nautical miles), fishing effort (hours fished), 
fishing gear, vessel length, and engine power. Data for plaice, sole and cod are analysed. 
Figure 3.2 
Fishing areas, black point indicates 
the location of the fishing harbour 
used in the model
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3Fishing areas are defined by aggregating ICES rectangles, similar to (Rijnsdorp et al. 
2012) (Fig. 3.2). The large Dutch beam trawlers are prohibited from fishing in the Plaice Box 
(areas 6 - 9) and the 12 nautical mile zones (areas 1 and 2). These areas are excluded from fur-
ther analysis. Fishing effort is determined by summing the fishing time and the travel time 
per week. The fishing time for large trawlers is estimated at 65 hours per week based on the 
effort dataset. Travel time is calculated by taking the distance from the harbour of departure 
to each of the fishing grounds and assuming a steaming speed of 12 nautical miles h-1 (Poos 
et al. 2013). 
TRAWL CATCH RATES 
Seasonal catch rates per fishing area for the different size classes of plaice, sole, and cod in 
the beam trawl fleet are described using generalized additive models (GAM, Wood 2006). 
Catch rates are modelled using the weight of the catches (kg) from the logbooks per size 
class per fishing trip as a response variable while effort (hr) is used as offset variable (Wood 
2006). By using a negative binomial GAM with a logarithmic link function we allow over-dis-
persed data and zero-observations (Wood 2006; Zuur et al.; 2009). The model to estimate 
catch by size class n and area a per week is applied to the data per species s:
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = a + gear + ƒ1(n, t | a) + log(engine power) + ƒ2(sweek, n) + offset (log(effort)), 
 
 3.5
where ƒ1 and ƒ2 are smooth functions based on a tensor product smoother (Wood 2006). The 
tensor product smoother ƒ1(n, t|a) is based on a cubic regression spline for size class and 
a cyclic cubic regression spline for week by area. The cubic regression spline for week by 
area results in equal values and slopes at the beginning and end of the year (Wood 2006). 
The maximum degrees of freedom for both smoothing terms is limited (k = 4) to prevent 
over-fitting. The covariate engine power is the log-transformed horse power and is included 
because of its influence on the catch efficiency. The covariate gear is included to differenti-
ate the catch efficiencies between the beam and otter trawl. The covariate sweek within the 
second smoothing term ƒ2(sweek, n) is week number since the start of the data collection 
(1 January 1970) and captures the gradual changes in biomass for each size class over time 
as a result of recruitment and mortality. In addition to the estimates of the mean catches ms,n,a,t the model also returns the estimated dispersion parameter per species rs. All analyses 
were done using the R statistical program (version 2.12.1; R Core Development Team 2013). 
The ”mgcv 1.7-29” package was used for the GAM model for trawl catch rates (Wood 2011).
The GAM model is used to estimate the spatial and temporal patterns in catch rates 
(kg week-1) for each size class of each target species in the period 1970-1974. To obtain val-
ues representative for the time period in which the economic data is collected, the predic-
tions are rescaled with a factor calculated by dividing the mean of the absolute values of the 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) of 1970 to 1979 by the mean of the absolute values of the SSB 
of the past 10 years (2004-2013). 
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3ECONOMIC DATA
The three species modelled represent 82% of the gross revenue of the Dutch beam trawl 
fleet. Mean weekly market values for the marketable size classes are calculated from sale slip 
data from 2003-2007 (Fig. 3.1). The fine for overshooting the individual quota is set to 320 € 
kg-1. Such a high fine ensures full compliance to the individual quotas in the model. Costs of 
discarding in terms of additional sorting time are assumed to be negligible.
Information on the cost structure of large beam trawl vessels (2008-2010) is obtained 
from LEI (Agricultural Economic Research Institute). The variable costs represent about 75% 
to 80% of the total annual costs and include fuel costs, gear maintenance costs, cost of han-
dling and transportation of landings, crew shares and other variable costs, such as auction 
and harbour fees. Fuel costs depend on effort and fuel price and is estimated to be approxi-
mately € 6400 day-1 (van Marlen et al. 2014). Gear maintenance cost is assumed proportional 
to fishing effort, landing costs proportional to the total weight landed, and other variable 
costs proportional to the gross revenue. Crew shares are predominantly determined by an 
agreement between the owner and his crew. Crew share is calculated after fuel, handling 
and transportation costs are deducted from the gross revenue. Values used for variable costs 
in the simulation model are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Variable costs of the beam trawl used in the simulation
Variable fishing costs Value Units
Fuel costs 6400 € d-1
Gear maintenance 347 € d-1
Landing costs 0.24 € kg-1
Employment costs 33 %
Other variable costs 0.05
RESULTS
TRAWL CATCH RATES
The input data of the simulation model consists of the estimates of the weekly catch rates 
for the different size classes of plaice, sole and cod. Distinct seasonal patterns between the 
different size classes for each of the three target species are observed (Fig. 3.3). Large plaice 
(>31cm, size classes 1,2 and 3) exhibit a similar seasonal distribution in most areas with low 
catch rates during spring and summer and high catch rates in the winter months. The smal-
lest marketable size class (27-31cm, size class 4) exhibits the opposite pattern with higher 
catch rates in spring and summer and lower catch rates in winter months. In addition, the 
catchability of large plaice appears to be higher in the more central and northern areas of 
the North Sea (e.g. area 13, Southern Dogger Bank) compared to the more coastal areas (e.g. 
area 3, Southern Bight). 
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For sole, the catch rates of the larger size classes (>33cm, size class 1 and 2) peak in 
winter and early spring, while the smaller size classes (size classes 3, 4, and 5) show a season-
al pattern, with a peak in summer and early autumn similar to that for smaller plaice. Sole 
catch rates are highest in the North Sea areas closer to the coast such as the Southern and 
German Bight (areas 3 and 10). Within the more central and northern areas of the North Sea 
catch rates are lower.
The highest catch rates of cod (all size classes) within the coastal areas (area 3, south-
ern Bight) are observed in December and January. A different pattern emerges for the off-
shore areas such as the German Bight (area 10 and 11) where the catch rates of the smallest 
size class (35 – 46cm) peak in late spring and summer while large cod (88+ cm) catch rates 
peak in winter and early spring. These patterns although still present, level off in most north-
ern areas such as the Dogger Bank and Central North Sea (area 13 and 16). Catch rates of in-
termediate size classes (3 and 4) of cod are consistently low throughout the year for all areas.
Figure 3.3 
Seasonal variations in the landings per unit of effort (LPUE 
kg week-1) of the size classes of a plaice, b sole and c cod. 
Size classes are ordered from 1—large to 5—small
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SIMULATION MODEL
The catch rates for the different size classes of plaice, sole, and cod are used as input to the 
model, together with the cost structure for the different choices. The model is run for indi-
vidual plaice quotas ranging from 100 to 800 t. No publicly available information exists on 
the amount of individual quotas per vessel, hence we used the 2013 plaice landings of the 
fishing vessels of the Dutch harbor Urk as a proxy for individual quotas. The landings ranged 
between 160 and 795 t per vessel, with a median of 629 t. Runs are used to evaluate the ef-
fects of different landing ITQ levels on effort allocation, and discarding behavior. 
EFFORT ALLOCATION 
Increasing individual quota for the limiting species results in a very small increase in overall 
fishing effort per vessel. However, there is a substantial reallocation of fishing effort over the 
fishing areas (Fig. 3.4). A low individual quota results in a concentration of fishing effort in 
the German Bight (area 10) which is one of the areas open for fishing close to the harbor. 
As individual quotas increase, more effort is allocated to areas 11 and 13 at the expense of 
effort in area 10. This shift to northern fishing grounds can be explained by the availability 
of large plaice in those areas.
CATCHES OF MARKETABLE FISH 
The marketable catches comprise landings and discards (over-quota and high-graded fish). 
Landings are perfectly controlled by the individual quota because fines for overshooting 
quota are much higher than the value of the extra catch and the risk of getting fined for 
overshooting is 100% in the model. Discarding of marketable plaice occurs in two different 
ways: over-quota discarding, when quota is exhausted and discarding occurs for all size clas-
Figure 3.4 
Annual fishing effort (days at sea) and 
fishing areas selected as a function of 
the plaice quota for a beam trawler 
under a management regime where 
discarding is allowed. Area 4 is only 
selected for quotas>300 tonnes year-
1. The effort allocated to this area is 
extremely limited. The majority of ef-
fort is allocated to areas 10, 11, and 13
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3
ses, and high-grading, when fishers have quota available and discard certain size classes. 
The model results indicate that over-quota discarding is largely unaffected by the amount of 
quota available, while high-grading increases with a decreasing quota (Fig. 3.5). 
All over-quota discarding occurs at the end of the year (Fig. 3.6). When more quota is 
available, fishers take more time to reach their quota limit and therefore over-quota discard-
ing occurs later in the year. In our case study system, there is substantial seasonal variation 
in the prices of the different size classes for the limiting species. At the beginning of the year 
prices for all size classes are lower than later in the year. In addition, larger fish generally 
fetch higher prices than smaller fish, except for the beginning of the year when the opposite 
is observed. As a result of the seasonal variability in prices, the highest amount of fish being 
high-graded is in the first weeks and at the end of the year when fish prices are low (Fig. 
3.6). With low quota fishers will high-grade year-round. An increase in quota systematically 
reduces the occurrence of high-grading throughout the year. The decrease in high-grading 
first occurs in the middle of the year (price of fish is highest) and then at the end of the year. 
The size distribution of the catches, landings and discards of marketable plaice is 
influenced by the amount of quota (Fig. 3.7). Each of these distributions depends on the 
allocation of effort to areas or weeks characterised by different size composition and the 
discarding choices made by the individual skippers. At high quota, there are relatively few 
discards of the smallest size classes. Reductions in quotas result in an increasing amount of 
small fish being high-graded. The relationship between the discarding of small fish and the 
quota is far from linear and results from the interplay between the seasonal differences in 
availability and ex-vessel price of the different market categories.
Figure 3.5 
Landings and discards (tonnes year-1) 
of a beam trawler as a function of the 
plaice quota. Discards are distinguis-
hed between high-grading and over-
quota discarding
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3
DISCUSSION
Having started with a broad query which produced 336 papers, our review of literature 
resulted in 44 papers describing observations of high-grading. Our findings that only 44 
papers contained high-grading observations corroborates Boyd and Dewees (1992), who 
stated that even if high-grading is expected, it is difficult to detect and prove: on board 
Figure 3.6 
Weekly landings and discards for a beam trawler at a plaice 
quota of 200, 500 and 800 tonnes year-1. High-grading and 
over-quota discarding are depicted separately
Figure 3.7 
Proportion of marketable size classes in the catch, landings 
and discards for a beam trawler as a function of plaice 
quota
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3observers may influence the fishing behaviour of skippers and reduce the probability of 
detection (Liggins et al. 1997, Benoît and Allard 2009). Despite this problem, the positive 
reports reviewed shows that high-grading occurs worldwide in both pelagic and demersal 
fisheries, in fisheries with and without ITQs, in commercial and recreational fisheries, and 
in single-species and mixed fisheries. In all these fisheries, we expect differences in utility 
among different size classes of fish (Zimmermann and Heino 2013) or among different peri-
ods within the quota planning horizon (Rijnsdorp et al. 2012), being one of the prerequisites 
for high-grading (Branch et al. 2006). We expect the incentive to high-grade to depend on 
the price differential among the different size classes (Kingsley 2002).
Most of the fisheries in which high-grading was observed are mixed fisheries man-
aged under individual catch quota systems. This is not surprising given that individual quo-
tas allow individuals to maximise the economic return on their quota by high-grading the 
cheaper parts of the catch and increasing the average return per unit quota (Gillis et al. 1995; 
Squires and Kirkley 1995). These fisheries allow individual fishers to plan the use of their quo-
ta, being it on an annual, trip or other time-period. The mixed nature of the fishery allows 
income from a fishery even if parts of the limiting quota species are discarded. Meanwhile, 
discarding of undersized fish may also occur in mixed fisheries if minimum size limits of dif-
ferent species and mesh size regulations do not match (Daan 1997). 
Our review suggests that high-grading often occurs because of quota constraints. 
For example, in the North Sea, megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) is high-graded and 
the likelihood of this species being discarded decreases significantly with increasing quota 
(Macdonald et al. 2014). Likewise, the amount of high-grading for cod in the North Sea by 
Belgian fishers decreased nearly linearly with trip quota (Depestele et al. 2011). Elsewhere, 
high-grading is suggested as a problem of limiting individual quota (Dewees, 1989; Dewees, 
1998). In a few cases, market conditions were pinpointed as the important driving force for 
high-grading. This difference in the frequency of occurrence could suggest that fisheries 
strive to find markets for as much of their catch as possible. 
We found substantially fewer papers that described observations of over-quota dis-
carding than those describing observations of high-grading. This could be due to several 
reasons. First, high-grading can occur for reasons of constraining quota or market condi-
tions, while over-quota discarding only occurs because of limiting quota. Second, we de-
cided to only include papers where the wording unequivocally indicated that discarding 
occurred after quotas were depleted. Finally, we expect that fishers will use price differences 
in market classes and fishing seasons to high-grade their catches, rather than discard the 
entire catch including the high-valued market categories at the end of the year.  
The dynamic state variable model simulates a mixed fishery under individual quota 
constraints with a price differential among different size classes. Seasonal and size variations 
of the prices result in the discarding of specific size classes if quota are restrictive. Important-
ly, the model results indicate that the amount of high-grading is sensitive to the amount of 
quota, while over-quota discarding is almost constant irrespective of the quota level. The 
reason for this difference is that high-grading is the result of fishers planning their use of 
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3available quota. Over-quota discarding is the result of the stochastic nature of the catches 
which prevents fishers from planning their catches perfectly. Hence, we hypothesize that 
the amount of over quota discarding is a function of the variability in the catch rates. In an 
environment with price differences among size classes or seasons, over-quota discarding 
will decrease with decreasing uncertainty in catch rates.  
By incorporating size structure in the resources, seasonally variable catch rates and 
fish prices we have improved the ability to explore the consequences of quota manage-
ment on the discarding of marketable size classes compared to earlier studies (e.g. Gillis et 
al. 1995; Poos et al.; 2010; Batsleer et al., 2013). Some simplifying assumptions, however, still 
remain. In our study, six assumptions are relevant. First, we assume that individual fishers 
maximize their economic performance while fully complying with management regula-
tions. Non-compliance to quota regulations would result in a lower amount of high-grading 
and over-quota discarding if fish are landed illegally. Second, the model ignores quota leas-
ing. Such quota leasing could reduce high-grading and over-quota discarding if fishers who 
are forced to discard can buy quota from vessels with excess quota because of low catch 
rates. This quota leasing would not occur in situations with low quota when all vessels are 
constrained by the quota, or in situations with high quota when no vessels are constrained. 
Third, the model does not incorporate any frequency or density dependent effects, such 
as exploitation and interference competition, which may negatively affect catch rates (Ri-
jnsdorp et al. 2000, Gillis 2003), or price formation (as in e.g. Dowling et al. 2012). Fourth, 
only three target species (i.e. plaice, sole and cod) are included in our model of which only 
plaice has a catch quota affecting the behavior of a fisher while in reality, sole and cod are 
also managed by quota. In addition, location choice may also be affected by the availability 
of other components of the mixed fishery such as turbot (Scophthalmus maxima) and brill 
(Scophthalmus rhombus) (Gillis et al. 2008). Fifth, we assume that the hold capacity does not 
constrain the landings within a fishing trip. Finally, the model assumes that the proportional 
catch of different size categories is fixed within each area and season. In reality, the fishers 
may have the additional behavioral flexibility of changing the proportional catches of dif-
ferent size categories by changing the mesh size of the gear. However, in our case study the 
effect of changing the mesh size is substantially different for the different species. Increasing 
the mesh size has a much stronger effect on the catches of the more valuable sole than it has 
for plaice, because of the difference in shape between the two species (Van Beek et al. 1983). 
Our model shows that fishers can respond to changes in individual quota by reallo-
cation of effort and discarding part of their marketable catch. These results are in line with 
previous studies showing the adaptability of fishers in a mixed fishery to reallocate effort in 
space and time thereby optimizing their catch composition relative to the size of the quota 
(Poos et al. 2010; Batsleer et al. 2013). Our model results indicate that substantial high-grad-
ing may occur at the beginning of the year, long before quota are exhausted as a result 
of seasonal variation in the price of plaice. During the spawning period, the price of the 
larger size classes of plaice is relatively low as compared to the smaller size classes due to 
the presence of a large gonad and a lower meat quality of spawning fish (van Overzee and 
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3Rijnsdorp 2015). High-grading also occurs during other parts of the year, in particular in late 
summer and autumn when a new year class recruits to the fishery and the high catch rate of 
the smallest size class coincide with a relatively low price compared to the larger size classes. 
The amount of over-quota discarding is more limited and by definition concentrated at the 
end of the year. This over-quota discarding is the result of the uncertainty in the catch rates, 
preventing individuals from optimizing the use of quota by high-grading alone. 
In the model, individual landing quotas are strictly enforced by means of high fines 
while high-grading is allowed. In reality, high-grading is prohibited in the North Sea since 
2009. To test whether a ban on high-grading can be enforced effectively, we estimated the 
number of observed infringements from the campaign results of the joint deployment plan 
of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA). All campaign results in terms of number of 
on board inspections, number of infringements of fisheries conservation measures, and the 
nature of the infringement are published on the EFCA website. Based on the reports from 
the period 2009-2012, it seems that inspections in the North Sea rarely detect high-grading: 
The 3000 inspections carried out, recorded approximately 350 infringements, of which only 
one was related to high-grading (EFCA 2014). Although this could indicate high-grading in 
these fisheries occurs rarely, we infer that it reflects the difficulty of detection because (i) 
high-grading can only be detected by fishery inspectors when fishers are caught in action 
and (ii) the time needed to process the catch on board is relatively short.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to model discarding of marketable fish while 
explicitly distinguishing between high-grading and over-quota discarding. Given the dif-
ficulties in obtaining reliable estimates of the amount of marketable fish that is discarded, 
modelling studies can provide the urgently required insight as to the quantity, the age and 
size structure as well as the conditions when this may be expected. This insight may guide 
inspection agencies to manage their inspection effort. More importantly, the insight as to 
the quantity as well as the size or age-structure of the discarded catch will allow fisheries 
scientists to explore the accuracy of their assessment of the stock (Dickey-Collas et al. 2007; 
Pawlowski and Lorance 2009; Harley et al. 2000; Heery and Berkson 2009) and the quality of 
the scientific advice (Daan 1997; Rijnsdorp et al. 2007; Ulrich et al. 2011). 
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CHAPTER 4
MIXED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: 
IS THE BAN ON DISCARDING LIKELY TO 
PROMOTE MORE SELECTIVE AND FUEL 
EFFICIENT FISHING IN THE 
DUTCH FLATFISH FISHERY?
Batsleer J., Rijnsdorp A.D., Hamon K. G., Overzee H.M.J., Poos J.J.
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4ABSTRACT 
We model the potential effects of a discard ban on the annual fishing strategy of individual 
fishers in a mixed fishery under individual quota management. The North Sea beam trawl 
fishery, which catches large amounts of undersized plaice, is used as a model system. Under 
a discard ban, fishing is restricted to the fishing grounds and weeks where a maximum re-
venue can be realised with other species while catching the quota of the restricted species 
with a reduced bycatch of undersized fish. Model results suggest that, if properly enforced, 
a discard ban provides an incentive to implementation of more selective fishing gears that 
catch fewer small fish and are more fuel efficient (pulse trawl). If a discard ban is not properly 
enforced, restrictive quota do not necessarily result in the intended decrease in discarding 
as the fishery continues to fish while discarding the over-quota catch and least valuable size 
classes caught. 
KEY WORDS
landing obligation, 
beam trawl, 
pulse trawl, 
sole, plaice, 
North Sea, 
TAC, 
quota.
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4INTRODUCTION
Among the concerns about sustainable exploitation is the discarding of part of the catch 
(Alverson et al., 1994; Jennings and Kaiser, 1998; Uhlmann et al., 2014). Because trawl fis-
heries are generally not fully selective for the marketable fish species and fish size catego-
ries, they can catch a large proportion of undersized target species, non-target species, and 
over-quota catches and lower valued fish of quota species. These catches are subsequently 
discarded (Gillis et al., 1995a; Catchpole et al., 2005). Discarding may occur because of a mis-
match between fishing opportunities and fishing capacity (over-quota discarding and high-
grading), or because of a mismatch between minimum landing size (MLS) and mesh size 
regulations for species caught in mixed fisheries. Many discarded fish do not survive the 
catching and sorting process (Van Beek et al., 1990; Kaiser and Spencer, 1995; Broadhurst et 
al., 2006). This additional mortality may jeopardise the sustainable use of marine resources, 
especially because they are not always well recorded and it can be difficult to account for it 
in fisheries management (Alverson et al., 1994; Crowder and Murawski, 1998; Dickey-Collas 
et al., 2007). 
In response to the societal concerns about discarding, the 2013 reform of the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Regulation (EU) 1380/2013) of the European Union (EU) includes 
a discard ban for quota regulated species which are not covered under the prohibited 
species list (Article 15, Regulation (EU) 1380/2013) (Borges, 2015). This discard ban aims at 
stopping discarding for commercial valuable species, much like in other countries such as 
Norway (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011), Iceland (Arnason, 1995) and New-Zealand 
(Annala,1996). If properly implemented and enforced, a discard ban could reduce discarding 
by encouraging the use of more selective gears and by forcing fishers to select fishing areas 
with lower discard catch rates (Condie et al., 2013; Batsleer et al., 2013). As the catch of under-
sized fish may not be completely avoided, a discard ban is expected to reduce the economic 
value of the landings for fisheries operating under catch quota since part of the landings will 
consist of undersized fish which cannot be sold for human consumption but will likely be 
sold at a lower price for fish meal (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2011; Buisman et al., 2013). 
This may create an incentive for the fishing industry to use more selective fishing gears to 
avoid unwanted catch (Condie et al., 2013, Condie et al., 2014). Gear modifications such as 
an increase in cod-end mesh size or the deployment of escape panels and sieve nets have 
proven to reduce the discards of unwanted and undersized fish (Briggs et al., 1999; Revill and 
Holst, 2004; Catchpole and Revill, 2008). 
The North Sea flatfish fishery is mainly carried out by Dutch beam trawlers targeting 
sole (Solea solea) and plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) with a bycatch of other bottom dwelling 
fish (Daan, 1997; Gillis et al., 2008) and managed with individual transferable quota (Salz, 
1996; Rijnsdorp et al., 2007). Because of the small mesh size required to catch the slender 
sole, large numbers of undersized plaice are caught and discarded (van Beek, 1998; Aarts 
and Poos, 2009). The recent increase in the cost of fuel has reduced the economic profit-
ability in this fleet (Rijnsdorp et al., 2008; Bartelings and Soma, 2010). To reduce fuel costs, 
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4vessels reduced their towing speed and replaced their heavy beam trawl gear with a pulse 
trawl gear (Beare and Machiels, 2012; Poos et al., 2013b). Pulse trawl gears requires about 
half of the amount of fuel per hour of fishing as the gear is towed at a lower speed and use 
electrical pulses to stimulate the flatfish out of the sea bed as compared to the convention-
al beam trawlers using mechanical stimulation with tickler chains (van Marlen et al., 2014; 
Soetaert et al., 2015). 
In this paper we use the North Sea flatfish fishery as a model of a mixed fishery sys-
tem to (i) investigate the consequences of a discard ban on the discarding decisions under 
individual quota management; (ii) test whether a discard ban may promote the transition 
towards the more selective and energy saving pulse trawl. We use a Dynamic State Variable 
model that was previously developed for this fishery (Poos et al. 2010). This model is adapted 
to allow studying how a discard ban will affect the discarding decisions and economic prof-
itability of conventional beam trawlers and new pulse trawlers. The response of the fleet to 
a discard ban is compared to the situation where discarding is allowed. The latter situation 
reflects both the current management regime and the situation of a discard ban where fish-
ers do not comply with the regulation. Although the model is parameterised for two gear 
types used within the Dutch flatfish fishery we make several simplifications that affect the 
numerical outcomes. Nevertheless, our results are informative of the potential effects of the 
discard ban on the discarding decisions and the transition towards a more selective and fuel 
efficient fishing gear.
METHODS
SIMULATION MODEL 
We model bottom trawl fishers targeting three size-structured fish species (sole, plaice and 
cod). For each species we model 5 size categories, based on regulatory market categories. 
The fishers operate under individual landings quota for the target species using either 
conventional beam trawl gear or pulse trawl gear. The two gears differ in catch efficiency, 
species- and size-selectivity and cost structures (van Marlen et al., 2014). A Dynamic-State 
Variable Model (DSVM: Clark and Mangel, 2000, Houston and McNamara, 1999) is used to 
evaluate annual strategies for fishing vessels under annual landing quotas. Extending the 
DSVM of Poos et al. (2010) individual skippers maximise expected annual net profit by ma-
king weekly decisions: (i) to go fishing or not; (ii) where to fish; (iii) and how much to discard. 
The weekly time scale is chosen because most fishing trips last from Monday to Friday (Rijns-
dorp et al., 2011). The choices depend on spatially and temporally varying catch rates for the 
different species and size classes, cost structures, and annual quotas. 
The expected catch rates of each gear type are a function of fishing location and sea-
son. Because the ex-vessel price varies among species, size class and seasons, the size struc-
ture of the catch is an important determinant for the economic return of a catch. We assume 
Chapter 4
86
4that landings quota are restrictive for a single species; plaice. We chose plaice as an example 
of a choke species, because it is the target species of which the largest numbers of under-
sized fish are caught. Hence, plaice quota will likely be the limiting factor when undersized 
plaice will be counted against the quota. 
THE DYNAMIC-STATE VARIABLE MODEL
The cumulative landings (in weight) of species s of the total number of species S and size 
class n of N size classes is denoted by Ls,n. The cumulative landings in weight of the quota 
constrained species, that we define by s=1, represents the state of the individual skipper, 
denoted by L and equal to ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)]  
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = α + ƒ1(n, a, t) + ƒ2(wn, n) + β log(engine power) + log(effort)  
 
.
The optimal fishing strategy in each week of the year, denoted by t depends on the 
state of the individual skipper. In our case, the cumulative landings of the quota constrained 
species affects the possibility to continue fishing and land fish without exceeding the annual 
individual quota. Dynamic state variable models find the optimal behavioural strategy by 
working backwards, starting at the end of the year. The expected net revenue at the end 
of the year is linked to the choices in the preceding weeks by means of a value function 
between time t and the end of year T. The value function depends on the cumulative land-
ings of the quota species L for an individual skipper, the amount of individual quota U for 
the quota species, the fine per unit weight for exceeding the individual quota F, and is ex-
pressed as V(L, U, F, t). Individual quota are not transferable and individuals exceeding their 
quota get a fine that depends on the quota overshoot (L - U), hence the state-dependent 
part of the revenue at the end of the year  is defined by the fine at the end of the year for 
overshooting the quota:
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)]  
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = α + ƒ1(n, a, t) + ƒ2(wn, n) + β log(engine power) + log(effort)  
 
 4.1
In addition, the expected net revenue is determined by the weekly gross revenue and the 
costs of fishing. Each week individuals choose to visit fishing area a (including area 0: “staying 
in harbour”) and to keep or discard any combination of the size classes caught of the quota 
species. This behaviour is defined by the vector d = [d1, d2, ... , dN], in which each element 
(size class) can take the value 0 (discard) or 1 (keep on board and land). 
For all times t preceding T we use stochastic dynamic programming (Clark and Man-
gel, 2000) to find the optimal solution by backward iteration of:
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)]  
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = α + ƒ1(n, a, t) + ƒ2(wn, n) + β log(engine power) + log(effort)  
 
 4.2
Where R (a, d, t) is the expected immediate contribution of the gross revenue from the sales 
of fish in a week resulting from choices a and d. H(L,U,F,t;a,d) is thus the utility value of an 
individual making choice a and d, given its state at time t behaving optimally from time t + 1 onwards. The catches are modelled as a random variable having a negative binomial 
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4distribution with a mean ms,n,a,t per area, week, species and size class, and a dispersion pa-
rameter per species rs. The means and dispersion parameters are estimated from logbook 
data from the case study fleet. The term κ represents a factor accounting for the additional 
revenue obtained from landing marketable species that are not explicitly modelled but are 
caught while targeting the model species, e.g. turbot, brill, and whiting. The term G(a) are 
the incurred fuel costs per trip resulting from the choice of fishing area a, while the term C(a) represents the variable costs in a week resulting from the choice of fishing area a in-
cluding crew, landing and other variable costs. The term L’ reflects the change of the state L 
resulting from the weekly landings for the quota species. The term 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
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𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
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denotes the expected value taken over all possible states resulting from choices a and d. The 
future utility given that an individual behaves optimally from time t onwards is:
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)]  
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
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 4.3
Starting with V(L,U,F,T)= Φ(L,U,F) we can iterate backwards in time and find the optimal choice 
in terms of location and discarding behaviour for all possible states, combining the direct net 
revenue obtained in a fishing trip and the effect of the fines when exceeding annual quota. 
The expected direct gross revenue R(a,d,t) is a function of the landings of the of the 
5 size classes within the 3 species. These landings result from location choice and the spatial 
and temporal distribution of the 5 size classes within the 3 species, as well as the discarding 
decisions. The gross revenue from the main species depends on the landings and the ex-ves-
sel price for a size class of a species in a given week. The landings are determined by the 
discarding decision and the catches. The expected catches consist of two components: the 
marketable catches of fish that are larger than the minimum landings size, and the catches 
of fish that are smaller than the minimum landings size. The model is parameterized from 
logbook data on marketable catches and effort, discards estimates from Poos et al. (2013), 
pairwise comparisons of catch rates from beam trawls and pulse trawls, and economic data 
obtained from accountancy data. 
EXPECTED CATCH RATES OF MARKETABLE FISH
Catch rates of marketable fish for this fishery can only be derived from logbook data on 
landings. We chose to use the data of the early 1970s because in this period the quality of 
the data was not affected by misreporting, over-quota discarding or high-grading that may 
have occurred since the introduction of restrictive quota in the mid 1970’s (Daan, 1997; Poos 
et al., 2010). Weekly catch rates per fishing area for the different size classes of plaice, sole, 
and cod (Table 4.1) are estimated for 238 conventional large beam trawl vessels (>=300hp). 
The engine power of the vessels ranged between 310 to 2500 hp, with a mean of 640 hp. 
Fishing areas were defined similar to (Rijnsdorp et al., 2012) (Fig. 4.1). Although estimates 
were made for all areas, the coastal areas 1,2 and 6-9 are excluded from the DSVM model 
because large beam trawlers are prohibited from fishing in those areas.
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4Expected catch rates in each of the fishing areas are statistically modelled using the 
observations from the logbooks with generalized additive models (GAM; Wood, 2006). The 
weight of the catches (kg) per size class and species per fishing trip as a response variable 
while fishing effort (hr) is used as offset variable (Zuur, 2012). By using a negative binomial 
GAM with a logarithmic link function we allow for over-dispersion and allow zero-observa-
tions (Zuur et al., 2009). For each species s, the model is fit independently to data to estimate 
mean catch by size class and area  per week t :
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = � 0, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈−(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈    
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∗  𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)]  
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)}   
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = α + ƒ1(n, a, t) + ƒ2(wn, n) + β log(engine power) + log(effort)  
 
 4.4
Table 4.1 Size classes of the three target species. Size class 5 of plaice represents the undersized fish.
Size class Plaice Sole Cod
1 > 41 cm > 38 cm > 88 cm 
2 35 - 41 cm 33 - 38 cm 72 - 88 cm
3 31 - 35 cm 30 - 33 cm 55 - 72 cm
4 27 - 31 cm 27 - 30 cm 46 - 55 cm
5  < 27cm 24 - 27 cm 35 - 46 cm
Figure 4.1 
Study area, with the fishing areas and 
the harbour from which the case stu-
dy fleet operates (black dot).
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4where α is the model intercept, and ƒ1 and ƒ2 are smooth functions based on a tensor prod-
uct smoother (Zuur, 2012). The tensor product smoother ƒ (n a, week) is based on a cubic 
regression spline for size class and a cyclic cubic regression spline for week, by area. The 
cubic regression spline for week results in equal values and slopes at the beginning and 
end of the year (Wood, 2006). The covariate wn within the second smoothing term is week 
number since the start of the data collection and captures the gradual changes in biomass 
for each size class over time as a result of recruitment and mortality. The maximum degrees 
of freedom for both smoothing terms is limited (k = 4) to prevent over-fitting. The effect of 
log-transformed covariate engine power (with units kW) is estimated in parameter β and 
is included because of its influence on the catch efficiency (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006). Effort is 
treated as model offset: as a column of the model matrix with associated parameter fixed 
at 1 (Wood, 2006). In addition to the estimates of the mean catches ms,n,a,t the model also 
returns the estimated dispersion parameter per species rs. All analyses were done using the 
R statistical program (version 2.12.1; R Development Core Team, 2013).
The GAM model is used to estimate the spatial and temporal patterns in catch rates 
(kg week-1) for each size class of each target species in the period 1970-1974. To obtain catch 
rates representative for the current situation, the predictions are rescaled to the values of 
the spawning stock biomass (SSB) of 2004-2013 (ICES, 2013), multiplying the historic catch 
rates by the ratio of the SSB estimates in the two periods. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL PATTERNS IN CATCH RATE OF UNDERSIZED PLAICE
For plaice, one of the size classes represents undersized (< 27cm) fish. Predictions for these 
catches (in numbers) per km2 by age for the beam trawlers are obtained from (Poos et al., 
2013a). The predictions are made for a location within each of the fishing areas. Predicted 
numbers by age are converted to weight (kg) by applying a von Bertalanffy growth model 
taking account of the seasonal fluctuations in growth (Somers, 1988) to research survey data 
and commercial samples collected between 2005 – 2010, and a length-weight relationship 
estimated from discard samples collected between 2009 and 2011. Catch per week are sub-
sequently calculated accounting for the gear-width (24 m), the towing speed, (12 km h-1), 
the haul duration (2 hr), and the number of hauls per week (40). 
CATCH EFFICIENCY OF BEAM TRAWL AND PULSE TRAWL GEAR
Table 4.2 shows the relative catch efficiency of the pulse trawl and beam trawl. The results 
are based on the results of a comparative fishing experiment (van Marlen et al., 2014). The 
difference is partly due to the difference in towing speed: pulse trawl ~ 5 nautical miles h-1; 
conventional beam trawl ~ 6.5 nautical miles h-1 and the difference in the species and size 
selectivity of the gear.
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ECONOMIC DATA
The three species modelled contribute 82% to the gross revenue of the beam trawl fleet. 
Weekly mean ex-vessel price of the marketable size classes are calculated from sale slip data 
from 2003-2007 (Fig. 4.2). The price for undersized plaice in the discard ban scenario is de-
rived from a market survey demonstrating a selling price between 0.15€ kg-1 and 0.30€ kg-1 
can be expected (Buisman et al., 2013). In our study we assumed an average price fixed to 
0.22€ kg-1 in the discard ban scenario and 0.00€ kg-1 in the scenario where discarding is allo-
wed and landing undersized fish is prohibited. We ignored price elasticity to keep our model 
relatively simple. This is a reasonable assumption since in general fish have low elasticity as it 
can be substituted by other fish products on the world market (Nielsen et al., 2009). 
Table 4.2 Economic and relative catch efficiency (kg.h-1) parameters of the beam trawl and pulse trawl gear used in the 
simulation.
Costs parameters Beam trawl Pulse trawl
Fuel costs 6400€ d-1 2400€ d-1
Gear maintenance 347€ d-1 347€ d-1
Landing costs 0.24€ kg-1 0.24€ kg-1
Employment costs 33% 33%
Other variable costs 0.05 0.05
Catch efficiency parameters
Sole 1 0.86
Cod 1 0.31
Marketable plaice 1 0.71
Undersized plaice 1 0.52
Figure 4.2 
Seasonal variation in the ex-vessel price of the five size clas-
ses of (a) plaice; (b) sole and (c) cod. Size classes are ordered 
from 1 (large) to 5 (small). The smallest size class in plaice re-
presents the undersized fish. Ex-vessel prices from the mar-
ketable size classes are derived from the actual sales data 
from 2003 to 2007. Ex-vessel price for undersized plaice are 
constant and derived from a market analysis (Buisman et 
al., 2013). 
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4Information on the cost structure of large Dutch beam trawl vessels (2008-2010) is 
obtained from accounting data collected annually from a panel of vessels by LEI. The vari-
able costs represent about 75% to 80% of the total annual costs and include fuel costs, gear 
maintenance costs, cost of handling and transportation of landings, crew shares and other 
variable costs, such as auction and harbour fees. Fuel costs depend on trip effort and fuel 
price and are estimated to be approximately €6400 day-1 for a large beam trawler and €2400 
day-1 for a pulse trawler (van Marlen et al., 2014). Fishing effort per week was estimated from 
the time spend at sea minus the travel time between the harbour and the fishing ground 
assuming a steaming speed of 12 n miles h-1 (Poos et al., 2013b). Vessels in the model operate 
from a single harbour (Harlingen, see Fig. 4.1). Gear maintenance cost is assumed propor-
tional with fishing effort, landing costs proportional to the total weight landed, and other 
variable costs proportional to the gross revenue (Table 4.2). Crew shares are determined by 
an agreement between the owner and his crew and is calculated from the gross revenue of 
which fuel, handling and transportation costs are deducted. 
MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS
Simulations are run for a range of plaice quota (between 100 to 800 tonnes per year per ves-
sel) to study how quota constraints affect discarding decisions and energy efficiency. Two 
scenarios were applied: one scenario in which discarding is allowed and a second scenario 
in which discarding is banned. No publicly available information exists on the amount of 
individual quotas per vessel in the Dutch fleet, hence we used the 2013 plaice landings from 
one of the main fishing fleets leaving from the harbour of Harlingen as a proxy for individual 
quotas. The landings ranged between 160 and 795 t, with a median of 629 t. 
RESULTS
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL PATTERNS IN CATCH RATE 
Distinct spatial and seasonal patterns in catch rate are observed for the different size classes 
of plaice, sole and cod. Figure 3 shows the patterns in a selection of areas representing the 
main fishing areas of the fleet. Catch rates of undersized plaice (size class 5) are high in the 
eastern North Sea (areas 10 and 11) and show a clear seasonal pattern with high values in 
summer and early autumn. High catch rates for large plaice (size class 1 and 2) are observed 
in the eastern area (area 11) and central area (area 13) as well as in the winter period in more 
southern areas (areas 3 and 10). 
Sole catch rates are highest in the southern (area 3) and eastern areas (areas 10 and 
11). Catch rates in northern areas is low. Catch rates of the smaller size classes (size classes 3, 
4, and 5) show a seasonal pattern with a peak in summer and early autumn. In contrast, the 
catch rates for the larger size classes peak in winter and early spring. 
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Cod catch rates in the southern North Sea (area 3) show a seasonal peak in winter. In 
the German Bight (area 10 and 11), catch rates of the smallest size class (size class 5) peak 
in late spring and summer, while large cod (size class 1) catch rates peak in winter and early 
spring. These patterns, although still present, are less distinct in most northern areas such 
as the Dogger Bank and Central North Sea (area 13 and 16). Catch rates of intermediate size 
classes (3 and 4) of cod are consistently low throughout the year for all areas.
SIMULATED DISCARDING DECISIONS AND LOCATION CHOICE
Under a discard ban, fishing effort (Fig. 4.4) and catches (Fig. 4.5) are limited by plaice quota, 
particularly for the conventional beam trawl. Pulse trawlers are less affected by the plaice 
quota and spend more days fishing and catch substantially more sole than beam trawlers, 
but less cod. The catch of undersized plaice is similar between both gears. At low plaice 
quota conventional beam trawlers remain in port in the beginning of the year when ex-
vessel fish prices are low, and later when the catch rates of undersized plaice are relatively 
high. Pulse trawlers remain in port only in the first weeks of the year. 
Figure 4.3 
Seasonal variation in the landings per unit of effort (LPUE 
kg/week−1) of the five size classes of (a) plaice; (b) sole; 
(c) cod for a selection of fishing areas. Size classes from 1 
(large) to 5 (small). The smallest size class in plaice repre-
sents the undersized fish. The fishing areas shown are se-
lected to illustrate the typical seasonal distribution pattern 
in the southern, eastern and central North Sea, and repre-
sent the important fishing grounds chosen in our model.
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The difference in response to quota between both gears is related to the higher selec-
tivity of the pulse trawl, which catches fewer undersized plaice. This allows the pulse trawlers 
to deploy more effort in the Southern Bight (area 3) where the catch rate of sole is high (Fig. 
4.3). The beam trawl fishes in the German Bight (area 10) where the catch rate of sole is 
slightly higher than in area 3, in spite of the higher catch rate of under sized plaice. At higher 
plaice quota, effort is shifted to areas (area 11 and 13) with higher catch rates of large plaice. 
If discarding is allowed, a reduction of the plaice quota hardly affects fishing effort, but 
does affect the location choice (Fig. 4.4). At low plaice quota, both gears predominantly target 
sole in the German Bight (area 10). At higher plaice quota, the window of opportunity to tar-
get marketable plaice in northern areas is higher and more effort is allocated to these areas. 
As a consequence, a reduction in the plaice quota does not result in a proportional decrease 
in the catch of marketable plaice because the part of the catch that exceeds the quota will be 
discarded (Fig. 4.5 and 4.6). A reduction in the plaice quota results in a change in the species 
composition of the catch: the catch of sole and undersized plaice increases, while the catch 
of cod decreases. The annual catch of beam trawlers is higher than pulse trawlers (Fig. 4.5).
Figure 4.4 
Annual fishing effort (days at sea) and fishing areas selec-
ted as a function of the plaice quota for a pulse trawler 
and a conventional beam trawler under a discard ban, and 
under a management regime where discarding is allowed.
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Figure 4.5 
Catches (tonnes yr−1) of a pulse trawler and beam trawler 
as a function of the plaice quota under a discard ban and 
a regime where discarding is allowed: (a) marketable size 
plaice; (b) undersized plaice; (c) sole; (d) cod.
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Figure 4.6 
Annual discards of marketable plaice and undersized plaice 
for a beam trawl (left panel) and a pulse trawler (right pa-
nel) as a function of the plaice quota under a management 
regime allowing discards. 
Figure 4.7 
Net annual revenue (1000 Euro) of a pulse trawler and a 
beam trawler under a discard ban (right panel) and under a 
management regime allowing discarding (left panel).
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SIZE COMPOSITION OF LANDINGS AND DISCARDS
If discarding is allowed, the plaice discards consist of undersized as well as marketable sized 
fish. The quantity and the size distribution is influenced by the quota and differs between 
both gear types (Fig. 4.6). At low quota, large quantities of both marketable and undersized 
plaice are discarded. If the quota increases, the quantity of discarded marketable sized plai-
ce decrease. For a pulse trawl, the proportion of marketable sized plaice discards is greater at 
low quota, but smaller at high quota compared to a beam trawler. Quantities of undersized 
plaice discards only slightly decrease with increasing plaice quota despite the reallocating 
of effort to northern areas where catch rate of undersized plaice is low. 
ECONOMIC RETURNS AND FUEL EFFICIENCY
The net revenue, resulting from the total revenue minus the variable costs, depends on the 
management scenario and differs between the beam trawl and the pulse trawl gears (Fig. 
4.7). As is expected, net revenues increase for both gears with increasing plaice quotas. Re-
Figure 4.8 
Fuel use per landed weight (upper panels) and revenue 
(lower panels) for the management scenario that allows 
discarding (left panels) and the scenario (right panels).
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4gardless of having a ban or not, is a pulse trawler is economically more profitable under all 
plaice quotas. Implementation of a discard ban substantially reduces the net revenue for 
both gears. However, the discard ban causes a larger reduction in net revenues for the beam 
trawlers than for the pulse trawlers. 
When allowing discards, both gears are able to maintain a net revenue above 700 k€ 
y-1. As the plaice quota increases, net revenue gradually increases as a result of an increasing 
contribution of plaice in addition to continuously high sole revenues. As plaice quota levels 
increase, the sole landings of a pulse trawler decreases because more effort is allocated to 
northern fishing grounds, causing net profit of both gears to approach each other. 
In the scenario where discarding is allowed, the pulse trawler is about twice as ef-
ficient in its fuel use per Euro of revenue or kilogram of landings (Fig. 4.8). Fuel efficiency 
increase with increasing plaice quota. Under a discard ban, difference in fuel efficiency be-
tween the gears is smaller when expressed in terms of revenue and almost absent when the 
fuel efficiency is expressed in terms of the weight of the landings. The difference in fuel effi-
ciency between the management scenarios is due to the lower fishing effort applied under a 
discard ban when vessels make fewer trips to fishing grounds where catch rate and revenue 
are close to their seasonal maximum. 
DISCUSSION
DISCARDING DECISIONS
Under the assumption of full compliance, our model suggests that a discard ban results in 
a reduction of the catch of undersized plaice. The reduction depends on the plaice quota. 
Under the assumption of non-compliance, the amount of undersized plaice discards will 
remain high and is hardly affected by the plaice quota. A restrictive quota of plaice even 
result in an increase in plaice discarding (Fig. 4.6) because the fleet shift its fishing towards 
sole in areas where undersized plaice are abundant. In this situation, not only undersized 
plaice are discarded, but also low-value size classes of marketable sized plaice (Fig. 4.6). This 
high-grading occurs well before the quota are exhausted and is a result of the economic 
optimization given the available quota (Squires et al., 1998). 
Because the pulse trawl is more efficient in catching sole than other species and catch-
es less undersized fish (van Marlen et al., 2014), pulse trawling is expected to reduce (abso-
lute) discarding of undersized fish. The expectation is supported by our simulation of the 
scenario allowing discards (Fig. 4.6). Under a discard ban, however, our model suggests that 
the catch of undersized plaice does not differ much between the conventional beam trawl 
and the pulse trawl (Fig. 4.5). This result is due to higher economic profitability that allow the 
pulse trawlers to spend more time fishing. 
Under the discard ban regime, we assumed that fishers received a low price for the 
undersized plaice. At present, there is still uncertainty how market opportunities for under-
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4sized fish would develop when the discard ban will be in effect (Buisman et al., 2013). A low 
market value may incentivise fishers to illegally discard small sized fish and land more high 
valued fish to cover their costs of fishing, while higher market prices can encourage fishers 
to start fishing for small sized fish, counteracting the actual intention of a discard ban to 
reduce the impact on unwanted catches (Buisman et al., 2013, Sardà et al., 2015). 
TRANSITION TO A MORE SELECTIVE AND FUEL EFFICIENT GEAR
Our results show that a pulse trawler has higher net revenues than beam trawlers. Under a 
discard ban the difference in net revenue between the two gears increases, suggesting that 
a discard ban may increase the incentive for traditional beam trawlers to replace the tickler 
chain beam trawl by a pulse trawl. 
The difference in profitability between the two gears is mainly due to the lower fuel 
cost of the pulse trawl. The difference in profitability may be overestimated, because data on 
the cost of gear maintenance and fixed cost of the pulse gear is not available. On the other 
hand, a discard ban may entail increased costs for handling (i.e. additional crew), storing and 
landing discards (Mangi and Catchpole, 2012, Sardà et al., 2015), which will predominately 
affect the variable cost of the conventional beam trawl that catches a larger amount of un-
dersized fish. 
The current developments in the fleet, where a large number of vessels have applied 
for a permit to replace the conventional beam trawl with a pulse trawl, provides support for 
our conclusion and shows that the current high fuel cost (Beare and Machiels, 2012, Poos 
et al., 2013b) is already a sufficient stimulus to replace conventional beam trawls with pulse 
trawls (Condie et al. 2014). 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
The EC has agreed to reduce unwanted catches and prevent discarding by means of pro-
gressively introducing a discard ban (EC, 2011). Studies by Feekings et al.(2012), Heath et 
al. (2014), Borges (2015) and Sardà et al. (2015), have argued to conduct more research on 
the effectiveness and consequences of the discard ban. Our study showed that a discard 
ban could stimulate the use of more selective gear. However, if not properly enforced, the 
consequences of a discard ban may be very different. Although these results are conditional 
on the model formulation, our approach is generally applicable to study the consequences 
of management scenarios for any mixed fishery for which sufficient biological and economic 
information is available. 
Our results reflect the short term effects of a discard ban on the net revenues of the 
two gears. The long term effects remain to be studied. It is to be expected that the long term 
yields will differ under the different management scenarios as a result of the evolution of the 
resources. Such analyses are the domain of bio-economic management strategy evaluations 
where the feedback between fleet and stock dynamics are explicitly modelled (Andersen et 
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4al., 2010, Prellezo et al., 2012). In such models, effects of the changing selectivity of the fish-
ing fleets on the reference points for sustainable exploitation, such as FMSY can be evaluated.
It should be noted that our results only reflect the short term response of a fishery to 
the discards ban. If the ban indeed results in a change in selectivity, we also expect longer 
term changes to occur in fish populations and the economy of the fishery. If mortality in 
discarded fish is high, a reduction in plaice discarding following a properly enforced dis-
card ban will likely result in an increase in recruitment to the fishery. In theory, this increase 
in recruitment could offset the short term economic losses. However, the extent to which 
the increase in recruitment of fish to the fishery will result in higher yields and spawning 
stock biomasses will depend on how density dependent feedback mechanism operate in 
the stocks. As a result of this uncertainty, the long term economic consequences are also 
uncertain. 
MODEL VALIDATION
The Dynamic State Variable Model approach (Gillis et al., 1995b, Houston and McNamara, 
1999, Clark and Mangel, 2000, Poos et al., 2010, Dowling et al., 2012) is particularly suitable 
to study effort allocation and discarding decisions of fishers under various management 
constraints and model assumptions. Here we studied the possible consequences of a dis-
card ban that is currently being implemented in the European Union, using the North Sea 
flatfish fishery as a case study. The DSVM includes the characteristics relevant to the research 
question: seasonal variation in the availability of different size classes of three target species, 
including the undersized fish of one of the fish species, differences in ex-vessel prices among 
size classes and seasons and two fishing gears that differ in species- and size-selectivity and 
variable cost. Although our model was parameterised for the Dutch beam trawl and pulse 
trawl fleet, the results will only be indicative of the response of both fleets to the implemen-
tation of the discard ban because of the simplified assumptions and model formulation. 
Our model simplifications with regard to maximising net revenue, perfect knowledge 
about the stochastic nature of catch rates, lack of transferability of individual quota, and 
lack of interference competition between fishers have been discussed by Poos et al. (2010). 
The assumption that all vessels operate from a single harbour (Harlingen) affects the pre-
dicted fishing effort and catches. Indeed, the simulated effort distribution is restricted to 
three fishing areas, while observation of the entire Dutch fleet indicate that fishing effort is 
distributed over a larger number of fishing areas (see Fig. 7b in Rijnsdorp et al., 2008). Also, 
we cannot expect that the simulated catches and the size distribution will accurately predict 
the present day catches because the seasonal distribution in the abundance was based on 
data collected in the 1970s. Not only may spatial patterns have changed, but also we made 
the assumption that the relationship between spawning stock biomass and catch rates was 
linear, similar to a Holling type 1 functional response (Holling, 1959). The validity of this as-
sumption is untested, and alternative relationships, such as a Holling type II response could 
apply. We nevertheless chose to use the data of the early 1970s because in this period the 
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4quality of the data was not affected by misreporting, over-quota discarding or high-grading 
that may have occurred since the introduction of restrictive quota in the mid 1970’s (Daan, 
1997; Poos et al., 2010). 
Despite these assumptions, the simulation model was in broad agreement with the 
observations. First, at a representative plaice quota of 350 tonnes the proportion of under-
sized plaice of the simulated catch (40%) compares to an observed value of around 50% 
(Uhlmann et al., 2013). Second, the model shows a close similarity in the spatial distribution 
between the two gears in the scenario where discarding is allowed. This is in agreement with 
a strong positive linear correlation of fishing effort among our fishing areas (r2 = 0.82, n= 15, 
P<0.01) between the two gears observed in the field. 
In the model, we used fairly large geographical areas, following Rijnsdorp et al. (2012). 
The spatial scale at which local concentrations of fish may occur may be much smaller than 
the fishing areas used in our model (Poos et al, 2007). We may thus underestimate the spatial 
flexibility that the fishery has in finding its optimal behaviour. Spatial measures on smaller 
scale are such as closures of small areas with high catch rates of undesirable species or size 
classes are another way to reduce discards (Needle and Catarino, 2011) that we did not ex-
plore here,
In this study we assume that plaice is the limiting quota species. Indeed, in the period 
2004-2010, the plaice landings in the North Sea have matched the quotas, suggesting that 
the quota have been restrictive. The sole quotas have not been fully used in all years in the 
same period (ICES, 2013). Given the increased use of pulse trawls with a high catchability 
for sole, the sole quotas may become limiting in the near future. The 1st phase of the im-
plementation of the discard ban is focussed on the discarding of the target species of the 
fishery (e.g. sole and plaice). In the 2nd phase, other bycatch species may also be included. 
This may seriously affect the effort allocation and discarding decisions as the catch weight 
of undersized dab is of the same order of magnitude as that of plaice (Uhlmann et al., 2013).
COMPLIANCE OF THE FISHERY TO A DISCARD BAN
Whether the introduction of a discard ban on the amount of discard produced in the flatfish 
fishery is critically dependent on the full compliance of the fishers to land all the fish they 
catch. Assuming full compliance, the model suggests that the amount of discards will be 
substantially reduced but at the cost of a substantial reduction in revenue. It is uncertain, 
however, whether this will apply to the European fisheries. Compliance will, e.g., depend 
on the frequency of inspection and the fine imposed when violating a regulation (Jagers 
et al., 2012, Batsleer et al., 2013). Experience in other countries showed that a full cover-
age observer programme can provide a strong incentive to comply to quota management 
in mixed fisheries (Branch and Hilborn, 2008). In the European Union, fisheries inspection 
is the responsibility of the national inspection services that carry out at sea inspections as 
well as inspections of the landings on land. The inspection frequency of individual vessels is 
unlikely to be sufficient to enforce full compliance. The lack of recovery of cod in the North 
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4Sea, for instance, has been related to high-grading, which is already prohibited in the North 
Sea (Ulrich et al., 2011). Such high-grading is expected in mixed fisheries with individual 
quota and price differences among size classes. The ex-vessel price is positively related to 
fish size in a broad variety of pelagic and demersal species (Zimmermann and Heino, 2013). 
Also in flatfish fisheries, there are indications for over-quota discarding and high-grading 
(Poos et al., 2010). Pilot experiments on the implementation of fully documented fisheries in 
Denmark and the UK indicate that this method may improve compliance (Kindt-Larsen et al. 
2011; Mangi et al., 2015).
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CHAPTER 5
EXPLORING HABITAT CREDITS TO 
MANAGE THE BENTHIC IMPACT IN A 
MIXED FISHERY 
Batsleer J., Poos J.J., Marchal P., Vaz S.,Vermard Y., Rijnsdorp A.D.
5ABSTRACT 
The performance of a combined catch quota and habitat credit system is explored to man-
age the sustainable exploitation of a mix of demersal fish species and minimise the ben-
thic impacts of bottom trawl fisheries using a dynamic state variable model approach. The 
model is parameterised for the eastern Channel demersal mixed fishery using otter trawls 
or dredges. The target species differ in their association with habitat types. Restricting catch 
quota for sole and cod does not reduce the benthic impact, except when reduced to very 
low values forcing the vessels to stay in port. Quota management has a minimal influence 
on fishing behaviour and hence results in a minimal reduction of benthic impact. Habitat 
credits are required to manage the benthic impact. Indirectly, these restrict the possibilities 
to exploit the fish species. However, when reducing habitat credits from high to low, the net 
revenue only decrease slightly at first, and more steeply at low Individual Habitat Credits. 
There is thus room to reduce habitat impacts of these fisheries with limited effect on the 
net revenue. 
Chapter 5
108
5INTRODUCTION
The impact of bottom trawl fisheries on benthic habitats and ecosystems is a matter of glob-
al concern (Kaiser et al. 2006). Such bottom trawl fisheries use towed gears that make direct 
physical contact with the seafloor to catch species living or feeding close to the bottom 
substrate (Valdemarsen et al., 2007). As a consequence, these fisheries potentially reduce 
structural complexity of habitats, injure or kill target and non-target species, alter species 
composition, and modify ecosystem processes such as benthic production (Dayton et al., 
1995; Collie et al., 1997; Thrush et al., 1998 ; Kaiser et al., 2002). 
The extent to which bottom trawl fisheries disturb benthic ecosystems depends on 
the type of fishing gear used, the frequency and distribution of fishing activities in an area 
( Kaiser et al., 2006; Rijnsdorp et al. 2016) as well as the sensitivity of habitats and benthic 
ecosystems to fishing disturbance (Collie et al., 2000; Eno et al., 2013). This sensitivity differs 
across habitats as a result of differences in natural disturbance (bottom shear stress, effects 
of waves), bottom typology (e.g. slope and depth), sediment composition, and species com-
position (Hall, 1994; Jennings and Kaiser, 1998; Snickars et al., 2014, van Denderen et al., 
2014). Complex biogenic habitats with emergent structures are likely to be more affected 
compared to naturally disturbed soft sedimentary habitats (Jennings and Kaiser, 1998; Lind-
holm et al., 2015). 
Fish species caught by bottom trawl fisheries differ in their preference to habitat types, 
because of their morphological and behavioural characteristics. Habitat preference gener-
ally changes along the life cycle of species, because of ontogenetic niche shifts (Thouzeau 
et al., 1991; Le Pape et al., 2003; Atkinson et al., 2004). Adult roundfish species, for example, 
have a preference for hard bottom habitats with a high structural complexity providing food 
and shelter (Tupper and Boutilier, 1995; Wieland et al., 2009), while flatfish species such as 
plaice and sole prefer soft bottom habitats in which they can burry themselves to avoid 
predation (Gibson and Robb, 2000). As a result, the impact of a fishery on the seabed habitat 
and benthic ecosystem depends on the linkage between the habitat preference of the dif-
ferent species, and the species preference of the fishery. 
Many fisheries management systems around the world historically focussed on the con-
servation and sustainable exploitation of commercial fish and shellfish stocks by setting Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs) but ignoring the potential wider ecosystem effects of fishing (Pikitch 
et al., 2004; Chu 2009; Holland and Schnier 2006). Policy developments such as the amend-
ments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act in the U.S. and the reform of the Common Fishery Poli-
cy (CFP) in Europe have recognised the importance of safeguarding ecosystem composition, 
structure and functioning and have embraced an ecosystem-based approach. This objective 
requires managers to assure a sustainable use of natural resources while minimising impacts of 
fishing activities on the structure and functioning of seabed habitats and benthic ecosystems.
The conventional approach of fisheries managers to maintain or restore ecosystem 
processes focusses on technical measures including limitations on fleet capacity and fishing 
effort, gear restrictions and spatial measures (Rice et al., 2012). While spatial measures (e.g. 
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5marine reserves or marine protected areas) can support the conservation of biomass and 
diversity of organisms (Halpern, 2003; Lester et al., 2009) the socioeconomic benefits for the 
fishery are often limited (Caveen et al., 2015). Several studies have proposed the use of a 
credit system as an alternative management approach (Holland and Schnier, 2006; Kraak 
et al., 2012). These credit systems try to balance economic and environmental values asso-
ciated with fisheries by addressing specific conservation goals with limited effects for the 
fishery (Van Riel et al., 2015). 
Our study explores the performance of individual catch quota combined with a habi-
tat credit system to manage the sustainable exploitation of a mix of demersal species and to 
minimise the benthic impacts of bottom trawl fisheries. Results are compared to traditional 
quota management for two commercial valuable species, cod and sole, which have different 
habitat associations. We apply an individual based simulation model of the effort allocation 
and discarding decisions in a mixed fishery (Poos et al., 2010; Batsleer et al. 2013). The model 
is adapted to include individual habitat credits (IHC) and is parameterised for the French 
multipurpose bottom trawl fleet in the eastern English Channel. This fleet may switch be-
tween dredging for scallops and otter trawling for a mix of demersal fish species (Carpentier 
et al., 2009). We then evaluate the extent to which the incorporation of habitat credits in a 
quota management system can be a tool for ecosystem based management, in terms of 
benthic impacts reduction and sustainable exploitation of fish.
METHODS
STUDY AREA
The Eastern English Channel (ICES division VIId) is a narrow and relatively shallow shelf-sea. 
A strong east-west tidal current affects seabed habitats in this area (Coggan and Diesing, 
2011). The Eastern English Channel consists of 15 ICES rectangles (~30 × 30 nautical miles), 
which we have divided into grid cells of 3x3 nautical miles each. Spatial distribution of hab-
itats is derived from a detailed map of Eastern English Channel seabed habitats in Coggan 
and Diesing (2011) (Fig. 5.1). Each grid cell was assigned the dominant habitat type present 
within that cell. We distinguished five habitats based on grain size and depth (soft, infralit-
toral coarse, circalittoral coarse, deep coarse, and rock). Soft sediment habitats consisted of 
fine sand or muddy sediments, found along the coast and in the eastern part where the Eng-
lish Channel borders the North Sea. Coarse sediment habitats were the predominant type in 
the eastern English Channel. Rocky seabed habitats were a combination of infralittoral and 
circalittoral rock and other hard substrates occurring towards the west along the coast with 
an extensive reef found in the western part of the study area (Diesing et al., 2009). Adjacent 
cells of the same habitat type were merged and counted as a single fishing area, resulting 
in 126 fishing areas. This is done within each ICES rectangle, in order to be used with the 
available fisheries data. 
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Habitat impact credits were assigned to each fishing area based on the sensitivity of 
habitats to fishing activities. Rock habitat and deep coarse sediment habitat support emer-
gent epibenthos such as sponges, bryozoans and hydroids, making them more vulnerable 
to trawling compared to more shallow and dynamic soft sedimentary habitats (Jennings 
and Kaiser, 1998; Kaiser et al., 2006; Eno et al., 2013; Boulcott et al., 2014). Impacts credits 
were divided into three arbitrary classes (2, 5 and 10 credits). Rock and deep coarse habitats 
received 10 habitat impact credits, circalittoral received 5 credits, while infralittoral coarse 
and soft sediment habitat received 2 credits (Table 5.1). 
STUDY FLEET
The French multipurpose bottom trawl fleet comprises of vessels between 12 and 18m long, 
with an average engine power of 240 horse power. These vessels are allowed to fish inside 
and outside the 12 nautical mile zone (Carpentier et al., 2009). Vessels make daily trips to 
Figure 5.1 
Habitat distribution map based on Coggan and Diesing 
(2011), with the main French fishing harbours used in this 
study. ICES rectangles are delineated by the white dashed 
lines.
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5their fishing grounds, operating from several ports around the eastern English Channel, 
mainly Boulogne-sur-Mer and Dieppe. 
Logbooks and sales slip data were available for the period 2006 to 2010. The data set 
included information of individual vessels by fishing trip on vessel length, engine power, 
gear type, mesh size, fishing ground (ICES rectangle), fishing effort (hours fished), and the 
weight and value of the landings per species. Aggregated fishing effort estimates per fishing 
area were derived at the fine scale resolution (3 x 3 nmi) for 2008 from Delavenne (2012) 
(Table 5.1). 
We selected vessels that can switch between demersal otter trawling (OTB) and dredg-
ing for scallops (Pecten maximus). The scallop fishery is fully open between November and 
April (Guyader et al., 2004). Demersal otter trawling is generally operated with 80mm mesh 
size nets, targeting a variety of demersal species. The scallop dredge (DRB) lands few other 
commercial valuable species. The Bay of Seine is the most important scallop fishing ground 
in the eastern English Channel and some fishers temporarily change harbour to reduce their 
journey to the scallop fishing grounds. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL SHIFTS IN CATCH RATE
Five species (scallops - Pecten maximus, sole - Solea solea, plaice - Pleuronectes platessa, cod 
- Gadus morhua, sea bass - Dicentrarchus labrax) and one assemblage of cephalopods (cut-
tlefish - Sepia officinalis; squids - Loligo vulgaris and L. forbesii) will be considered here due to 
their economic importance for this fleet. These will from now on be referred to as six “spe-
cies”, for the sake of simplicity, keeping in mind that one of these “species” really represents a 
group of cephalopods. Catches in the present study were estimated on the basis of landings 
per unit effort of French commercial vessels. For each of the species the mean and variance 
of catches were estimated from the logbooks at their spatial (ICES rectangle) and temporal 
(week) scale (Fig. 5.2). These mean and variance in catches (kg) were estimated using gen-
eralized additive models (GAMs) (Wood, 2006). In the GAMs, fishing effort (hr) was used as 
model offset (Zuur, 2012). This use of effort as model offset allows predicting catch rates 
(kg/hr) from the GAM results. A negative binomial response with a logarithmic link function 
was applied, allowing for over-dispersion and zero-observations (Zuur et al., 2009). Scallop 
catch rates were analysed only including trips with dredges, while catch rates of the other 
Table 5.1 Habitat types, associated habitat impact credits and fishing effort distribution (%) over habitat types.
Habitat Habitat impact credit Effort OTB (%) Effort DRB (%)
Rock 10 1.0 0.2
Deep Coarse 10 14.9 16.4
Circalittoral Coarse 5 68.4 71.3
Infralittoral Coarse 2 9.2 5.7
Soft 2 6.6 6.4
Total (h yr-1) 394385 46545
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five species were analysed for trips done by demersal otter trawls. The model estimating the 
catch C per species s by area per day is given by: 
Cs= ∝ + β(year)+ ƒ1(engine power)+ ƒ2(mesh size)+ ƒ3(lat,lon,DOY)+log(effort) 5.1
Where α is the model intercept and ƒ1, ƒ2 and ƒ3 are smooth functions based on a tensor 
product smoother (Zuur, 2012). The differences in catch rates among years is estimated in 
the parameter β(year). The tensor product smoother ƒ1(engine power) is included due to 
its influence on the catch efficiency (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006) and ƒ2 (mesh size) is included 
as the choice of mesh size may indicate the species the fishery is targeting. The interaction 
term ƒ3(lat,lon,DoY) fits the effects of space (latitude and longitude based in geographic 
midpoint of the ICES rectangle) and time as day of year (DoY). The term is based on a thin-
plate spline (Wood, 2003) for the space variables and a cyclic cubic regression spline for 
DoY. The cyclic cubic regression spline was chosen to receive equal values and slopes at the 
beginning and end of the year (Wood, 2006). For scallops the cyclic cubic regression spline 
for DoY was changed into a cubic regression spline because of the closed season from May 
to October. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to assess the model fit, whereby 
Figure 5.2 
Schematic representation of the methodology and data 
used in this study.
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5the model with the lowest AIC was selected as best candidate. The best models included a 
limited degree of freedom for the ƒ1 and ƒ2 smoothing terms (k=4), but a higher degree of 
freedom for the ƒ3 smoothing term of the space * time interaction (k=9). All analyses were 
done using the mcgv package within the R statistical program (version 2.12.1; R Core Devel-
opment Team 2013; mgcv description). 
CATCH RATES BY FISHING AREA
The GAM provides estimates of catch rates per species per ICES rectangle. The rectangles 
are composed of mosaics of habitats (Fig. 5.1). To estimate catch rates by fishing area within 
ICES rectangles, catch rates were assumed to be positively correlated with effort per fishing 
area (Fig. 5.2). This assumption is supported by observations that fishing effort is not homo-
geneously distributed within an ICES rectangle, but is distributed on a finer spatial scale, 
concentrating within areas of high fish densities (Rijnsdorp et al. 2011). 
Observed fishing effort per fishing area on the fine scale resolution (3 x 3 nmi) were 
derived from combining weekly effort from logbooks by ICES rectangle with fine-scale effort 
distribution (Table 5.1) as follows: First, the fraction of effort distributed over the habitat 
types within each ICES rectangle was calculated from VMS data for each gear type. Multiply-
ing these fractions with the effort distribution by ICES rectangle in the logbooks resulted in 
a distribution of effort in habitat type h within an ICES rectangle a by week w (Ehaw). 
Catch rate at the resolution of the habitat type h within each ICES rectangle a (Lha) was 
not directly available but calculated from catch rates in the logbooks at the ICES rectangle 
scale: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
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 5.2
Where Ehaw is the effort per week w in habitat type h in ICES rectangle a and Sha is the surface 
area of habitat type h in ICES rectangle a. The α is a scaling-factor to aggregate the highest 
fish density within habitat types with the highest effort by area ratio. When α is set to zero, 
catch rates are equal over each habitat type within an ICES rectangle. Increasing α results in 
a differentiation in catch rates over habitat types, with larger catch rates in habitat types with 
the highest aggregation of effort (Fig. 5.3). The value of α is arbitrarily set to 0.5, assuming 
fishing activities concentrate within areas and habitat types with a high density of target 
species (Rijnsdorp et al. 2011).
 To scale the catch rates by week, estimates are rescaled to reflect the average fishing 
effort per week. Fishing effort per week was estimated from the logbooks; resulting in the 
average time spent at sea (10h day-1) and average number of trips per week (4 trips week-1). 
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ECONOMIC DATA
Mean weekly market values for the six species are calculated from auction price data in the 
period 2006-2010 (Fig. 5.4). During the scallop season, scallops contribute to more than 85% 
of the gross revenue and account for almost 40% of the annual income of the fleet (Carpenti-
er et al., 2009). The five other species included in our study account for another 27% of the to-
tal annual income. The six species combined thus contribute 67% of the total annual income. 
The model includes a fine for overshooting individual landings quota or individual 
habitat credits. The fines have been set to arbitrarily high values of 1950€ kg-1 and 5000€ IHC-
1 to ensure vessels compliance with the management regulations within the model. 
Variable costs for this fleet include fuel costs, landing costs, and crew salaries (Table 
5.2). Fuel costs depend on the type of vessel and gear used. Fuel costs were available in the 
IFREMER SIH (2011) database and estimated to be approximately 440€ day-1 when operating 
a dredge and 730€ day-1 when operating a demersal otter trawl (mean 2008-2010). Landing 
costs are defined as the fees paid by the vessel when catches are landed and depends on 
the total revenue the vessel obtained. Salary costs depend on the total revenue obtained at 
the end of the fishing trip. Other variable costs are mostly related to fishing effort. Landing 
costs, salary costs and other variable costs are derived from a study of (Daurès et al., 2013) 
and assumed to be independent of the gear type used during a fishing trip. 
Figure 5.3 
Variation in catch rates (LPUE, kg h-1) for 6 target species on 
different substrates. Rock (R), deep coarse sediment (DC), 
circalittoral coarse sediment (CC), infralittoral coarse sedi-
ment (IC) and soft sediment (S).
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SIMULATION MODEL
The performance of a combined catch quota and habitat credits system is forecasted using 
a Dynamic State Variable Model (DSVM) (Houston and McNamara, 1999; Clark and Mangel, 
2000). Such models have been applied in fisheries research to forecast fishing strategies un-
der different management and market constraints (Gillis et al., 1995; Poos et al., 2010; Dow-
ling et al., 2012). 
The model is parameterized for vessels in Boulogne with the predicted spatial and 
temporal catch rates of the 6 species under consideration (scallops, sole, plaice, cod, sea bass 
and cephalopods), ex-vessel prices, and variable costs. Two gear types are modelled that can 
be used interchangeably: demersal otter trawls can be used throughout the year targeting 
the 4 finfish and cephalopod species, while scallop dredges can only be used during the 
Table 5.2 Variable cost of the scallop dredgers and demersal otter trawl used in the simulation.
Variable costs OTB DRB 
Fuel (€ DAS-1) 730 440
Crew costs (% of revenue) 40 40
Landing costs (% of revenue) 6 6
Other variable costs (€ DAS-1) 40 40
Figure 5.4 
Average ex-vessel price per week for each of the target spe-
cies. No prices are available for scallops outside the open 
season. 
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5scallop season. The model assumes individual skippers will maximize their expected annual 
net revenue by making weekly decisions on (1) whether to go fishing or not; (2) what type 
of gear to use and (3) where to fish. These choices are affected by their annual catch quota 
and habitat credits.
The optimal fishing strategy in each week of the year, denoted by t, depends on the 
state of the individual skipper. In our case, the cumulative uptake of habitat credits as well 
as cumulative landings of the quota constrained species affects the possibility to continue 
fishing without exceeding the annual habitat credits or landing quota. To simplify model 
results, simulations were done assuming catch quota are restrictive for two species: cod and 
sole. These species were chosen on the premise that they differ in their preference of habitat 
types. 
DSVMs find the optimal behavioural strategy by working backwards, starting at the 
end of the year. The expected net revenue at the end of the year is linked to the choices in 
the preceding weeks by means of a value function between time t and the end of the year T. The value function for an individual skipper depends on the cumulative landings of the 
quota species L, the amount of quota U for cod or sole, the cumulative uptake of habitat 
credits I, the amount of habitat credits available C and the fine for exceeding the quota or 
habitat credits D and is expressed as V(L,U,I,C,D,t). Individuals exceeding their quota or hab-
itat credits pay a fine that depends on the quota (L - U) or credit (I - C) overshoot and the 
fine per unit weight (d1) and per credit (d2). The state-dependent part of the revenue at the 
end of the year, after all fishing has been completed,  is defined by the fine of overshooting 
quota and/or credits as:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
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𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5.5) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  ⎝⎜
⎛(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ ∑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∗ � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝
∑�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝ �
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
    (5.2) 
 
 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
    0,    𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶     −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,    𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶    −(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,    𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,    𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (5.3) 
 
 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5. ) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
 5.3
For each week before T, the expected net revenue is determined by the value function, the 
weekly gross revenue from the catch and the cost of fishing. Each week individuals choose 
to use a type of gear g and to visit a fishing area a (including area 0: “staying in harbour”). For 
all time t preceding T we use stochastic dynamic programming to find the optimal solution 
by backward iteration of the net expected revenue H from t to the end of the year conside-
ring the choices a and g and the states L and I at t and optimal choices in subsequent weeks:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  ⎝⎜
⎛(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ ∑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∗ � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝
∑�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝��
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
    (5.2) 
 
 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
                     0,      𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,      𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (5.3) 
 
 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5.5) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
 5.4
Where R(a,g,t) is the expected immediate contribution of the gross revenue from the sales 
of the catch in a week resulting from choices a and g. The term κ represents the percentage 
that the six species contribute to the total income (67%). The term  represents the variable 
costs in a week resulting from choosing fishing area a and using gear type g including fuel, 
crew, landing costs and other variable costs. The term L’ reflects the change of the state L 
Exploring habitat credits to manage the benthic impact in a mixed fishery 
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5resulting from the weekly landings for the quota species. The term I’ reflects the change of 
state I as a result of the weekly choice of fishing in an area with a given amount of habitat 
credits. The term 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  ⎝⎜
⎛(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ ∑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∗ � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝
∑�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝��
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
    (5.2) 
 
 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
                                         0,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,         𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (5.3) 
 
 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5.5) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
denotes the expected value taken over all 
possible states resulting from choices a and g. The future utility given that an individual 
behaves optimally from time t onwards is:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  ⎝⎜
⎛(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ ∑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∗ � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝
∑�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝��
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
    (5.2) 
 
 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
                                         0,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,         𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (5.3) 
 
 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5.5) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
5.5
Starting with 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) +  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + log (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  ⎝⎜
⎛(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ ∑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ∗ � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝
∑�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �∝��
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
    (5.2) 
 
 
 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
                                         0,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                     −(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   −(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,         𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (5.3) 
 
 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) ∗ (100
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) + 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)]  (5.4) 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) = max
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 {𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)}       (5.5) 
 
 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿′,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1)] 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) 
 
we can iterate backwards in time and 
find the optimal choice in terms of location and gear type for all possible states, combining 
the direct net revenue obtained in a fishing trip and the effect of the fines when exceeding 
annual quota or habitat credits. 
The expected direct gross revenue R(a,g,t) from the sale of the six target species for 
any choice depends on the catch and the ex-vessel price in a given week. The catch is deter-
mined by the choice of gear and the spatial and temporal distribution of the target species. 
MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS
This study explores the performance of individual quota management for sole and cod in 
combination with a habitat credit system to sustainably exploit resources and minimize the 
impact of the fishery on the benthic ecosystem. First, the performance of traditional quota 
management for sole and cod is evaluated in relation to benthic impact. Individual quota for 
sole are gradually increased from 2 to 16 tonnes per year. Given the low observed quotas for 
cod under the cod recovery plan, individual quota for cod are lower and increase from 0.2 
to 1.6 tonnes per year. Second, management scenarios were explored that combined indi-
vidual catch quota and habitat credits. Habitat credits varied from 20 to 300 per year, while 
quota varied from 1 to 15 tonnes and 0.1 to 1.5 tonnes per year for sole and cod, respectively. 
The maximum of 300 habitat credits per year was based on the maximum uptake of habitat 
credit by fishers in unconstrained model simulations.
RESULTS
CATCH QUOTA SIMULATIONS
First we explored the effect of individual catch quota on habitat impact by estimating the 
fishing effort in different habitat types (Fig. 5.5a). Reduction of sole quota hardly affects the 
level of fishing effort and the choice of habitats. Vessels fish year-round (52 trips yr-1) and only 
reduce the number of trips when sole quota is reduced to 2 or 4 tonnes per year. The majority 
(ca 80%) of trips are occurring in low impact circalittoral coarse and soft sediment habitats. 
As a result, the influence of sole quota on the amount of IHCs used by a vessel is minimal. 
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In contrast, a reduction of cod quota affects both the level of effort and the choice 
of habitats (Fig. 5.5b). At the highest cod quota, a vessel will fish year-round, allocating the 
majority of trips over circalittoral coarse and soft sediment habitats. A decrease in cod quota 
results in a gradual decrease to 48 trips per year at the lowest cod quota and a slight increase 
in fishing in the more sensitive deep coarse habitats. This reallocation results in an increase 
in IHC used over the year in spite of the reduction in the number of trips.
CATCH QUOTA AND HABITAT CREDIT SIMULATIONS
Because a reduction in the catch quota for sole and cod does not result in a reduction of 
the impact on benthic habitat, and in the case of cod quota even in a slight increase, addi-
tional management measures are required to reduce the benthic impact. In this section we 
explore how a habitat credit system can mitigate benthic impact in a fisheries managed by 
individual catch quota for the main target species.
Habitat credits constrain the fishery if the IHC are less than 220 IHC year-1, but the effect 
is largely independent of the sole or cod quota (Fig. 5.6a, f ). When combined with sole quota, 
a decrease to 100 IHC results in a switch from OTB to DRB (Fig. 5.6c & d). The overall effort is 
maintained or even increased when the OTB effort is already high and complemented with 
a high DRB effort. The latter is observed when high sole quota are combined with a small 
reduction of habitat credits (180 IHC). A further reduction of IHC (< 100 IHC) will cause a 
reduction in the overall effort, whereby vessels continue to fish for scallops but stop fishing 
with the OTB. The influence of individual sole quota on the overall effort is limited. A decrease 
in quota to 3 tonnes per year results in slight reduction in overall effort. This reduction can be 
explained by the decrease of effort by OTB due to the constraining effect of low sole quota.
Figure 5.5 
Average number of trips in a year to a substrate-type (DC = 
Deep coarse, CC= Circalitoral coarse, IC= Infralittoral coarse 
and S = Soft sediment), depending on the quota of plaice 
(a) and cod (b). The black line shows the average impact 
(credit uptake). 
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Figure 5.6 
Average credit use, total effort, otter trawl effort, dredge ef-
fort and net revenue in relation to the individual habitat 
credits in combination with three levels of individual catch 
quota for plaice (panels a to e) and cod (panels f to j). Sole 
quota range from 3 to 15 tonnes per year and cod quota 
range from 0.3 to 1.5 tonnes per year
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5Net revenue is rather stable and starts to decrease steeply when credits are reduced 
below 100 IHC (Fig. 5.6e). A reduction in sole quota has a minor effect on the revenue as it is 
partially compensated by landings of other species. When IHC are very low, the influence of 
sole quota is negligible because a vessel will choose to dredge for scallops. Costs, however, 
will be lower given the lower amount of effort being used. Hence, the fishery can still remain 
profitable despite a reduction in habitat credits and sole quota. 
When habitat credits are combined with cod quota, a decrease in habitat credits has 
a limited influence on the overall effort of the fishery (Fig. 5.6g). At high IHC, effort will be 
divided over both metiers, with most effort being allocated to the DRB (Fig. 5.6h & 5.6i). A 
decrease in IHC results in a reduction of OTB effort and an increase in DRB effort, irrespective 
of the quantity of cod quota. Hence, the overall effort is maintained. Only when IHC are low 
(<100 IHC) effort is reduced and vessels no longer choose to fish using OTB, but only fish 
with the DRB (as long as IHC > 60). Decreasing IHC results in a modest reduction of net rev-
enue. This is largely the result of an increase in DRB effort that compensates the lower OTB 
effort. Only when IHC are very low and the fishery is fully focussed on the scallop fishery, net 
revenue sharply declines below € 200K. Because cod has a relatively lower economic value 
and a lower catch rate, compared to the other target species, the loss in revenue from cod 
at reduced catch quota is compensated by switching to economically more valuable species 
and increasing the level of DRB effort. Our results thus suggest that when reducing habitat 
credits from high to low, the net revenue only decrease slightly at first (Fig. 5.6e & j), and 
more steeply at low IHCs. This result is largely independent of the individual catch quota 
available. 
TRIP ALLOCATION OVER HABITAT TYPES 
When habitat credits are combined with sole quota, the choice where to fish is mainly de-
termined by the IHC available (Fig. 5.7a). Regardless of the quantity of sole quota, high IHC 
results in an allocation of trips predominantly to circalittoral coarse and soft sediment ha-
bitats. Few vessels will fish in areas with more sensitive deep coarse sediments. A reduction 
in IHC pushes vessels away from circalittoral coarse sediments to less sensitive infralittoral 
coarse and soft sediments. The shift from more sensitive to less sensitive habitat types is 
influenced by the amount of individual sole quota. At high sole quota, fishing in deep coarse 
sediments stops when habitat credits are slightly reduced, whereas at low sole quota, trips 
to deep coarse sediments decline but continue until IHC are very low (< 100 IHC) and trips to 
these sensitive habitats are no longer made. 
In addition to the IHC available, low cod quota influence the choice of where to fish 
(Fig. 5.7d). At high IHC and low cod quota vessels will allocate more trips to sensitive deep 
coarse sediment habitats and less trips to fishing grounds with circalittoral coarse sediment 
habitat. Nevertheless, circalittoral coarse and soft sediment habitats still remain the domi-
nant fishing grounds. At high cod quota, fishing in more sensitive habitat types decreases 
if IHC are reduced (Fig. 5.7f ). At low cod quota a decrease in IHC initially result in a small 
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increase in the number of trips to circalittoral fishing grounds and a decrease in the number 
of trips allocated to fishing grounds with deep coarse sediment habitats. A further decrease 
in IHC will push vessels away from sensitive habitat types and as a result, all effort is concen-
trated in infralittoral coarse and soft sediment habitats.
DISCUSSION
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
The model results indicate that reducing individual catch quota does not necessarily reduce 
benthic impact exerted by French bottom trawlers in the eastern English Channel. Reduc-
tion of individual catch quota could even result in an increase in the benthic impact as ves-
sels could reallocate effort towards fishing grounds towards more vulnerable habitats to 
Figure 5.7 
The average number of trips made to a certain habitat type 
for the different impact scenarios. Top panels (a-c) are a fis-
hery under sole quota from 3 (left) to 15 (right) tonnes per 
year. Lower panels (d-f ) are for the fishery constrained by 
cod quota (0.3, 0.9 and 1.5 tonnes yr-1). 
Chapter 5
122
5avoid catching quota-restricted species. In the model, a reduction of benthic impact is only 
achieved when individual habitat credits are reduced. A reduction in IHC by 50% results in 
a small reduction in total effort and net revenue. Vessels are able to reallocate their effort to 
less vulnerable fishing grounds while maintaining their effort and revenue. When IHC are 
reduced more than 50%, vessels cannot make any profit out of fishing and they have to stay 
in port to not exceed their habitat credits.
SIMULATION MODEL
The simulation model was parameterized for the eastern English Channel French bottom 
trawl fleet. Results of the fleet response are indicative for this particular fleet given the nec-
essary simplifications made. Model simplifications include the assumptions that: (1) fishers 
are profit maximizers and comply fully with management regulations given severe sanc-
tions for non-compliance, (2) individuals have perfect knowledge about the temporal and 
spatial distribution of catch rates, (3) the quota for a single species (sole or cod) is constrain-
ing the fishery, and these quota are not transferable, and (4) there is no competition among 
fishers. The hypothesized effects of these simplifying assumptions have been discussed in 
Poos et al. (2010) and Batsleer et al. (2013). We further assume that vessels did not move from 
Boulogne to other harbours at the opening of the scallop season. In the model the scallop 
season was assumed to be open from November to April throughout the eastern English 
Channel. In reality the opening of the season depends on annual scientific advice and the 
opinion of authorities, and may be different among areas (Carpentier et al., 2009). Given that 
scallops are a valuable species, vessels may temporarily move to harbours close to the best 
scallop fishing grounds (Bay of Seine) to reduce steaming time. 
Although we had to make a large number of simplifying assumptions, as discussed 
above, these assumptions will not affect the qualitative results showing that within mixed 
fisheries the seasonally and spatially variable availability of target species allows a varie-
ty of effort allocation patterns that yield similar net revenue with widely different benthic 
impacts. A habitat credit system will provide an incentive for fishers to reduce the benthic 
impact at a minimal economic cost. 
Currently, catch data are not collected at the scale where fishing within different hab-
itats can be detected. Hence, an arbitrary scaling factor (α) had to be used to estimate CPUE 
within different habitats. This scaling factor distributes the highest catch rates within an 
ICES rectangle to the subareas with the highest fishing effort. Information on the fine scale 
distribution (interval of 2h) of fishing effort for vessels >15m can be obtained from Vessel 
Monitoring Systems (VMS) (European Commission, 2003). Although catch data in logbooks 
can be distributed over fishing positions recorded in VMS data, such procedures generally 
assume that catches are uniformly distributed over VMS positions (Dinmore et al., 2003; Ger-
ritsen and Lordan, 2011; Hintzen et al. 2012).
In this study, habitat impact credits are independent of the historic fishing activities in 
the habitat. However, historic fishing activities can be an important factor determining fish-
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5ing impact on the benthic ecosystem (Kaiser, 2005). Reducing habitat credits in response to 
the frequency of fishing may lead to a concentration of fishing activities in that specific area, 
given the reduced cost of fishing (Holland and Schnier, 2006). The exact dynamics of making 
a frequency dependent habitat credit system could be investigated in a future study.
The habitat credits in the model do not vary by gear type. Empirical studies, however, 
indicate that gear type strongly affects the magnitude of fishing impact (Collie et al., 2000; 
Kaiser et al., 2006; Eigaard et al., 2016). Sensitivity matrices synthesize these results, describ-
ing the sensitivity of habitats to different gears based on the physical bottom of each gear 
and the sensitivity of the benthic community to the additional mortality caused by the bot-
tom contact. These sensitivity matrices can be used by policy makers to assign gear-specific 
habitat credits (Eno et al., 2013). 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND BROADER RELEVANCE
There is a growing awareness on effects of fisheries on ecosystems beyond the obvious 
reductions in population biomass as a result of fisheries catches. An ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management aims at mitigating these effects and strives to restore 
and conserve the composition, structure and functioning of ecosystems. Management ap-
proaches, such as credit management systems, have been suggested as a mean to protect or 
improve ecosystem structures and functions (Holland and Schnier, 2006; Kraak et al., 2012), 
in complement to traditional measures (Winter and May, 2001; Raakjær Nielsen, 2003; Smith 
et al., 2010; Abbott and Haynie, 2012; Caveen et al., 2015). Such systems build on incentiv-
izing responsible fishing practices, constraining fishers with a number of credits or a share 
of the property while allowing them to adjust their behaviour and chose freely when and 
where to fish to make optimal use of their credits or share. However, management objec-
tives in such systems will only be achieved if credits or quota are set at the right target or 
limit reference point (Van Riel et al., 2015). Setting these targets or limit reference points will 
depend on the availability of data and knowledge. In addition, the decision will be a process 
where policy-makers, scientists, fishing industry and other stakeholders need to be engaged 
and agree on the specific goals of the management system.
Our study shows that a complementary use of habitat credits with catch quota could 
minimize benthic impact, while the fishery can continue to sustainably exploit a mix of 
resources. The development of credit systems, however, is still in its infancy and requires 
more knowledge on the relationship between different ecosystem components, improved 
data collection at the right scale and extensive monitoring and enforcement (Holland and 
Schnier, 2006; Kraak et al., 2012; Van Riel et al., 2015). The collection of more detailed infor-
mation and data gathering would require more effort from the fishing industry in terms of 
privacy and investments on board, but then again fishers will retain their freedom to choose 
when and where to fish. Hence, for spatial measures to meet ecological objectives and to 
be cost-effective, an understanding of the adaptive behaviour of fishers to these measures 
is critical.
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6GENERAL DISCUSSION
The adverse side effects of fisheries have increasingly raised societal concern, in particular the 
bycatch and impact on the seafloor and benthic ecosystem. Criticism on the Common Fisheries 
Policy for failing to implement fisheries regulations which conserve (European) fisheries re-
sources and protect ecosystem structure and functions have lead to the European Commission 
to adopt an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. In response to the societal concern 
the EU has introduced a ban on discarding in the latest reform of the CFP to reduce this waste-
ful practice. The effectiveness of this ban depends on the adaptive behaviour of the fishers. 
This thesis developed a spatial explicit model of the behaviour of fishers to study how 
management measures influence the behavioural responses of fishers in terms of effort al-
location and discarding decisions and the ecosystem and economic impacts thereof. The 
model was used to study how the discarding and benthic impacts of bottom trawl fisheries 
could be reduced and applied to the Dutch North Sea flatfish fisheries and the French mixed 
demersal fisheries in the Channel. 
In chapter 2 of this thesis I evaluated the performance of individual quota manage-
ment as well as a combination of individual quota with a ban on discarding to improve the 
regulation of fishing mortality for a depleted stock exploited in a mixed fishery. Our findings 
show that a management system with individual quota that allows fishers to discard will in-
crease the discarding. Individual vessels continue fishing for other species while discarding 
marketable fish of the species for which quota are fully exploited. As such, quota manage-
ment does not limit fishing mortality to the level specified for conserving a particular stock. 
These findings are in line with observations on over-quota discarding in mixed fisheries 
(Pascoe, 1997, Poos et al., 2010) and supports the criticism on landings quota management 
being an ineffective measure to control fishing mortality in mixed fisheries (Daan, 1997). 
Combining the individual quota with a discard ban, individual fishers reallocated their effort 
away from areas and weeks with high catch rates of the quota constrained species, targeting 
other species, reducing the amount of discarding. Such behaviour, i.e. the ability to align the 
species mixture of their catch with the availability of quota by reallocation fishing activities 
has been observed (Branch and Hilborn, 2008, Branch, 2009). When properly enforced, a dis-
card ban can reduce over-quota discarding, control fishing mortality, and thus contribute to 
the conservation of vulnerable species. However, measures to reduce discarding coincided 
with a reduction in the economic performance and may jeopardise the compliance as fish-
ers may trade-off economic gains of non-compliance against the costs. Achieving accept-
ance and compliance to the measures may require high penalties.
Policy and market forces are the main drivers in the decision making of fishers to discard 
marketable fish. In chapter 3 I elaborate on the conditions under which discarding of market-
able fish may occur by reviewing literature on observations on high-grading and over-quota 
discarding. Empirical evidence suggest that high-grading, i.e. discarding low valued fish to 
make room for more valuable fish, occurs under different management systems for a large 
variety of fisheries worldwide. Yet, discarding of marketable fish while quota is still available 
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6mainly occurs in mixed fisheries managed by an individual quota system. Following the litera-
ture review I applied a simulation model exploring discarding decisions in a mixed fishery con-
strained by annual individual quota. Model results illustrate that high-grading is strongly linked 
to the availability of quota, while over-quota discarding occurs on a rather constant level. This 
difference can be explained by the ability of fishers to strategically plan their fishing activities 
throughout the year. Fishers adapt their fishing activities to optimize the composition of their 
catch taking account of the availability of quota and seasonal price variations. In addition our 
findings show a clear difference between the size composition in the landed catch and the 
actual catch (i.e. including discards). Quantifying the differences in age and size structure as a 
result of discarding as well as the conditions under which discarding occurs can improve the 
quality of the stock assessments and the sustainable management of exploited fish stocks. 
Chapter 4 is exploring the potential of the discard ban to reduce catches of under-
sized target species and to incentivise a transition towards more selective gears. A simula-
tion model was applied to the Dutch flatfish fishery in the North Sea which is an ideal case 
study given the current transition from conventional beam trawling with tickler chain to-
wards pulse trawling using an electrical stimulus. Similar to our study in chapter 2 a discard 
ban, assuming full compliance, forces fishers to reallocate their fishing activities in space and 
time where they can achieve maximum revenue by targeting other species while exploiting 
the restrictive quota with reduced catch rates of undersized fish. While reallocation reduces 
the amount of undersized fish, the catch of undersized fish does not differ much between 
the conventional beam trawl and the pulse trawl. Due to their improved fuel efficiency and 
different species specific catch efficiencies compared to traditional beam trawlers, pulse 
trawlers are economically more profitable providing more flexibility in the time spend fish-
ing. As such, a discard ban can incentivise the use of more selective gear to reduce the catch 
of undersized fish which would otherwise be counted against the quota, fetching a low 
price and reducing the economic value of the landings.
Within the ecosystem approach to fisheries context, the impact of fisheries goes be-
yond the mortality on target and non-target species as a result of the catching process, but 
also includes the impact of fishing activities on benthic habitats and ecosystems. Gear type, 
frequency, and distribution of fishing activities as well as the sensitivity of habitats to fishing 
disturbance determine the extent of the benthic impact (Collie et al., 2000, Kaiser et al., 2006, 
Rijnsdorp et al., 2016). The conventional approach to protect the benthic ecosystem from 
fishing activities is through spatial measures. Such measure have proven to support con-
servation objectives in overfished situations. However, they often lack acceptance from the 
fishing industry as these measures are often associated with socioeconomic losses (Caveen 
et al., 2015). Chapter 5 of this thesis explores the potential of a habitat credit system (Hol-
land and Schnier, 2006) as a tool for ecosystem based management, balancing conserva-
tion goals with economic profitability for the fishery. The performance of catch quota and 
a habitat credits system is predicted using a simulation model parameterized for French 
multipurpose bottom trawl vessels. Model results suggest quota management has a limited 
effect on fishing behaviour and does not reduce benthic impact of the fishery. In contrary, 
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6managers have to be aware restrictive quota can increase the benthic impact. Vessels may 
reallocate effort to more vulnerable habitats trying to avoid areas of high catch rates of the 
quota restricted species. A habitat credit system has the potential to reduce the benthic im-
pact and maintain profitable fisheries as vessels can adjust their behaviour and chose freely 
to reallocate their fishing activities to make optimal use of the available credits. However, in 
order for the fisheries to maintaining effort and revenue credits should not be reduced to 
very low levels. Currently credits systems are still in their infancy and require more detailed 
knowledge on setting appropriate targets and limits before they can be implemented as an 
operational fisheries management system.
The fishing industry, environmental organisations and the general public are increas-
ingly demanding (science based) support for management decisions made by fisheries 
managers. Under current fisheries policy, managers need to ensure management measures 
contribute to the sustainable use of natural resources, while minimizing the ecosystem im-
pact of fishing activities and maintaining economic resilient fisheries. However, manage-
ment measures may not always result in expected outcomes, as demonstrated for TAC 
management in mixed fisheries (Daan, 1997) or when spatial measures implemented to 
protect spawning or nursery areas fail because of changes in the spatial and temporal fish 
distributions (Rijnsdorp et al., 2001, Beare et al., 2013). Also, management measures aimed at 
improving the sustainability of one component on the ecosystem can have negative ecosys-
tem impacts elsewhere, such as when area closures lead to effort displacement to previously 
unfished areas (Dinmore et al. 2003). This thesis contributes to the ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management as an innovative spatial explicit simulation model is developed to de-
liver insights into complex socioeconomic and ecological trade-offs resulting from manage-
ment measures. I show adaptive behaviour of a fishing fleet is certainly a factor which can 
influence the outcome, but which is easily overlooked. Hence, fleet dynamics is an essential 
element to understand the effectiveness of management measures.
MODELLING FISHERS BEHAVIOUR
The dynamic state variable model used in this thesis was developed from the model used in 
Poos et al. (2010). The model was extended to include size-structured fish populations with 
seasonal changes in their distribution as well as seasonal variation in the ex-vessel price 
of the different species and size classes. The integration of these elements into our model 
enabled us to evaluate fleet responses to opportunity costs (rationale of fishing now or la-
ter) and explore the consequences of a number of new management scenarios, such as the 
discard ban. The model was applied to several mixed demersal fisheries which would be 
impacted by the evaluated scenarios. The model outcomes are generally applicable to the 
fisheries studied. However, since several simplifying assumptions had to made, results can-
not be directly implemented in management of the fisheries. The key assumptions will be 
highlighted and discussed. 
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6MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Many studies on fisheries behaviour include profit as the currency fishers will aim to max-
imize (Hilborn and Walters, 1987, Gillis et al., 1995, Babcock and Pikitch, 2000, Poos et al., 
2010). The legitimacy of using profit maximization as the driving force has received sup-
port from observations and interviews (Hilborn and Kennedy, 1992, Robinson and Pascoe, 
1997). While these studies acknowledge fishers are well aware of wealth and profit, they also 
indicate non-monetary considerations are valued by individuals. The validity of modelling 
fishers behaviour driven by profit maximization has been questioned and alternative influ-
ential factors with less emphasis on economic interests have been put forward (Eggert and 
Martinsson, 2004, Salas and Gaertner, 2004). 
An example of an alternative factor could be the drive to maximize landings. Maximi-
zation of landings, whereby fishers will catch as much as their capacity allows them to, may 
be valid as long as there are no catch restrictions, large costs or heavy fines for exceeding 
quota involved. However, management restrict catches and implement heavy fines exceed-
ing limits, reducing the incentive to harvest resources at full capacity. Other factors are the 
tendency to follow traditional patterns and the attitude of individuals towards taking risks 
(Holland and Sutinen, 2000, Eggert and Tveteras, 2004, Marchal et al., 2009). In both cases, 
fishers choose their fishing strategy by deliberating potential benefits versus potential con-
sequences of their choices.
Modelling fisheries behaviour requires a better understanding of the different mon-
etary and non-monetary incentives driving decision-making in fisheries. One approach to 
obtain empirical information explaining behavioural choices in fisheries is by conducting 
surveys and interviews with individual or a group of fishers (Robinson and Pascoe, 1997, 
Holland and Sutinen, 2000). Robison and Pascoe (1997) however, acknowledge difficulties 
substantiating the reliability of the information received from interviews or surveys. Given 
the competitiveness within fisheries, individuals may be reluctant to share, often sensitive 
and private, information on the reasoning behind the decisions they make. Despite this 
drawback interviews can yield valuable information on decision making in fisheries, provid-
ed care is taken to the way interviews are set up, e.g. individuals or focus groups, as well as 
clarity on the questions formulated (Holland and Sutinen, 1999). 
Empirical information from interviews can be used as a basis to construct and vali-
date models. Discrete-choice models in particular are well suited for modelling decisions 
between several discrete alternatives. This type of modelling has been applied in a varie-
ty of disciplines within behavioural sciences such as traffic and marketing preferences (De 
La Barra, 1989) and found its way in fisheries science as well. A commonly used variant of 
discrete-choice models are Random Utility Models (RUM). These models assume individu-
als have to make a choice between a finite set of alternatives (e.g. fishing area, gear type). 
Each alternative has an expected utility based on a variety of explanatory variables (e.g. 
past experience, tradition, expected revenue) and an error term, representing the stochas-
tic component of unobserved variables which affect preferences of an individual (Holland 
and Sutinen, 1999). By observing which alternatives are chosen by individuals, it is assumed 
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6those alternatives are generating the highest expected utility. RUMs have been applied to 
predict individuals location, gear and species choices as well as entry and exit decisions in 
commercial fisheries (Holland and Sutinen, 1999, Holland and Sutinen, 2000, Marchal et al., 
2009, Tidd et al., 2011). 
RUMs have a retrospective approach, being driven by observations on historical pat-
terns making them less well suited to predict behavioural adaptations in relation to chang-
ing conditions (Dowling et al., 2012). In this context, DSVMs have an advantage over RUMs 
as they lack dependency on historical patterns to predict future choices. In addition, these 
models allow individuals to cope with opportunity cost such as the decision to discard mar-
ketable fish early in the year taking into account the potential future benefits of landing 
marketable fish later in the year fetching a higher price (chapter 4). These aspects make the 
DSVM an ideal tool to evaluate the influence of new or unknown measures such as the land-
ing obligation or a credit system on behavioural adaptations of a fishing vessel. 
Decision on the fishing operation, i.e. when, where and what to fish for as well as what 
to discard are mainly made by the skipper. In most fisheries the crew and sometimes the 
skipper as well are paid on the basis of the revenue, being the gross revenue minus the vari-
able costs. Hence, a remuneration system where the income of the crew and skipper depend 
on the gross revenue creates an incentive to maximize the monetary value of the catch. 
While profit maximization may not cover the full range of behavioural consideration in a 
fleet, there is a strong incentive for economic optimization in the fleets we have studied. Yet, 
we can not excluded the fact that other factors will play a role in decision making. Provided 
we can develop a better understanding of the different drivers influencing the behaviour of 
a fleet, adaption of our utility function to include these alternative utilities can only improve 
the outcomes. However, we have to keep in mind that in the light of new management 
measures it will always remains difficult to validate the behavioural adaptations of the fleet. 
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR
Fisheries have increasingly been faced with catch and effort limitations, claims for space by 
other users and pressure from public and environmental organizations to reduce the impact 
on the environment. Hence, commercial fisheries have become highly regulated in the past 
decades. Many fishers perceive regulations as major limitations on the way they can perform 
their fishing activities, thereby potentially creating an economic incentive not to comply 
with adopted regulations (Frailey and Taylor, 1987, Hatcher et al., 2000).
Failure to comply with regulations may interfere with achieving proposed manage-
ment objectives. For example, quota management should prevent fishers from taking more 
than their share of available quota. However, if quota are limited, these can be fully exploited 
early in the year. In order to circumvent such early exhaustion of quota a fisher may decide 
to discard marketable catch to preserve quota for more valuable fish later in the year (i.e. 
high-grading) or he can catch land a larger amount of fish than his quota allows (i.e. quota 
busting) (Copes, 1986). Because both activities are illegal fishers will fail to report these dis-
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6cards or additional catches which in turn may increase the uncertainty of stock assessments. 
This is of particular concern for stocks which are already at a low levels. 
The example above indicates the importance to increase our knowledge on the rea-
sons of non-compliance behaviour in fisheries. Compliance behaviour in fisheries was ini-
tially analysed using models applying an economic approach (Sutinen and Andersen, 1985, 
Anderson and Lee, 1986). The models used the study of Becker (1968) as a starting point. 
He was the first to develop a theoretical framework to explain decision-making for commit-
ting a crime. His model assesses the levels of enforcement and severity of the punishment 
required to minimize social loss (i.e. economic costs to the society) due to illegal behaviour. 
In his model he assumes individuals behave rationally, making a trade-off between the ex-
pected utility, being monetary costs and benefits, for committing a crime against the utility 
received from complying with the regulations. The utility of committing a crime is assumed 
to be a function of the probability of conviction (i.e. being detected, apprehended and con-
victed) and the punishment that goes with the commission of a crime. While illegal behav-
iour decreases as the level of both enforcement and punishment increases, the response to 
commit a crime is larger by changes in the risk of being convicted than the changes to the 
level of punishment. 
Analysis of compliance behaviour based solely on an economic perspective has been 
criticised for ignoring the influence of normative and socials aspects on compliance be-
haviour (Cameron, 1988, Tyler, 1990, Garoupa, 2003). In fisheries only a few studies have at-
tempted to analyse compliance behaviour including monetary and non-monetary motives 
into a model (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999, Hatcher et al., 2000). Non-monetary motives are 
integrated in the models by extending the utility function to include variables such as mor-
als (i.e. one feels the regulation is justified) towards illegal behaviour, social pressure and the 
effect of an individual’s perspective to the legitimacy (i.e.one accepts that the authority en-
forcing the regulation has the right to do so) of regulations. Results of these studies provide 
indication of the influence non-monetary motives can have on compliance behaviour and 
support the idea that besides increasing monitoring, control and enforcement activities, 
policymakers should be aware of the normative commitment (i.e. morality and legitimacy) 
of individuals to the policy. In addition, integration of both monetary and non-monetary 
motivations in studies on compliance behaviour will be more consistent with theories on 
human behaviour (Tyler, 1990). Although non-monetary motivations can be included in the 
utility function of the DSVM, the parameterization will not be straight forward. 
Understanding the normative commitments of individual fishers to regulations is 
complex, because of the variation among their objectives. Including non-monetary aspects 
in the utility function of the model would require extensive and detailed information from 
the fleet on the morality and perception of the legitimacy of regulations, in particular quo-
ta restrictions, the landing obligation and spatial measures. In fisheries, monetary fines are 
more rule than exception and fishers often regard fines as part of their business (Branch 
et al., 2006). The response of individuals to monetary fines derived for the model studies 
(chapter 2) are in line with observations that compliance will increase when the level of the 
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6expected fine becomes more severe. In addition, I assume fully enforced regulations which 
is achieved by increasing the fines up to a level that poses an unacceptable high risk of 
exceptionally high costs. This type of deterrence has been used in the Northeast American 
multispecies fisheries management plan as a countermeasure for low detection rates (Frai-
ley and Taylor, 1987). Therefore, I believe economic motivations, as applied in this thesis, are 
a valid approach to address compliance under short-term decision-making. 
INDIVIDUAL QUOTA MANAGEMENT
Catch quotas or “total allowable catches” (TAC) are the predominant strategies to manage 
fisheries. Catch quotas can be exploited by a common-pool or a rights based approach. Un-
der a common-pool approach there is a fishery-wide TAC for which fishers compete until 
the TAC is fully exploited. This ensues a race to fish, creating an incentive to invest in more 
powerful vessels and more efficient gear and technology to outcompete others. As such, the 
common-pool approach is criticised to lead to unsustainable exploitation levels and eco-
nomic inefficient fisheries (Grafton, 2000). A right based approach allocates individual rights 
to a predetermined share of the catch, ensuring an individual owns a secured portion of 
the allowable catch. This approach should encouraging stewardship over the resources and 
providing more flexibility in time and space to harvest the resources, because fishers do not 
have to account for the catches of others (Grafton et al., 2006). Rights based management 
approaches have been increasingly recognised to be core to achieve biologically and eco-
nomically sustainable fisheries (Hilborn et al., 2005, Branch, 2009). 
Individual quota are the most commonly used right based approach to manage fish-
eries. Individual transferable quota ((Christy, 1973), ITQ) are an extended form allowing fish-
ers to sell, lease or buy quota. By allowing the transfer of quota, ITQs are believed to reduce 
the incentive to discard (i.e. high-grading and over-quota discarding) and increase the eco-
nomic efficiency of fishing activities (Little et al., 2009). Discarding can be reduced when 
fishers who would be forced to discard because they have (almost) fully exploited their share 
of quota (before the end of the year) can buy quota from fishers who know they will not 
make full use of their share. In addition, quota transfers between individuals can increase 
net revenue of both vessels.
Since the introduction of ITQs in the 1970’s many fisheries worldwide are currently 
managed by ITQs (Costello et al., 2008, Chu, 2009) (figure 6.1). Within the European Union 
specifically, Member States are being encouraged to establish a system of transferable fish-
ing rights (EU Regulation 1380/2013). While most Member States have already implemented 
some kind of rights based management approach (e.g. community catch quotas; individu-
al (transferable) effort or catch quotas; vessel catch limits; and territorial use rights (MRAG 
et al., 2009), some Member States are reluctant to adopt an ITQ system for their fisheries. 
Member States are opposed to transferability of quotas, because they fear the rights to the 
property will be concentrated in the hands of a few corporations or individuals. France, for 
example, has non-transferable quota in order to prevent quota from being considered as 
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6assets, thereby protecting their traditional fishing communities and maintaining economic 
and social equilibrium in fishery-dependent coastal zones (MRAG et al., 2009).
In this thesis, I have assumed the fisheries are managed by individual non-transferable 
quota. This implies the model does not allow quotas to be transferred from one fisher to 
another during a year. While this assumption holds true for the fisheries in France, the Dutch 
mixed-fisheries for flatfish was one of the first fisheries to adopt ITQs to manage their fish-
eries on plaice and sole (Chu, 2009, van Hoof, 2013). Examining the impact of adopting an 
ITQ system in fisheries have been studied by either a retrospective analysis (Arnason, 1995; 
Annala, 1996; Hamon et al., 2009) or by modelling trading behaviour within a simulated ITQ 
market (Dupont, 2000, Little et al., 2009, Marchal et al., 2011). Little et al. (2009) for example, 
have included trading of quota into an agent-based model to evaluate fishing strategies un-
der right-based management. The model simulates choices individual vessels in a multi-spe-
cies fisheries make in terms of fishing location and quota trading in order to maximize their 
profit. The main elements determining whether a vessel will engage in quota trading are the 
amount of quota available and the quota price. The quota price is assumed to be equal to 
the average marginal profit (i.e. the profit of harvesting a unit of fish) across vessels or fleets. 
Buying additional quota is only in the interest of a vessel when the difference between its 
expected marginal profit of catching fish and the costs of obtaining additional quota is pos-
itive (Guyader and Thébaud, 2001). For a vessel willing to sell quota this difference should 
be negative. Model results showed that transferability of quota increases profitability of the 
fleet; even less efficient vessels are able to make substantial profits by leasing their quotas. 
However, when there are no trading opportunities for species for which quota are already 
filled, fishing will continue until most quota (often of the most valuable species) are fully 
exploited. Hence, quota transferability may improve the match between catches and quota, 
but does not necessarily alleviate discarding. 
Due to the lack of quota transferability in our model, the outcomes may not fully cor-
respond to actual observations. In particular, within the context of the discard ban future 
projections are uncertain. Under the discard ban the transition from landing quota to catch 
quota may become problematic. Especially in mixed fisheries, potential restrictive quota 
Figure 6.1 
Assessment of the increased use of 
the ITQ system globally (copyright, 
Chu, 2009).
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6may lead to severe restrictions in fishing activity when these quota are fully exploited at 
an early stage (i.e. choke species). Quota transfer may partially prevent the early cessation 
of fishing activities due to choke species. However, quota owners may want to retain their 
quota to prevent their own company or fleet to be restricted in their fishing activities. In 
addition, the new discard regulation provides opportunities for flexibility in dealing with 
quotas through inter-annual quota and inter-species (i.e. counting the catch of one spe-
cies to the quota of other species) flexibilities, as well as exemptions from landing discards 
based on survivability and de minimis (i.e. an exemption when increased selectivity is dif-
ficult to achieve or when handling discards on board generates disproportionate costs). To 
date, it remains uncertain how these flexibilities and exemptions will be implemented and 
influence future fishing opportunities. Hence, it is difficult to predict how quota trading will 
develop under the discard ban. Including quota transfer into the model will make it more 
operational for practical use, however, this would require a more detailed knowledge on the 
actual implementation of the management regulations. 
VARIABILITY IN CATCHES
The dynamic state variable models that are used extensively in this thesis allow for decisions 
to be made in a stochastic environment. The catches that can be obtained in any season 
and at any location are uncertain and modelled as random variables. In essence, I used the 
assumption that the statistical distribution of future catches in any area are perfectly known 
to the fishers. This is not to say that future catches are known, only their stochastic nature is 
known. Indeed, in reality, fishers have a certain degree of knowledge on the seasonal distri-
bution of the different target species, that results from ontogenetic and seasonal spawning 
migration (Poos and Rijnsdorp, 2007). In our models we have parameterized the variability 
using long time series of catches, estimating means and variances of catch rates, using spa-
tial and temporal covariates, while also correcting for vessel characteristics. Using the esti-
mated means and variances from such a statistical model implies that the means and vari-
ances of catches in December are already known at the beginning of the year, and no further 
“learning behaviour” occurs in which fishers update their knowledge of the environment. In 
reality fishers likely update their knowledge on the spatial and temporal distribution, using 
their long term catch histories as priors. The information is then updated using observations 
on catch rates in the different areas, in a Bayesian manner. The individual integrates new in-
formation with its prior expectation and forms a revised, posterior expectation about catch 
opportunities (Van Gils, 2010). The effectiveness of such a strategy depends on the autocor-
relation that may occur over time and among locations on top of the seasonal variations. 
Indeed, spatial and temporal autocorrelations on top of the annual variability caused by 
migrations is known to exist (Poos and Rijnsdorp, 2007). This autocorrelation can result from 
e.g. the existence of local patches of high food abundance, or inter-annual differences in the 
contribution of different nursery grounds to the fishable stock. 
Chapter 6
140
6Knowledge on the spatial and temporal distribution of the main target species is most 
likely built up from personal experience combined with information exchange with other 
fishers (Wilson, 1990, Gillis et al., 2006). Information-sharing networks are not uncommon 
within fishing communities. Especially fishers who are closely connected, i.e. friends or fam-
ily, will share information about the abundance and locations of resources (Palmer, 1991, 
Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton, 2009). Consequently, fishers may adapt their fishing strate-
gies to increase their fishing success. Acquiring information on the best fishing grounds may 
thus provide an advantage over other fishers competing for the same resources. Sharing 
information used to be face-to-face in the harbour or through radio conversations when 
being at sea (Palmer, 1991). Technological advances, however, have made it easier to obtain 
information on the fishing locations and activities of other vessels. The Automatic Identi-
fication System (AIS) for example, while implemented for maritime safety and security, al-
lows fishers to follow each other’s activities while being at sea, acquiring information that 
is traditionally not shared. It is clear that acquiring information, either by sharing, learning 
or observing, will affect decision making behaviour of individuals within the fleet. Incorpo-
rating such behaviour into simulation models requires a deviation from models using fixed 
behavioural strategies toward a more flexible modelling approach allowing individuals to 
learn and adapt their behaviour, e.g. artificial neural networks (Dreyfus-León, 1999, Gaert-
ner and Dreyfus-Leon, 2004). Such models assume fishers have incomplete information on 
the distribution of the resources but gain experience when fishing, sharing their experience 
of the different fishing grounds with individuals in the same group. These models result in 
complex model behaviour but contribute to the interpretation of behavioural decision mak-
ing processes under uncertain environmental conditions.
A CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
THE EMERGENCE OF A DISCARD BAN IN EUROPEAN WATERS
Discarding, i.e. throwing a part of the catch back to sea, is common practice in many fisheries 
(Kelleher, 2005). This practice can be largely attributed to policy regulations which obliges 
fishers to discard the part of the catch that does not meet legal prescriptions. For example 
catches below the minimum landing size, i.e. the smallest size measurement for a fish or 
shellfish to be legally landed and sold, have to be discarded. Similarly, due to quota regu-
lations catches of species for which quotas have already been exhausted before the end of 
the year (over-quota) have to be discarded at sea (chapter 2, 3 and 4). In addition, market 
drivers, such as fish price or consumer demands, may incentivise fishers to discard certain 
species or size classes having no or a low economic value (high-grading) (Gillis et al., 1995). 
By discarding the size classes with a low economic value, fishers retain their quota for land-
ing more valuable size classes (chapter 3).
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6Discarding in commercial fisheries has received an increased amount of (negative) at-
tention. Public campaigns, such as Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall’s Fish Fight campaign, raised 
public awareness to the undesirable ecological and ethical effects of discarding by stressing 
discarding is a wasteful and disruptive practice as natural resources are extracted from the 
ecosystem only to be thrown back to sea dead (Borges, 2015). It was clear that fisheries 
management failed to reduce discarding in European fisheries. In response, discard reduc-
tion in commercial fisheries became an essential objective within European fisheries man-
agement. In July 2011 the European Commission presented their proposal for the reform 
of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This reform included the enforcement of a discard 
ban in European waters, obliging all European fishing vessels to retain and land their entire 
catch, including small sized individuals, of all species subject to quota management. In 2013 
the European Parliament agreed on the reformed CFP (EU regulation 1380/2013), which in-
cludes article 15 referring to the landing obligation. The term “landing obligation” is more 
frequently used to reduce the negative connotation with the word “ban”. The reformed CFP 
came into force in January 2014. The discard ban, however, is implemented progressively as 
of 2015, starting with the Baltic and pelagic fisheries and followed by the demersal fisheries 
in 2016. For demersal fisheries the discard ban will be implemented in phases, commencing 
with the species defining the fisheries (table 6.1). For example, beam trawlers fishing in the 
North Sea using 80mm to 119mm mesh size will have to land their entire catch of sole (Solea 
solea), whereas beam trawlers rigged with a mesh size larger then 119cm are allowed to 
discard sole, but have to land plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) catches. Gradually more species 
will fall under the discard ban the following years, being fully implemented, i.e. covering all 
species subject to total allowable catches, in 2019. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DISCARD BAN
One of the major changes under the discard ban is the transition of landing quota to catch 
quota . This transition should ensure fishing opportunities reflect the total catch instead of 
the landings of a stock. Catch quota are based on landing quota which receive an uplift by 
adding a discard component. Since 2014, the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea.(ICES), which is an intergovernmental organisation requested to provide advice on 
the fishing opportunities, started providing advice on fishing opportunities in terms of both 
catches and landings for several stock including North sea plaice and sole. 
The quantity and composition of discards is highly variable by fisheries. It is expected 
that for some fisheries a quota uplift for a given stock may not suffice to cover the total 
annual catch for that particular stock . In that case, an early exhaustion of quota may cause 
the fishery to “choke” (i.e. a full stop of fishing activities) regardless the availability of suffi-
cient quota for other species. Hence, species for which insufficient quota is available to cover 
their catches are referred to as “choke species”. In mixed fisheries in particular, where many 
species are caught simultaneously, multiple choke species may occur and close the fishery 
(Borges, 2015). For example species such as plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), dab (Limanda li-
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6manda), turbot (Scophthalmus maximus) and brill (Scophthalmus rhombus) could potentially 
become choke species for the mixed demersal fisheries in the North Sea, while hake (Mer-
luccius merluccius) and saithe (Pollachius virens) are species that could potentially choke the 
North Sea mixed whitefish trawl fishery. Fishers should ensure having sufficient quota for 
the species they are exploiting or adapt their fishing strategies (i.e. technical or behaviour) 
to prevent an early stop to the fishing activities.
Within article 15 (describing the landing obligation) of the CFP (EU regulation 
1380/2013) provisions are included that allow some flexibility to alleviate an early cessa-
tion of fishing activities due to potential choke-species. First, there is some flexibility in the 
uptake of quotas by allowing Members States to “bank” or “borrow” up to 10% of the quota 
of a species (inter-annual quota flexibility) or to deduct up to 9% of quota of target spe-
cies to cover catches of species exceeding their quota or for which no quota are owned 
(inter-species quota flexibilities). The latter will only be allowed when the species which is 
being counted against the target quota is within “safe biological limits”, i.e. the size of the 
stock and fishing mortality should be at a level preventing the stock from impaired recruit-
ment (Blim and Flim). Second, the regulation specifies situations (art. 15(4)) which exempt 
species from the discard ban. Exemptions apply to (1) species on the prohibited species list 
(e.g. the common skate (Dipturus batis)), (2) by-catch of species for which high survival after 
the catching process has been scientifically demonstrated, and (3) catches under a de min-
imis exemption. Under a de minimis exemption 5% of the catch can be discard under the 
conditions that it is very difficult to improve the selectivity of a gear or when using selective 
fishing gear handling of unwanted catches on board leads to ”disproportionate costs”. 
While these provisions allow some flexibility to deal with unavoidable catches and po-
tential choke species, there is much uncertainty on how these provisions will be implement-
ed in practice (STECF, 2014). The wording used in the regulation to specify the applicability 
Table 6.1 Phased approach of the discard ban by species and gear. 
mesh size Cod Plaice Sole Whiting Hake Saithe Nephrops Northern 
prawn
Trawls (TR1) ≥ 100mm 2017
(if cod recov-
ery plan is 
removed)
2016 2017 2017
(if cod recov-
ery plan is 
removed)
2019 2016 
(50%) 
2018 (rest)
2017 2016
Trawls (TR2) 70 - 90mm 2018 2018 2016 2017 2019 2018 2016 2016
Trawls 32 - 69mm 2018 2018 2017 2017 2019 2018 2017 2016
Beamtrawl (BT1) ≥ 120mm 2018 2016 2017 2017 2019 2018 2017 2016
Beamtrawl (BT2) 80 - 99mm 2018 2018 2016 2017 2019 2018 2017 2016
Gillnets & entangling 
nets
2017 2018 2016 2017 2019 2018 2017 2016
Hooks & lines 2017 2018 2017 2017 2016 2018 2017 2016
Handline 2017 2018 2017 2017 2019 2018 2017 2016
Pots 2018 2018 2017 2017 2019 2018 2016 2016
Traps 2018 2018 2017 2017 2019 2018 2016 2016
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6of these provisions allows for subjective interpretation. The most well-known example is the 
inconclusive debate on what constitutes “scientific evidence demonstrating high survival 
rates”. Is a survival rate of >50%, i.e. a greater proportion of fish is returned alive than dead 
after the catching process, a scientific sound argumentation? Or is the reasoning that all fish 
which are returned alive directly contribute to the stock biomass more appropriate, and thus 
favours that a much lower percentage should suffice to obtain an exemption. Similarly, how 
should both criteria “very difficult to improve selectivity” and “disproportionate costs” be in-
terpreted and scientifically demonstrated to support a de minimis exemption. Additionally, 
within the regulation it is not specified whether a de minimis applies to the TAC of a species 
or to the total catch of all quota species of a vessel, fleet or Member State. Given the exist-
ing uncertainties in the precise implementation of the discard ban, the results presented in 
this thesis will not precisely correspond to future observed changes in the dynamics of the 
fleet. Our model, however, is particularly suitable to evaluate conservation and economic 
trade-offs and visualize consequences of management scenarios. The model can be used to 
evaluate the consequences and explore the scope of responses in fisheries behaviour under 
different survival, de minimis or inter-species flexibilities scenarios. Eventually, science often 
cannot provide a single “true” value, but can provide insight in the potential consequenc-
es of choices, leaving the decision whether something is high, difficult or disproportionate 
with the fisheries managers.
A DRIVER FOR MORE SELECTIVE FISHERIES
Under a discard ban undersized or low value catches of quota regulated species will be de-
ducted from their annual quota at the expense of quota for marketable fish. This should 
be an incentive for fisheries to improve their species and size selectivity in order to reduce 
catches of unwanted fish. This reduction should lead to more sustainable exploitation of the 
resources, prevent the wasteful practice of discarding and improve the economic efficiency 
of the fisheries. 
Studies on gear selectivity have largely been focused on reducing the vulnerability of 
fish to be retained in the gear by technical modifications or the way the gear is operated (e.g. 
towing speed or tow duration) (Dahm et al., 2002, Catchpole and Gray, 2010). Gear modifica-
tions may consist of changing the configuration of the net by increasing mesh sizes (Briggs 
et al., 1999, van Marlen, 2003, Erzini et al., 2006) or by inserting square- or diamond-mesh 
escape panels (Stewart and Ferrell, 2002, Suuronen et al., 2005, Catchpole and Revill, 2008, 
Briggs, 2010) and separator and sorting grids (Polet, 2002, Graham and Fryer, 2006), but 
can also lead to the development of alternative fishing techniques such as the pulse trawl 
in the Dutch demersal fisheries (chapter 4) (van Marlen et al., 2014, Soetaert et al., 2015). In 
mixed fisheries the development of gear modifications can be challenging as improving the 
selectivity for a given species or size class can coincide with losses or additional retention 
of others (Polet, 2002, Stewart and Ferrell, 2002). For example, the use of a sorting grid in 
the North Sea brown shrimp fishery resulted in a large reduction of fish (70%) and benthos 
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6(65%) in the catch, but commercial fishers were not inclined of using the grid because the 
loss of marketable brown shrimp exceeded acceptable levels (Polet, 2002). Hence, a loss 
of marketable catches, and thus (in the short-term) a loss in economic profitability of the 
fishery is of particular concern as this may discourage fishers to use modified or alternative 
gears as well as to continue innovating. On the other hand, in chapter 4 I showed that pulse 
trawlers could spent more time at sea due to their higher economic profitability, resulting in 
a minimal differences in undersized catches with the conventional beam trawl. While the in-
novation provides the fleet with an economic advantage the expected ecological advantage 
of having a more selective fishing gear was reduced. 
Besides technical adaptations, selectivity can be improved by adapting fishing be-
haviour. Adaptations mainly relate to the spatial and temporal reallocation of fishing ac-
tivities. The spatial and temporal distribution of a fishing fleet is concordant with areas of 
high density of their target species, and thus targeting behaviour is reflected in the spatial 
distribution of the fleet relative to that of the fish stock (Quirijns et al., 2008). It is expected 
fisheries can reduce unwanted catches by actively reallocating fishing activities in relation 
to the spatial and temporal distribution of certain species, size or age classes. Fishers will 
gain knowledge on the annual migrations between spawning and feeding areas of their 
target species and can, to some extent, predict the large scale patterns in resource availa-
bility (Poos and Rijnsdorp, 2007). On a smaller scale, fish aggregate very likely in response 
to their food, which may only persist for a period of a few days up to two weeks (Poos and 
Rijnsdorp, 2007). Predicting the location of these patches is much more difficult and fishers 
have to sample the environment to find them. Indeed, many fishers have acquired knowl-
edge and information on the distribution of marketable fish (Catchpole et al., 2005) but have 
obtained limited information on the distribution of by-catch species or undersized fish. This 
is not surprising given unwanted catches could be discarded legally and thus had no added 
economic and informative value. In order to avoid and relocate fishing activities, knowledge 
and information on areas with high catch rates of juvenile or non-target species will need 
to be acquired and exchanged among fishers, as is observed in Scottish Fisheries (Eliasen et 
al., 2014). Also changes in the fishing process itself, , i.e. number of hauls or haul duration, 
could potentially reduce the amount of bycatch. However, such changes will find very little 
support from the fishing industry as they are expected to reduce the yield and increase 
labour on board the vessel.
A FISHERS PERSPECTIVE
Developing mitigation measures without taking account of the context in which the prob-
lem occurs could have unexpected and unwanted consequences, and undermine compli-
ance (Eliasen et al., 2014). In case of the discard ban, the European Parliament adopted the 
ban presuming it to be a remedy for the symptom of discarding, which often results from 
fisheries management itself, while insufficiently taking account of the driving factors that 
make fishers discard a part of their catch (Borges, 2015, Trapman and Kraan, 2015). In this 
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6context, policy makers view the discard ban as a “tool” to change current fishing practices 
in order to reduce wasteful practices, achieve more sustainable exploitation of resources 
and improve economic profitability of the fleet (Kraan and Verweij, 2016 ). While fishers may 
agree it is in their interest to reduce unwanted catches, they see no justification in doing so 
by having to land all catches of the quota managed species. 
As opposed to policy makers, fishers see neither ecological nor economic benefits re-
sulting from a discard ban. From an ecological point of view, landing undersized fish is against 
the norms and values of fishers as they are concerned about the additional mortality on the 
stocks, reducing potential future yield. Studies have shown that the probability of fish surviv-
ing the catching and sorting process on board is generally low and depends on factors such 
as gear type, substrate, tow duration and depth (Van Beek et al., 1990, Kaiser and Spencer, 
1995, Yergey et al., 2012; Sauls, 2014). Fishers, however, argue a large part of the catch must 
survive given the liveliness of the fish during processing on board as well as the ongoing 
increase in stock-sizes despite the high levels of discarding taking place. Also, discards are 
a food source for many scavenging seabirds, mammals and benthic fauna (Cook, 2003) and 
fishers are concerned that retaining the entire catch may have negative consequences for 
the population of these species. Heath et al. (2014) showed that cascading effects within the 
ecosystem may occur, but that the direction (i.e. positive or negative) of the cascading effects 
are much dependent on the exact implementation of the regulation as well as changes in 
fishing practices (e.g. improved selectivity). The ecological impact of the discard ban is poorly 
studied and as such poorly understood, which potentially fends envisaged benefits. 
Economically, fishers fear the discard ban will have a big influence on the profitability 
of their business and the industry as a whole. Undersized fish cannot be sold for human 
consumption and will be mainly processed into animal feed, fetching a low price (see chap-
ter 4) (Buisman et al., 2013). The revenue from selling these fish will not suffice to cover the 
additional costs incurred from processing the fish on board (i.e. labour, storing and icing) 
as well as on shore (i.e. unloading, sorting and transportation). Processing the entire catch 
on board will increase workload and force vessel owners to hire additional crew. Because 
in many fisheries the crew receives a fixed share of the net revenue the question is raised 
how additional crew will be remunerated. On one hand, dividing the fixed share among a 
larger crew will result in lower wages for individual crew members. Consequently, the costs 
for labour will remain largely unchanged, but it will be more difficult to hire crew. On the 
other hand, maintaining the wages of individual crew members will create additional costs 
for labour. Also, it is expected capacity problems will arise because the total catch exceeds 
the maximum capacity of the fish hold, resulting in increased costs from steaming back and 
forth to the fishing grounds. Finally, the fear of choke species ending fishing activities early 
in the year, losing catches and yield from other species for which quota are still available 
(chapter 2 and 4). In response policy makers and environmental organisations refer to the, 
in their opinion, objective of the discard ban, which is to incentivise more selective fisheries. 
However, as mentioned before improved selectivity is often associated with a loss of market-
able catches, and thus profitability of the fishery. 
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6Fisheries highly value tradition and independence, facing change with suspicion or 
even fear as change is often associate with an unknown future (Eayrs et al., 2015). They need 
to be convinced that changes as a result of management measures positively contribute to 
achieving ecological goals and will not result in economic losses or additional constraints. 
Uncertainty about the aim of measures or their own future gives rise to a feeling of tension 
and a reluctance to accept change (Verweij et al., 2010). In turn, reluctance to accept manage-
ment measures can lead to non-compliance (Eayrs et al., 2015). Chapter 3 of this thesis adds 
to the concern about the implications of the discard policy of the European Union (Borges, 
2015, Sardà et al., 2015). As small fish generally fetch a low price (Zimmermann and Heino, 
2013), imposing a discard ban will increase the incentives for illegal discarding. If quota are 
adjusted to include the formerly unaccounted bycatch, the discard ban may even result in an 
increase of fishing mortality jeopardising sustainable management. Behavioural decisions 
in terms of compliance with regulations is influenced by the perception of the severity of 
the fine complemented with the probability of being detected (Garoupa, 2001). Ensuring 
compliance to implemented measures or regulations requires effective and often stringent 
control and enforcement procedures by means of electronic monitoring (EM) using on board 
cameras (CCTV), large observer coverage or intense port monitoring. In some fisheries such 
as the British Columbia groundfish fishery (Branch and Hilborn, 2008) and New Zealand fish-
eries (Pierre et al., 2014 ) on board observers have been a critical component of maintaining 
the integrity of the fisheries management regime. The drawback, however, is that such pro-
cedures are labour intensive and expensive (Kraan et al., 2013), raising the question whether 
such procedures will be financed by the industry or government. Ultimately, fisheries man-
agement regimes that facilitate effective control and enforcement and minimize the incen-
tive to non-comply will be most effective in achieving management objectives.
Clearly, the fish fight campaign has put a finger on the weak spot in fisheries manage-
ment and brought the attention of the general public to the “wasteful practice” of discarding. 
As a result the discard ban is a regulation based on a political response to societal concerns 
instead of science based argumentation. As such, potential consequences are not well un-
derstood, which impedes a common understanding between policy makers and stakehold-
ers on how best to address the issue of discarding. The different and sometimes opposing 
perspectives on the aims and potential ecological and socioeconomic consequences of the 
regulation creates a parallel monologue between policy makers, environmental organisa-
tions and fishing industry (Kraan and Verweij, 2016 ). Different opinions in combination with 
the many uncertainties on the details of implementation frustrates the support of fishers 
and exposes fisheries managers to the risk the regulation results in unforeseen effects. The 
DSVM is a solid tool to analyse unexpected effects and therefore, can make an important 
contribution to the science based support of fisheries management which is aimed at reduc-
ing discarding. In addition, by making stakeholders part of the implementation process in 
an early stage (as well as after implementation) they can identify themselves with the prob-
lem, establishing a more general understanding of the urgency and improve acceptance of 
the measures being taken.
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6OUTLOOK
Since Hilborn’s (1985) seminal paper on fleet dynamics and individual variation within a 
fleet, fisheries scientist have acknowledged the importance of fisheries dynamics to achie-
ving successful fisheries management. However, to date policy makers and fisheries mana-
gers have largely neglected this component in their decision making. This thesis contributes 
and advocates the need to develop innovative analytical methodologies which deliver suf-
ficiently robust insights into complex socioeconomic and ecosystem issues to improve the 
basis of decision making.
As a contribution to the scientific underpinning of the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management I developed a simulation model which is generically applicable to study the 
implications of different management scenarios on the yield and impact of fishing activities. 
The models developed in this thesis provide a strong basis to explore possible unexpected 
effects of management measures resulting from the adaptive behaviour of fishers to these 
measures. It also provides an opportunity to involve fishers in the process by developing a 
common understanding of fishers behaviour.
The simulation model is only indicative on the short term dynamics. Because these dy-
namics will act on the system, they may potentially influence the long-term performance of 
management scenarios. To evaluate this influence, short term predictions should feed back 
into the model to inform the management system. For example, in this thesis predictions 
could be linked to existing stock assessment models and contribute to the improvement of 
mixed fisheries management. Exploring such interactions and feedbacks within the system 
as a whole is the goal of Management Strategy Evaluations (MSEs), which are essential to ad-
vice fisheries managers on the potential long-term performance of management measures 
(Sainsbury et al., 2000, Kell et al., 2007). 
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ADDENDUM
SUMMARY
SAMENVATTING
CURRICULUM VITAE
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
DANKWOORD
TRAINING AND SUPERVISION PLAN 
ASUMMARY
The European Common Fisheries Policy has received much criticism. In the first place for 
failing to implement effective management measures aimed at rebuilding and maintaining 
fish stocks at a sustainable level. In addition, it is said current fisheries policy fails to integrate 
the wider ecosystem effects of fishing into policy making, such as reducing pressure on non-
target species and habitats. Especially discarding (i.e. throwing back unwanted catches at 
sea) in commercial fisheries has received an increased amount of negative attention. Public 
campaigns stressed discarding is a wasteful and disruptive practice as natural resources are 
extracted from the ecosystem only to be thrown back to sea dead. In response, the European 
Commission agreed to enforce a discard ban for European fisheries, obliging all European 
fishing vessels to retain and land their entire catch, including small sized individuals, of all 
species subject to quota management.
This thesis explores how management measures can mitigate the adverse effects 
of fishing to support the development of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries man-
agement. I evaluate how fleet dynamics, i.e. the decision of individual skippers on when 
and where to fish, while competing for similar resources, may influence the performance of 
management measures. In particular the thesis focusses on how location choice and discard 
decisions made by individual fishers in a mixed fishery are influenced by management, re-
source distribution and technological innovations. Using a generic dynamic state variable 
model (DSVM), specific applications are built to address the behavioural dynamics for the 
Dutch North Sea flatfish fisheries and the French mixed demersal fisheries in the Channel in 
response to new management regulations and economic opportunities.
The first research chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) explores how a combination of 
quota management with a discard ban may improve the regulation of fishing mortality for 
a depleted stock that is exploited in a mixed fishery. Our finding show that under a discard 
ban, when properly enforced, individual fishers reallocate fishing effort away from areas 
and weeks with high catch rates of the quota constrained species, reducing over-quota dis-
carding and thus contributes to the conservation of vulnerable species. However, discard 
reduction measures which coincide with a reduction in the economic performance of the 
fishery may jeopardise compliance as fishers may trade-off economic gains of non-compli-
ance against the costs.
Fishers will discard marketable fish when quota are exhausted (over-quota discarding) 
or by trying to optimize their economic return by discarding size or age classes with the 
lowest economic value (high-grading). In chapter 3 observations of over-quota discarding 
and high-grading are reviewed to gain insight in the conditions under which discard deci-
sions may occur. The review suggest that high-grading occurs under different management 
systems for a large variety of fisheries worldwide. In addition, outcomes of the simulation 
model illustrate fishers have the ability to strategically plan their fishing activities to opti-
mize the composition of their catch taking account of the availability of quota and seasonal 
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Aprice variations. As a result, the size composition of the high-graded catch differs from the 
landed catch. Difficulties in accounting for this difference may undermine the accuracy of 
the stock assessments and quality of scientific advice.
Chapter 4 addresses the question how a ban on discarding may promote the transi-
tion towards more selective fishing gears. Model results suggest that under a discard ban, 
fishing activities are restricted and reallocated away from areas and weeks of high catches 
of small fish constrained by quota. Activities are allocated to areas and weeks where a maxi-
mum revenue can be realised landing other species and economically more valuable length 
classes of the quota restricted species.  When using more selective fishing gear, fishing ac-
tivities will be less restricted. Fewer small fish are landed which would otherwise be count-
ed against the quota, fetching a low price and reduce the economic value of the landings. 
Hence, there is an economic advantage and fishers can continue fishing for a longer period 
of time, including areas where a higher density of small fish as well as more economically 
valuable fish co-occur. As such, if properly enforced, a discard ban can incentivise the use of 
more selective gear to reduce the catch of undersized fish.
Trawl fisheries targeting demersal fish and shellfish cause mortality on target and 
non-target species, but impact benthic ecosystems. Fisheries managers mainly resort to 
technical management measures, such as gear restrictions or spatial measures to mitigate 
these impacts. Chapter 5 explores the potential of a habitat credit system as an alternative 
management approach to achieve sustainable exploitation of target species while minimiz-
ing the impact on the benthic ecosystem. Results show that a habitat credit system has the 
potential to reduce the benthic impact and maintain profitable fisheries as vessels can adjust 
their behaviour by reallocating fishing activities to make optimal use of the available credits. 
Fishers can adapt and change their behaviour in relation to imposed constraints, 
which can lead to unintended and unexpected consequences of fisheries management. 
To date, the effect of behavioural adaptations of individual fishers on the success of fisher-
ies management is often overlooked by policymakers. The models developed in this thesis 
provide a strong basis to explore possible unexpected effects of management measures 
resulting from the adaptive behaviour of fishers to these measures. Outcomes of this the-
sis draw attention to the importance of making fleet dynamics an integral part of fisheries 
management and the need to develop innovative analytical methodologies which deliver 
sufficiently robust insights into complex socioeconomic and ecosystem issues to improve 
the basis of decision making. 
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Het Europees Gemeenschappelijk Visserijbeleid heeft veel kritiek te verduren. In de eerste 
plaats omdat de genomen beheersmaatregelen onvoldoende zouden bijdragen aan het 
herstel en behoud van visbestanden. Daarnaast slaagt men er niet in om de ecosysteemef-
fecten van visserij in het visserijbeleid te integreren, zoals het verminderen van de bijvangst 
van niet commerciële soorten en de impact op de zeebodem. Met name het teruggooien 
van ongewenste vangsten in zee (discarden) in de commerciële visserij krijgt in toenemen-
de mate negatieve aandacht. Publieke campagnes benadrukte de voedselverspilling en 
verstorende effecten in het ecosysteem door het onttrekken van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
om ze daarna weer terug, vaak dood, terug te gooien in zee. Als reactie heeft de Europese 
Commissie in 2013 ingestemd met de invoering van een teruggooiverbod voor de Europese 
visserij. Dit houd in dat de meeste Europese visserijen verplicht worden om alle vangsten 
van soorten waarvoor een vangstbeperking is ingesteld zowel de marktwaardige als niet-
marktwaardige vis aangeland moet worden.
Dit proefschrift verkent hoe beheersmaatregelen negatieve effecten van de visserij 
kunnen beperken en bij kunnen dragen aan de ontwikkeling van een ecosysteembenade-
ring van het visserijbeheer. Echter, de effectiviteit van beheersmaatregelen kan beïnvloed 
worden door de dynamiek van de vloot. Deze dynamiek komt tot stand door keuzes die 
individuele schippers maken met betrekking tot welke soorten, waar en wanneer te bevis-
sen. Het is dus van belang om te begrijpen hoe de beheersmaatregelen de dynamiek van de 
vloot beïnvloed. Dit proefschrift beschrijft voornamelijk hoe de locatiekeuze van de visseri-
jactiviteit en de beslissing wanneer en welk gedeelte van de vangst te discarden beïnvloed 
wordt door maatregelen in het visserijbeleid, de ruimtelijke en tijdelijke verspreiding van de 
visbestanden en technologische innovaties. Er is een “dynamic state variable model” gebrui-
kt, en specifiek toegepast om het effect van nieuwe beheersmaatregelen en economische 
kansen voor de Nederlandse platvisvisserij op de Noordzee en de Franse gemengde bodem-
visserij in het Kanaal inzichtelijke te maken. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) beschrijft hoe een combi-
natie van vangstbeperkingsmaatregelen (quota) met een teruggooiverbod kan leiden tot 
een betere regulatie van visserijsterfte voor een uitgeput visbestand geëxploiteerd in een 
gemengde visserij (visserij waar meerdere soorten tegelijk bevist worden). Onze bevindin-
gen tonen aan dat onder het teruggooiverbod individuele vissers hun activiteit verplaatsen 
weg uit gebieden en weken met hoge bijvangsten van soorten met een strikte vangstbep-
erking. Als gevolg werd er ook minder gediscard en kunnen we stellen dat  een teruggoo-
iverbod, mits goed gehandhaafd, bij kan dragen aan het behoud van kwetsbare soorten. 
Echter, vissers zullen de economische voordelen van het niet-naleven van de regelgeving 
afzetten tegen de kosten. Discard reductie maatregelen die gepaard gaan met een afname 
in de economische prestaties van de vloot kunnen dan ook de naleving van de regelgeving 
in gevaar brengen. 
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AVissers zullen marktwaardige vis discarden wanneer het quota uitgeput is (over-quo-
ta discarding) of wanneer ze trachten hun economische rendement te optimaliseren door 
de lengte en leeftijdsklassen met de laagste economische waarde (high-grading) geduren-
de het jaar te discarden. Om inzicht te krijgen in de voorwaarden waarbij over-quota dis-
cards en high-grading mogelijk plaatsvinden, bevat hoofdstuk 3 een literatuuronderzoek 
naar observaties van beide vormen van discarden. Het literatuuronderzoek suggereert dat 
high-grading onder verschillende vormen van visserijbeheer en ook wereldwijd voorkomt. 
Daarnaast laat een modelsimulatie zien dat vissers hun activiteiten strategisch kunnen plan-
nen. Ze zijn in staat de vangstsamenstelling te optimaliseren door rekening te houden met 
de beschikbaarheid van quota en seizoensgebonden prijsschommelingen. Als gevolg is de 
grootte samenstelling van de vangst anders dan de samenstelling van de vis die daadw-
erkelijk aangevoerd wordt. Moeilijkheden bij het vaststellen van deze verschillen, kunnen 
de nauwkeurigheid van de bestandsschattingen en de kwaliteit van het wetenschappelijk 
advies ondermijnen.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt beschreven hoe een teruggooiverbod de transitie naar selec-
tiever vistuig kan bevorderen. Resultaten uit het simulatiemodel tonen aan dat een terug-
gooiverbod de visserijactiviteiten beperkt. Visserijactiviteiten verplaatsen zich weg uit geb-
ieden en weken met hoge bijvangsten van kleine vis voor soorten met een vangstbeperking 
naar gebieden en weken waar een maximale opbrengst gerealiseerd kan worden door het 
aanlanden van andere soorten en economisch meer waardevolle lengteklassen. Vissers die 
gebruik maken van een selectiever vistuig zullen minder beperkt worden in hun activiteit-
en. Er wordt minder kleine vis aangevoerd waardoor het quotum langer behouden blijft en 
gebruikt kan worden voor aanvoer van economische meer waardevolle lengteklassen. Er 
is dus een economisch voordeel en vissers kunnen langer doorgegaan met vissen, waarbij 
ook gebieden bevist kunnen worden waar zowel een hogere dichtheid aan klein vis alsook 
economisch meer waardevolle vis voorkomen. Als zodanig, mits goed gehandhaafd. kan 
een teruggooiverbod het gebruik van selectiever vistuig stimuleren om de vangst van on-
dermaatse vis te beperken. 
De trawlvisserij, boomkor-, dredge- en bordenvisserij gericht op demersale vis- en 
schelpdieren heeft naast directe sterfte op doelsoorten en soorten die geen commerciële 
waarde hebben ook een effect op het bodemecosysteem. Het beheren van deze effecten 
gebeurt vaak aan de hand van technische maatregelen. Er zijn ook alternatieve beheers-
maatregelen voorgesteld. In hoofdstuk 5 zijn de mogelijkheden van een “habitat credit sys-
teem” als een alternatieve benadering voor het minimaliseren van de effecten van visserij 
op het bodemecosysteem onderzocht. Het onderzoek laat zien dat bij een habitat credit 
systeem schippers optimaal gebruik kunnen maken van de beschikbare credits door hun lo-
catiekeuze aan te passen. Een habitat credit systeem heeft dus de potentie om effecten van 
visserij op het bodemecosysteem te verminderen en daarbij ook de economische prestaties 
van de visserij te behouden.  
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AVissers zijn in staat zich aan te passen en andere keuzes te maken als gevolg van bep-
erkingen die er opgelegd worden door het visserijbeheer. Dit kan onverwachte en onbe-
doelde gevolgen hebben. Echter, beleidsmakers zien de invloed van gedragsaanpassingen 
op de effectiviteit van het visserijbeheer vaak over het hoofd. De simulatiemodellen in dit 
proefschrift bieden een sterke basis om mogelijke onverwachte effecten van maatregelen 
als gevolg van adaptief gedrag van vissers te verkennen Uitkomsten van dit proefschrift 
vestigen de aandacht op het belang om de dynamiek van de vissersvloot een integraal on-
derdeel te maken van het visserijbeheer. Ook benadrukt het proefschrift de noodzaak om 
innovatieve analytische methoden te ontwikkelen die inzicht kunnen leveren in complexe 
sociaaleconomische en ecosysteem vraagstukken zodat er een betere besluitvorming kan 
plaatsvinden en effectieve beheersmaatregelen ontwikkeld kunnen worden. 
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